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Hildebrand, Tyler William (Ph.D., Philosophy)
Empiricism, Natural Regularity, and Necessity
Thesis directed by Professor Michael Tooley
This dissertation has two parts. In the first, I set out and defend a new empirical method of
practicing metaphysics. The method avoids appeals to intuitions, ordinary beliefs, and the like.
It does not accept basic principles of simplicity, unity, and the like. Instead, it proceeds from
logic, analytic principles, and immediate experience alone. In the second part of my dissertation,
I apply this method to the philosophy of laws of nature. I argue that there are excellent empirical
reasons to accept governing laws instead of laws that reduce to other features of the world, such
as natural regularities or facts about bare dispositions. The central idea is that observed natu-
ral regularities constitute strong evidence in favor of governing laws and against all competing
theories. Further, I argue that the only intelligible account of governing laws is one according to
which the connection between law and regularity is an irreducible necessary connection. Thus,
the second part of my dissertation constitutes a new argument for metaphysically interesting a
posteriori necessities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Natural necessities, if there are any, are special. They are unlike normal empirical facts in
that they must (in at least some sense of ‘must’) be true. Compare ‘the stone must fall if unsus-
pended’ with ‘the stone is heavy’. They are unlike the propositions of mathematics and logic in
that they are conceivably false. We can imagine the stone to float in midair without contradiction;
we cannot imagine 2 + 2 = 4 to be false, no matter our effort. In the case of mathematics and logic,
we (or at least most philosophers) find the necessity involved to be clear and accessible; we don’t
find serious epistemic problems in holding such propositions to be necessarily true. The same
cannot be said for natural necessity.1 In this case, we can’t “see” that the propositions are true
just by thinking about them or by examining their meaning or logical form. Something else is
required. Many philosophers have thought that this something else can’t possibly be empirical. I
shall argue that they are mistaken.
This project has two basic parts. In the first part, I set forth and defend an empirical method
of practicing metaphysics. The method does not appeal to intuitions, ordinary beliefs, and the
like. It does not accept basic principles of simplicity, unity, and the like. Instead, I argue that the
practice of metaphysics can proceed from logic, analytic principles, and immediate experience
alone. I believe that the defense of this method is the most important contribution of this project,
1 For the moment, I am not assuming that natural necessities are distinct from metaphysical necessities, though
perhaps they are. What is important for the moment is that natural necessities are synthetic rather than analytic.
2but I won’t discuss it in any detail in this chapter. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to explain
my very general approach to thinking about the philosophy of laws of nature. The reason for this
is that metaontological problems are most easily explained in the context of a particular issue in
ontology. The chapter provides that context.
In the second part of this project, I apply the method to argue that observed natural regu-
larities constitute decisive evidence for governing laws of nature. Further, I argue that governing
laws must be understood as involving irreducible synthetic necessities. Hence, my argument for
governing laws of nature constitutes a new argument for metaphysically interesting a posteriori
necessities.
1.2 Natural Regularities
As one with empiricist inclinations, I believe that our access to laws of nature begins with
our observations of the natural world. Our world has a very interesting feature: it is full of natural
regularities, which is to say (roughly) that our experiences of the world can be systematized using
general principles, that types of experiences occur in certain repeated patterns.2 For example,
every rock we have ever observed here on Earth falls to the ground when it is unsuspended. Stones
dropped into ponds always create a wave pattern of concentric circles. We have observed regular-
ities as far as observation takes us, at both macro and micro levels. Of course, some regularities
are not immediately obvious. It took us quite some time to recognize the correlation between
genes and macroscopic physical traits of living organisms. And sometimes we are mistaken about
particular regularities. For a long time, everyone believed that the universe was Newtonian. The
Eddington experiments—which revealed a particular irregularity from the perspective of the New-
tonian theory—gave us reason to doubt this theory. Newton’s theory was widely rejected, but the
view that the world is regular was not. Instead, a new theory, Einstein’s theory of relativity, took
its place, and allowed us to better systematize our observations of particular facts into a general
system. Though Newton’s theory was rejected due to the fact that some of the regularities it pos-
2 I shall offer a more careful definition of natural regularity in Chapter 5.
3tulated were false, we did not abandon our belief that the world is regular, that our world can be
systematized using a set of general principles.
My basic approach to solving philosophical problems concerning laws of nature is to focus
on natural regularities. After all, the feature of the world that makes the process of systemati-
zation possible, regularity, is somewhat incredible. If the repeated patterns or generalizations
weren’t finite, or if they were too large, we could not systematize them. If the world weren’t reg-
ular at all, we could not systematize our observations into any sort of useful system. Thus I take
natural regularities to be the natural starting point for any discussion on laws of nature. They
are our basic evidence, our epistemic contact with laws (or whatever it is that explains or is re-
sponsible for regularities). In fact, I believe that regularities constitute strong evidence in favor of
some theories of laws and against others. This evidence has been neglected by most philosophers
working in the area of laws of nature.
1.3 Theories of Laws
Recently, most of the debate concerning laws of nature has focused on five rather narrow
theories. The first is the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory according to which laws are atomic
states of affairs, consisting of second-order external relations between first-order universals, that
entail or probabilify regularities (see (Dretske 1977), (Tooley 1977), and (Armstrong 1983)). The
second is John Carroll’s (1994) view that laws, though they are states of affairs distinct from reg-
ularities that entail or probabilify regularities, cannot be given any further analysis. The third
is that laws reduce to or supervene on regularities in a Humean base (one that, at a minimum,
does not involve any synthetic necessary connections). This is Hume’s view, and has recently been
defended by (Lewis 1994), (Loewer 1996), (Earman and Roberts 2005a), (Earman and Roberts
2005b), (Schaffer 2008), and (Beebee 2000). The fourth is that laws reduce to regularities of a very
special sort: namely, regularities over a Non-Humean base in which (at least some) natural prop-
erties are taken to be bare dispositions, properties with a special sort of intrinsic modal character.
(Bird 2007) and (Ellis 2001) have recently defended versions of this view. The fifth, defended by
4(van Fraassen 1989), is that there simply are no laws. One way to get a clearer understanding of
laws of nature is to carefully consider each of these competitors and determine which is best. But
this method is problematic in certain respects. For one, it tends to encourage arguments that are
very narrow in scope, applying only to the narrow theories above. Though not a philosophical
problem, this makes the dialectic of the philosophy of laws of nature somewhat difficult to follow.
For another, the theories explained above are not exhaustive. There are other possible theories of
laws, some of which deserve careful attention. As we shall see in the next chapter, this situation is
problematic because it makes genuine confirmation of such theories in light of relevant evidence
difficult, if not impossible.
Fortunately, these problems can be remedied rather easily. One simply has to offer general
definitions of theories that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. I prefer to do so as
follows. Every theory of laws of nature can be placed into one of four categories generated by two
distinctions. These distinctions have been chosen carefully, though the reasons for drawing them
in this way will not become fully clear until later chapters. The first crucial distinction is between
Humeanism and Non-Humeanism.
Humeanism: a proposition is necessarily true (false) if and only if it is true (false) in virtue of its
meaning or logical form (that is, if and only if it is analytically true (false)).
Non-Humeanism: Humeanism is false; some synthetic propositions are necessarily true.
Humeanism entails that there are no synthetic necessities. The Humean has no trouble explaining
why it is a necessary truth that Fa&Ga entails Fa. This is a simple case of logical entailment. How-
ever, suppose now that a , b, F , G, and F andG refer to logically distinct properties. The Humean
will find the suggestion that Fa entails Gb unintelligible.3 This is the sort of necessary connection
that Humeanism denies but Non-Humeanism (may) allow; it is a basic necessity, not analyzable in
terms of meaning or logical form. Thus, Humeanism accepts, whereas Non-Humeanism rejects,
3 I am, for the moment, ignoring Tooley’s (1987) speculative explanation of the entailment that holds between law
and regularity. However, in Chapter 4 I shall argue that Humeanism is incompatible with the thesis that laws govern.
5the following dichotomy: all and only necessary propositions are analytic; all and only contingent
propositions are synthetic. Ultimately, I shall be defending a version of Non-Humeanism.
(I used to think that Non-Humeanism could be defined in terms of de re necessities. I now
think that this way of drawing the distinction is problematic. While the de re / de dicto distinction
is both interesting (see (Fine 1978)) and relevant to our purposes, it is too narrow. There are de
dicto propositions that are unacceptable from the Humean perspective, such as the proposition
that necessarily, nothing travels faster than the speed of light. The Humean will be skeptical of this
proposition despite the fact that it is de dicto. It is synthetic. No necessary connection can be
discovered between the concepts of velocity and light; there is no relevant relation between ideas.
The necessity must be taken as a brute, bare, irreducible necessity. Hume did not like such neces-
sities, and thus it would be misleading to characterize any view that accepted them as ‘Humean’.)
The second crucial distinction is between Governing and Descriptive (or Non-Governing) the-
ories of laws. A very rough way to draw this distinction is as follows: according to a descriptive
theory of laws, laws (if there are any) merely describe the world, so the laws depend on the regu-
larities they describe; according to a governing theory of laws, however, laws actively “shape” the
world, so the regularities depend on the laws. More precisely:
Governing Laws: (a) Laws are states of affairs distinct from regularities that entail (or probabilify)
regularities, and (b) there is at least one law.
Descriptive Laws: There are no governing laws; if there are any laws at all, they reduce to or super-
vene on other features of the world (such as facts about regularities or bare dispositions).
Of course, these are not the only distinctions relevant to laws of nature, but these are the distinc-
tions relevant to the matter of whether there are any synthetic necessities. Further distinctions
may be easily introduced later within the context of the four available types of theories generated
by the above two distinctions, but these four theories are the primary focus of this project. I shall
now offer a quick explanation of the four possible theories of laws of nature and situate them
within recent literature.
6Descriptive Humeanism accepts Humeanism and Descriptive Laws. The view has two promi-
nent versions: those theories that hold that there are laws (reductionism), and those theories that
hold that there are not (anti-realism). David Hume, David Lewis (1973) and (1994), van Fraassen
(1989), Loewer (1996), and Earman and Roberts (2005a) and (2005b) are all Descriptive Humeans.
They all accept a Humean ontology and reject the thesis that laws govern.
Governing Humeanism accepts Humeanism and Governing Laws. This is the view of Arm-
strong (1983), Tooley (1987), and Dretske (1977).4 Ultimately, I shall argue that Governing
Humeanism is internally inconsistent on the grounds that the necessary connection between law
and regularity must be taken as primitive, and is thus incompatible with Humeanism.
Descriptive Non-Humeanism accepts Non-Humeanism and Descriptive Laws. Like its Humean
counterpart, it comes in both reductionist ((Fales 1990), (Ellis 2001) (perhaps), and (Bird 2007))
and anti-realist (Mumford 2004) varieties. Versions of such theories are often called dispositional
essentialism or necessitarianism since they generally hold that the modal properties that ground
laws—that is, dispositional properties—are dispositions essential to the objects that instantiate
them, and they have the implication that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary.
Finally, there is the view that I prefer, Governing Non-Humeanism, which accepts Non-
Humeanism and Governing Laws. The entailment between law and regularity is analyzed as a
synthetic necessary connection. There are different ways that one could accept such a view. One
could hold that the analysis of laws make reference to some particular. For example, Isaac Newton
and George Berkeley both thought that God was in some sense responsible for the laws of nature.
The idea here is that a law is a sort of preference in the mind of God that the world be thus and so;
that preference is a state of affairs distinct from regularities, and (for some preferences) it entails
regularities. Alternatively, it may be that the world as a whole possesses a grand disposition that
is responsible for the regularities of the world (this is one way of interpreting Ellis’s (2001) own
view). Alternatively, one could hold that there is an analysis of the concept of laws that makes no
4 It is less clear that Dretske accepts Humeanism, though his (1977) claim that nomic necessitation is “an extensional
relation” suggests this reading. Since he is not as explicit in his endorsement of Humeanism, I shall usually just
attribute the Governing Humean view to Tooley and Armstrong.
7reference to particulars; this would be the case if one followed Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong
in thinking that laws are irreducible relations between universals (but did not follow them in
thinking that the connection involves no irreducible necessity). Finally, one could hold that there
is no analysis of the concept of laws beyond the idea that laws are states of affairs distinct from
regularities that entail (or probabilify) regularities (this is more or less Carroll’s (1994) view). For
the most part I shall ignore these narrower distinctions.
As mentioned earlier, the distinctions between the four general theories of laws are rel-
evant to the problem of whether there are any synthetic necessities. The distinction between
Humeanism and Non-Humeanism merely captures the two sides of this problem. The distinc-
tion between Governing and Descriptive theories is relevant because some philosophers (Tooley
and Armstrong) have claimed that their Humean theories (remember, they are Humeans in that
they reject synthetic necessity, but they are not Humeans about laws in the traditional sense of
the word) have explanatory power with respect to the regularities of the natural world; that is,
they claim that the probability of a world full of regularities given Governing Humeanism is
just as high as the probability of a world full of regularities given Governing Non-Humeanism.
If their claim is correct, then the matter of using natural regularities as evidence in favor of
Non-Humeanism becomes significantly more complicated and controversial. Thus the matter
of whether there are any synthetic necessities cannot (in the context of my argument) be detached
from the metaphysics of laws of nature. Ultimately, my thesis is that Governing Non-Humeanism
is preferable to all of the alternatives.
1.4 Chapter Outlines
In Chapter 2, I explain my basic approach to solving metaphysical problems. I assume a ver-
sion of empiricism according to which all descriptive concepts are formed on the basis of the im-
mediately observable, and according to which the justification of synthetic principles is ultimately
grounded in the immediately observable. I argue that nomological concepts require theoretical
analyses. I then explain the following three technical apparatuses: the Ramsey/Lewis method of
8defining theoretical terms, a probabilistic method of empirical confirmation, and a version of Car-
nap’s logical interpretation of probability. Finally, I explain how a properly constrained synthesis
of these methods allows for the practice of genuine metaphysics. In short, I argue that the practice
of metaphysics can proceed from immediate observation and analytic principles alone.
In Chapter 3, I offer a preliminary defense of Non-Humeanism by arguing that there is
nothing problematic with the idea of irreducible synthetic necessity. I do so by offering an anal-
ysis of the sort of synthetic necessity characteristic of Non-Humeanism that is compatible with
the version of empiricism I set out in Chapter 2 (it is a very “thin” analysis, capturing both a
priori and a posteriori necessity). I then argue that, given the intelligibility of Non-Humeanism,
the intrinsic character of Governing Non-Humeanism makes it a priori just as likely as Descrip-
tive Humeanism. In short, I argue that there is no reason (even for the empiricist) to prejudice
Governing Non-Humeanism on the grounds that it incorporates synthetic necessity.
In Chapter 4, I consider Tooley’s Humean-consistent account of the necessary connection
between governing law and regularity and argue that it fails. I then argue that Governing Humeanism
is self-contradictory. The argument is based on the idea that it is impossible to offer a Humean
analysis of the entailment that holds between governing laws and regularities. The only possible
necessary connection between the two is synthetic. Thus, all versions of Humeanism are commit-
ted to Descriptive Laws. The result is that Governing Non-Humeanism is superior to Governing
Humeanism.
In Chapter 5, I provide the basic empirical argument against Descriptive Humeanism. This
argument is based on the fact that Descriptive Humeanism, unlike Governing Non-Humeanism,
lacks explanatory power with respect to the regularities of the natural world. Since the con-
clusion of Chapter 3 is that Governing Non-Humeanism is a priori just as likely as Descriptive
Humeanism, Bayes’ theorem can be used to show that Descriptive Humeanism is a posteriori
much less likely to be true than Governing Non-Humeanism. Thus, regularities do more than just
give rise to our concept of laws of nature; they can actually be used to demonstrate that certain
theories of laws are a posteriori unlikely.
9In Chapter 6, I complete the argument for Governing Non-Humeanism by comparing it to
Descriptive Non-Humeanism. I begin by comparing the a priori probabilities of these theories.
Next, I argue that observed regularities must be understood to be regularities among categor-
ical properties (that is, among properties that are not bare dispositions). Finally, I argue that
Descriptive Non-Humeanism has no explanatory power over such regularities; it is only able to
explain regularities that hold among properties that are bare dispositions. Since Governing Non-
Humeanism does provide a good explanation of regularities holding among categorical proper-
ties, it is the preferred view. Thus, if my methodology set out in Chapter 2 is correct, the final
result is that Governing Non-Humeanism is the theory that is best supported by our empirical
observations.
In Chapter 7, I provide a summary of the overall argument for Governing Non-Humeanism
and discuss some metaontological implications of my empirical method of practicing metaphysics.
Chapter 2
Methodology
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I defend an empirical method of practicing metaphysics. The method avoids
appeals to intuitions, ordinary beliefs, scientific theories, and the like. It does not accept ba-
sic principles of simplicity, unity, and the like. Instead, it proceeds from logic, analytic princi-
ples, and immediate experience alone. It shows that, contrary to common belief, (something like)
British empiricism allows for the practice of a robust metaphysics. Though the primary aim of
the method is to show how a traditionally empirical metaphysics can be vindicated, the method
should be of interest to all metaphysicians. The core of the method demonstrates that immediate
experiences are relevant to metaphysical theories, and this core is consistent with many episte-
mological positions. Thus a very interesting conclusion is preserved even if many of the central
assumptions of this project are rejected: that immediate experiences are relevant to metaphysical
theories, and thus that metaphysics can be empirically informed without appealing to realistically
interpreted scientific theories.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains my epistemological assumptions,
which are essentially those of British empiricism. Section 2.3 discusses epistemic challenges to the
practice of metaphysics unique to this version of empiricism. Most importantly, such empiricists
must demonstrate how we can form metaphysically interesting concepts and how appearances
(the things given in experience) constitute evidence for metaphysical theories (theories about the
world itself). Section 2.4 introduces the tools and methods required for my empirical method.
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Section 2.5 synthesizes these resources and demonstrates how the resulting method defeats the
reasons for skepticism concerning genuine metaphysics. The central idea is that there are analytic
truths of the form if the world is in observable state O then there is a certain probability that meta-
physical theory W , a theory about the world itself, is true. We can know these conditionals a priori.
Then, for certain O, we can confirm that the world is in state O and infer that there is a certain
probability that theory W is true. In the Appendix to this chapter, I explain my stance on the
methodological relevance of intuitions and ontological economy.
2.2 Epistemological Assumptions
The purpose of this section is to introduce the epistemological assumptions of this project.
In the next section I shall explain some challenges to the practice of metaphysics specific to the
epistemological position introduced in the present section.
I assume a robust analytic/synthetic distinction according to which a sentence is analytic if
and only if it is true (false) in virtue of its meaning or logical form, and synthetic otherwise.
I assume a foundationalist epistemology according to which all inferentially justified beliefs
are justified on the basis of non-inferentially justified beliefs. The nature of non-inferentially
justified beliefs is explained by the assumptions that follow.
I assume two different empiricist theses. The first, concept empiricism, holds that all de-
scriptive (that is, non-logical) concepts are either given in immediate experience or analyzable
in terms of concepts given in immediate experience. The second, doxastic empiricism, holds that,
ultimately, all justification of synthetic propositions is on the basis of immediate experience.1
Thus all non-inferentially justified beliefs concerning synthetic propositions must be justified on
the basis of immediate experience. But what account is given of immediate experience?
I assume that the objects of immediate experience are sense data (or qualia, though for our
purposes it doesn’t matter which). This assumption is important for two reasons. First, it provides
1 Note that the latter thesis may need to be tempered slightly to fit with the other assumptions—most importantly,
the assumption that we have justification for the truth of certain logical principles. However, there are good dialectical
reasons for initially using this thesis in its strongest form.
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a suitable foundation for both concept empiricism and doxastic empiricism. Given that the objects
of immediate experience are sense data, it follows both that we can form clear and distinct con-
cepts of them and that beliefs about them are non-inferentially justified. Not surprisingly, then, it
is natural to adopt an internalist account of the language of metaphysical inquiry. Just as we stand
in a privileged epistemic relation to our immediate experiences, so we shall stand in a privileged
epistemic relation to the semantic content of the terms used to describe those experiences. This
places us in the position to analyze the different terms in our language (or, as I shall sometimes
speak, the different concepts we possess) for analytical connections. Second, this assumption en-
tails that there is a sharp distinction between the objects of perception and the external world. In
other words, it drives a wedge between appearance and reality.
Finally, I assume that we have good reason to believe that some particular system of logic
is correct (it does not matter which, as long as the system provides sufficient resources for the
technical apparatuses introduced later), or at least that we have good reason to accept certain
basic rules of inference. This assumption is indispensable. Among other reasons, it is required for
the justification of inferentially justified beliefs. One might worry that it undermines the claim
to be offering an empirical method, since it can be argued that the matter of choosing the correct
system of logic requires synthetic a priori reasoning (and thus that the assumption of doxastic
empiricism requires modification). Perhaps this is true. But it does not reflect the practices of
the many empiricists who appeal to logical principles (in support of epistemic reasons) in their
various levels of inquiry. And, even if it were true, a moderate empiricism that endorses the
synthetic a priori only for such matters could still proceed in accordance with the method without
introducing any additional synthetic a priori justification.
For later reference, let empirical foundationalism be the position that accepts the above as-
sumptions. This is essentially the view of the early-modern British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume.2 (I decided not to call my position British empiricism because I do not intend to be
reconstructing or interpreting the views of the British empiricists. That said, I do believe that my
2 It is also, more or less, Bertrand Russell’s view; see for example (Russell 1912, chapter 5).
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position is essentially the same as theirs.) Since Hume, many philosophers have thought that this
epistemic position precludes the practice of metaphysics. In the next section I shall explain why.
Before continuing, I want to make an important disclaimer. In assuming empirical founda-
tionalism, I am making some very strong epistemological assumptions. However, the core of the
method I shall defend does not in fact require empirical foundationalism. Thus, although em-
pirical foundationalism deserves careful scrutiny, this is not the place for such scrutiny. Suppose
we weakened some of the assumptions. Suppose we rejected concept empiricism, doxastic em-
piricism, and the analytic/synthetic distinction. The method would not then show that a purely
empirical metaphysics is possible, but it would show that metaphysics can be empirically informed
in a special way; namely, it would show that immediate experiences are relevant to metaphysical
theories. Thus the method I shall defend should be of interest even to those metaphysicians who
do not share my epistemological assumptions.
2.3 An Argument Against Empirical Metaphysics
This section quickly sketches a familiar Humean (“Humean” in the sense that it is due to
Hume, not in the sense that it presupposes Humeanism) argument against the possibility of meta-
physics that is based on the distinction between appearance and reality accepted by empirical
foundationalism.
It is difficult to say exactly what metaphysics is, but for our purposes the following char-
acterization shall suffice. Metaphysics is the area of study concerned with questions such as the
following: does God exist? is there cause and effect in the world? what is the nature of cause and
effect? are there properties? what is the nature of properties? are there minds? what is the nature
of mind? are there features of the world that answer to modal concepts? what is their nature?
These are questions that appear to resist scientific answers, and so the empiricist must have a
different empirical method in order to answer them.3
3 This is not to say that scientific theories are irrelevant to metaphysics. However, my view is that scientific
theories—that is, scientific theories with all their philosophical baggage (or adornments) removed—are essentially
just systematizations of observation statements. In order for such a systematization to become relevant to metaphysics,
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On the surface, the paradigm metaphysical questions listed above are questions not about
mere appearances (they aren’t questions about sense data or qualia), but rather about reality,
the world itself. According to my assumptions, we do not immediately observe the the world
itself, much less its metaphysical entities. At the very least, we do not discern the nature of
supernatural phenomena, causal relations,4 time, modal relations between contingent entities,
and the like through immediate observation. Regardless, the upshot is that matters metaphysical
are not resolved through immediate observation. The questions of metaphysics just aren’t about
that which can be given in immediate experience. Whatever account is given of appearances, it
does not entirely capture the subject matter of metaphysics, because there is an epistemic gap
between appearance (the foundation for all our descriptive concepts) and reality. Accordingly,
one problem for empirical foundationalism is that it needs to provide an account of theoretical
concepts that is consistent with concept empiricism; otherwise, we can’t even talk about reality,
much less have justification for beliefs about it.5
(Note: For this reason, many philosophers have thought that empiricists who practice meta-
physics are merely engaged in conceptual analysis. If we like, we can distinguish genuine meta-
physics from metaphysics as conceptual analysis as follows: genuine metaphysics makes claims
about the world itself, for example, God himself, causes themselves, etc.; metaphysics as con-
ceptual analysis does not, restricting itself to claims about our concepts of God, causes, etc. There
is a gap between our epistemological foundation—the non-inferentially justified beliefs about our
experiences—and the world itself. Genuine metaphysics requires the gap to be bridged; meta-
physics as conceptual analysis does not.)
Another, perhaps more serious, problem is that many philosophers have thought that bridg-
ing the gap between appearance and reality is impossible, at least for the empirical foundation-
it must first be given a philosophical interpretation. However, interpreting scientific theories in a way that is relevant
to metaphysics is very close to metaphysics itself, if it is not the very same thing.
4 Pace Anscombe (1971), Armstrong (1983), and Fales (1990, Chapter 1). My opinion is that these philosophers have
not succeeded in countering Hume’s well-known argument to the effect that causal relations are not observable (found
in Section IV of the Enquiry). More on this later.
5 This would be so even if Berkeleyan idealism were true. For in that case, one could not recognize the objectivity of
appearances without theoretical concepts, nor could one give an account of the theory itself: namely, that appearance
is reality.
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alist. That is, they have thought that appearances cannot justify beliefs about reality—that ap-
pearances radically underdetermine the nature of reality. The basic reasons may be expressed as
follows. On one hand, it seems that analytic principles aren’t suited to the task at hand. Analytic
propositions don’t entail synthetic propositions, and ‘the gap between appearance and reality
is bridged’ expresses a synthetic proposition. On the other hand, all synthetic principles are a
posteriori, but these principles are concerned only with appearances, not with the world itself.
Being concerned solely with appearances, they cannot bridge the gap. Therefore, it looks like any
principle that could bridge the gap would have to be a synthetic a priori principle. Since empiri-
cal foundationalism precludes justified beliefs concerning such principles, it looks like empirical
foundationalism precludes justified beliefs concerning genuine metaphysics.6 Thus we have a
serious challenge for doxastic empiricism even if the problems for concept empiricism can be
solved.
A demonstration that the above argument is mistaken requires a linking principle that con-
nects the world of appearances to reality, the world itself. I shall argue that there are analytic
linking principles of the form: O ⊃ W , where O is an empirical observation statement and W is
some proposition about the (probable) truth of a theory about the world itself.7 It is the conjunc-
tion of this sort of principle with actual empirical observations that provides the bridge between
appearance and reality. This strategy shouldn’t come as a surprise. The argument above is sound
only if it is assumed that metaphysical theories cannot have important implications for our expe-
rience. However, the analytic linking principles are supposed to show precisely the opposite: that
some metaphysical theories do have important implications for our experience—that is, that some
metaphysical theories are not underdetermined by appearances.
6 This type of argument is found in Carnap’s famous “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of
Language” (1959, 76).
7 Strictly speaking, the linking principles will be atomic statements of conditional probability, so the precise form
is as follows: P (T |O), the probability of theory T given observation(s) O.
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2.4 Empirical Resources
The purpose of this section is to introduce some resources available to the empirical foun-
dationalist. I cannot offer anything like a complete defense of the thesis that these methods are
consistent with empirical foundationalism, but I will provide at least some justification of this
claim.8 Along the way, I shall explain how these resources can accommodate concerns that arise
for the metaphysics of laws of nature.
2.4.1 Empirical Foundationalism
The first method provides a way of forming basic concepts; it is nothing more than the parts
of empirical foundationalism that state the criteria for the formation of basic concepts—namely,
its empiricist and foundationalist components. Following this method ensures that we stand in
privileged epistemic relations to our (properly formed, basic) concepts. In short, empirical foun-
dationalism provides us with a solid epistemic foundation for those concepts having to do with
the world of appearances.
The second method provides a way of forming complex concepts; it involves the system of
analysis that is used to generate new concepts and justify inferentially justified beliefs. For our
purposes, this method has two distinct components: first, a system of logic that permits quan-
tification over properties in addition to individuals;9 second, a method of defining quasi-logical
concepts such as parthood, property, event, state, and particular.10 Regarding the second compo-
nent, empirical definitions of the terms mentioned is possible. For example, we could give the
following definitions: the concept of parthood is defined either by a special sort of ostension (e.g.,
by distinguishing features of one’s visual field) or using a modal definition such as x is a part of y
=df it is impossible that y exists as it presently is and x does not exist; x is a particular if and only
if it is logically possible for there to be a y which does not differ qualitatively from x, but which
8 I hope to provide a more complete defense of this claim in my next major research project.
9 Two points: First, I assume that the adoption of this logic does not preclude nominalism; one can use such a logic
without reifying properties. Second, it is worth noting that Hume did not have this method at his disposal.
10 This list is borrowed from (Tooley 1987).
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is not identical with x; x is a (universal) property if and only if it is logically impossible for there
to be a y which exactly resembles x, but which is not identical with x.11 These two components
allow for the analysis of a great many concepts; they even allow for concepts of entities that are in
principle unobservable, such as the concept parts too small to be observed. More importantly, they
provide the right sort of foundation for the third method (discussed in 2.4.2).
2.4.2 Laws as Theoretical Entities
David Hume thought that we could not learn anything about laws of nature as they exist in
the world. The basic reason is that we do not directly observe laws or causes; we merely observe
regularities. This section begins with an explanation of the need for a theoretical treatment of
nomological concepts. This is to say that Hume was right to think that our causal and nomological
concepts are in need of analysis. This section concludes with an explanation and defense of a
version of the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms that is consistent with
a realist interpretation of theoretical entities. This is to say that Hume was wrong to think that the
only possible analysis of nomological concepts entails Descriptive Humeanism, a more general
version of Hume’s well-known regularity theory of laws.
2.4.2.1 Nomological Concepts: The Need for Analysis
Empirical foundationalism entails the following view of complex concepts: all complex con-
cepts must ultimately be grounded in concepts that are analytically basic, that is, not in need of
analysis. (We could elaborate on the idea of what it is for a concept to be analytically basic by
saying that a concept is analytically basic if and only if analysis of that concept is both impossible
and unnecessary.) According to empirical foundationalism, the only descriptive analytically basic
concepts are those that arise on the basis of immediate sense experience; immediate sense expe-
rience involves being in direct perceptual or introspective contact with the object or property in
11 The list of quasi-logical concepts is borrowed from (Tooley 1987), the latter two definitions are borrowed from
Tooley’s introduction to (Tooley 1999, Volume 3), and the latter definition of ‘parthood’ was suggested by Tooley
in correspondence. The point here is not to defend these definitions, but rather to show that it is possible to give
empirically respectable definitions of quasi-logical concepts.
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question.12 For example, consider how it is that we come to understand color concepts. We learn
about color through our immediate experiences of color. Words that refer to colors are defined
via ostension. For example, we see a set of red objects and are told that that quality which our
experiences of them have in common is the referent of ‘red’. Without the relevant experiences,
this definition would be worthless.
We can now discuss nomological concepts. Are any of them analytically basic? Some have
thought so. For example, Anscombe (1971), Armstrong (1983), and Fales (1990, Chapter 1) have
argued that we directly experience singular causal relations—a species of nomic relations—and
that these experiences form the basis for all further nomological concepts. We may call this view
of nomological concepts direct realism. The appeal of the direct realist approach is that it provides
a solid epistemological foundation for all nomological concepts. If direct realism is true, some
nomological concepts are analytically basic, and these form the foundation for more complex
nomological concepts. If direct realism is true, (at least some) nomic entities are not theoretical
entities; we believe in them because we experience them directly, not solely because they are
postulates of a theory that we accept. Direct realism solves many of the epistemological problems
often associated with Non-Humeanism and Governing Humeanism. Unfortunately, I believe that
direct realism is false. I shall argue that no nomological concept (of ours, anyway) is analytically
basic. The result is that, if any version of Non-Humeanism or Governing Humeanism is to be
entertained at all, a theoretical treatment of nomological concepts is required. If direct realism
is false, then Non-Humean or Governing Humean nomic concepts must be theoretical concepts
(complex concepts which require a special sort of analysis).
The argument against direct realism explained here is an ancestor of Hume’s. The particular
version is due to Michael Tooley (Forthcoming, Chapter 2). Tooley begins by pointing out that it is
not sufficient to say that our normal sense experience gives rise to the concept of causal relations.
To establish direct realism, it must be shown that this concept arises immediately, and not on the
12 “If a concept is analytically basic, then, by definition, one can acquire the concept in question only by being in
perceptual or introspective contact with an instance of the property or relation that is picked out by the concept”
(Tooley Forthcoming, Chapter 2).
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basis of some inference. There is thus a crucial distinction between
(1) concepts arising through sense experience
and
(2) concepts that are analytically basic.
Though analytically basic concepts arise directly from sense experience, it is not the case that all
concepts arising through sense experience are analytically basic. Hume famously thought that our
beliefs about cause and effect were precisely of the sort that “arise” through experience but that
are not given in experience (see Enquiry Section IV). We don’t perceive any connection between
cause and effect; we just imagine it to be there. The concept of cause and effect arises through a
combination of sense experience and imagination, but it is not, according to Hume, analytically
basic. Fales’s (1990) favorite example of a purportedly analytically basic nomological concept
involves the sensation of tactile pressure. The basic idea is that the experience of tactile pressure
naturally gives rise to the ideas of cause and effect because the causal relation itself is observed
directly. Of course, we must be careful not to conflate (1) and (2). The fact that the concept of
singular causation arises through our experience of tactile pressure does not on its own establish
that it is analytically basic.
Tooley then argues that once one is aware of this distinction, it becomes apparent that no
nomological concept is analytically basic. The argument is easier to understand if we start with
an analogous case. Consider the concept of a physical object’s being red: call this concept physical
redness. This concept could be acquired even if there were no red things in the world—perhaps
due to hallucinations or deceptions by an evil demon—and hence the concept of a physical object’s
being red is not analytically basic since it can be acquired without perceptual or introspective
contact with an instance of the property of physical redness. This is in stark contrast to the concept
of redness as a quality of experiences, which is analytically basic; call this concept qualitative
redness. Thus, qualitative redness and physical redness are distinct concepts since only the former
is analytically basic. This result is further supported by contemporary physical theories of color,
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according to which the color of an object is a complex matter having to do with properties of its
microphysical structure. Thus the concept of physical redness is complex. This is not the case
for qualitative redness, so once again we have good reason for thinking that physical redness and
qualitative redness are distinct.
Now consider the direct realist’s claim that the experience of tactile pressure on one’s skin is
a case in which the singular causal relation is directly experienced, and is thus analytically basic.
Here we have two concepts: the concept of tactile pressure and the concept of singular causal rela-
tions. Suppose that you experience tactile pressure as you press your hands together. Have you
directly experienced a singular causal relation, or have you merely experienced the tactile pres-
sure? It is quite easy to imagine circumstances in which one would feel as though tactile pressure
was the cause of some indentation in one’s skin even though no such causal relation had occurred:
one might be hallucinating, in which case no causal relation underlies the experience. Though one
cannot be deceived about whether one is experiencing the tactile pressure, this does not show that
the concept of singular causation as a relation between objects in the world is analytically basic;
it merely tells us something about the quality of our experience of tactile pressure.13 Therefore,
the concept of tactile pressure does not serve as an adequate base of nomological concepts, just
as the concept of qualitative redness doesn’t serve as an adequate base for the concept of physical
redness.
It seems likely that the preceding argument will apply to every (realistically construed)
nomic entity in addition to singular causal relations. None of the following appear to be good
candidates for directly observable entities: governing laws of nature, bare dispositions, counter-
factuals, et cetera. The entities that satisfy these concepts are, so far as we can tell, unobservable.
Thus, the preceding line of argument would apply to any of these concepts. For each one, there
is a Cartesian scenario in which one can have a non-veridical experience of the relevant entity
(that is, the relevant “causal relation”, “law”, et cetera);14 hence, no nomological concepts are
13 Tooley develops this argument with greater precision. Here, I have merely explained its basic structure.
14 Strictly speaking, this is a bit imprecise, since we do not ever experience these entities. Rather, we merely imagine
that we are experiencing such entities.
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analytically basic.
The result is that direct realism is false; nomological concepts are not analytically basic.
Therefore, they must be analyzed in terms of concepts that are more basic. According to Descrip-
tive Humeanism, the truthmakers for nomological propositions concerning observed regularities
ultimately reduce to those given immediately in sense experience; nomological propositions that
concern observed regularities do not require theoretical treatment. Hume’s regularity theory of
laws is a well-known example; laws are nothing (or little) more than generalizations of obser-
vation statements. For the Non-Humean and Governing Humean, however, there is a further
requirement. In light of the above argument, no entity uniquely posited by the Non-Humean or
Governing Humean can be immediately observable. Therefore, such theorists require a method
of explaining our concepts of such entities. Fortunately, a theoretical treatment of the relevant
concepts is available that allows us to understand the concepts and use them to refer to the ob-
jects that satisfy them. Thus, Non-Humeanism and Governing Humeanism do not require direct
realism in the first place.
2.4.2.2 Defining Theoretical Terms
The Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms allows for empirically re-
spectable analyses of our concepts of unobservable entities. See (Ramsey 1931), (Carnap 1966),
and (Lewis 1970); Tooley (1987, Chapter 1) provides a nice summary of objections to this method
along with replies. The importance of this method cannot be understated. It allows the empirical
foundationalist to form concepts of (and refer to) unobservable entities, such as the metaphysical
entities in the world itself. Without this type of method it would not be possible to provide em-
pirically respectable definitions of Non-Humeanism or Governing Humeanism. This method of
defining theoretical terms is our third method.
Before explaining the method, a clarification will be helpful. A theoretical entity is some
entity that we believe in because it is the referent of a term in a theory we accept (see (Lewis 1970,
428)). On the other hand, a theoretical term is one whose definition is special in that its meaning
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depends on the theory in which it appears; such terms are introduced into the language through
their inclusion in a theory. For example, the term ‘H2O’ had no meaning prior to its inclusion in
molecular theory, though ‘water’ certainly did. There are thus two distinct questions one can ask:
Are there any theoretical entities? and How do we understand theoretical terms? The answer to
the first depends on whether there is any true theory; if we are justified in believing that a theory
is true, we are justified in believing that there are theoretical entities of the sort specified by that
theory. The answer to the second question is specified by the method, its goal being to provide
definitions of theoretical terms using only those terms with which we are already familiar. So,
which terms are already familiar? Those specified by the first two methods above. Lewis’s (1970)
name for this set of concepts is theO-terms: ordinary terms, old terms, original terms. We shall not
restrict ourselves to any old terms, but only those that are empirically respectable in accordance
with the first two methods.
The precise method of defining theoretical terms is somewhat technical, though it is based
on rather simple ideas. After explaining the method itself, I shall discuss a method that ensures
that the terms used in the construction of a theory are definable within the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis
method of defining theoretical terms. The result is that there are relatively few occasions in
which the technical method itself must be directly applied, and thus the technical elements can
be avoided in usual practice.
What follows is a brief and (inasmuch as possible) non-technical sketch of Ramsey’s version
of the method. The first step is to treat all theoretical terms in a theory uniformly by paraphras-
ing all statements including theoretical terms into the same logical/syntactical form. Consider a
theory T which ordinarily includes (3). The theory could have included (4) instead, since (3) and
(4) are equivalent.
(3) a is an electron.
(4) a has the property electronhood.
The purpose of this step is merely to simplify the method. It allows for the uniform syntactical
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treatment of all theoretical terms.
The second step is to take the conjunction of the statements of T that include theoretical
terms (the purpose of doing so is simply to put all of the theoretical terms in one place for ease of
reference). This can be represented as follows, where each τ is a theoretical term:
The Postulate of T : T [τ1, ..., τn]
The Postulate of T can be existentially quantified to eliminate theoretical terms. This yields
The Ramsey Sentence of T : ∃x1...∃xn(T [x1...xn])
The basic proposal, due to Ramsey (1931), is that the Ramsey Sentence of T may be used in place
of T itself—that is, in place of the Postulate of T . No one has any trouble understanding the
Ramsey Sentence of T; it does not include any theoretical terms. The result? “[I]nsofar as the
theory T serves as a device for systematizing O-sentences, the Ramsey sentence of T will do the
job as well as the postulate itself.” (Lewis 1970, 431)15
Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis theoretical terms succeed in referring to theoretical entities (if there
are theoretical entities) by way of descriptions. The descriptions are special in that they do not
refer in virtue of the intrinsic properties of theoretical entities, but in virtue of their extrinsic or
relational properties to objects or concepts toward which we stand in a privileged (and empirically
respectable) epistemic relation. The descriptions are entirely relational. They pick out theoretical
entities in virtue of the fact that those entities instantiate relational properties analyzed in terms of
concepts that are empirically respectable.16 These features of the method have a very important
implication. Theoretical terms are semantically equivalent to descriptions, and, in many cases, the
semantic content of these descriptions is synthetic (this is to say that a proposition attributing the
relevant description to an object is a synthetic proposition). The result is as follows: different the-
ories may have different implications for our experience. This is very important; a synthetic definite
15 Lewis’s extension of Ramsey’s method, which I prefer, is slightly more precise and thus gives a more complete
understanding of theoretical terms, but it is rather complicated. For our purposes, however, Ramsey’s version of the
method will suffice.
16 Michael Tooley has helpfully pointed out that some theoretical terms can be analyzed in terms of the relations
among the relevant theoretical entities to each other, rather than in terms of their relations to empirically respectable
things.
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description stated in theO-language will have observable consequences. This allows for the possi-
bility that distinct metaphysical theories vary in their empirically observable consequences, since
distinct metaphysical theories will be (in the right cases) equivalent to distinct synthetic descrip-
tions. Therefore, the method of defining theoretical terms ultimately allows for the possibility of
the empirical confirmation (or falsification) of paradigmatically metaphysical theories.
The basic ideas underlying the method are not as technical as they might appear. The
method simply uses a special sort of description—one that even the empiricist can understand—
in order to pick out theoretical entities.17 Once we are aware of the method we can bypass it by
constructing careful definitions within the O-language. For example, suppose that we define an
atomic Non-Humean property as follows:18
AN: X is an atomic Non-Humean property if and only if X is a property such that its instantiation at
a spacetime point entails the existence of a property instantiation at a distinct spacetime
point.
and added that
S: there is at least one atomic Non-Humean property.
(Since our concern is with Non-Humeanism, let’s assume that the concept of a spacetime point
is part of our O-language.) We aren’t in the position to observe entailment relations between
logically distinct states of affairs; hence, ‘atomic Non-Humean property’ refers to a theoretical
entity if it refers at all. However, AN does not appeal to any term in the T -language. The only
theoretical term in the definition is the definiendum—‘atomic Non-Humean property’—itself (it
is important to remember that logical and quasi-logical vocabulary is part of the O-language).
S uses the term ‘atomic Non-Humean property’, but otherwise it merely makes an existential
generalization. Together with AN, S seems to make perfectly good sense. So why do we need the
method at all?
17 The Ramsey method allows for theories to be multiply realized. In effect, it is as though the descriptions are
indefinite. Lewis’s method fixes this problem; the resulting descriptions are, in effect, definite.
18 This is not the correct way to define atomic Non-Humean properties—it is too narrow—but this definition makes
for a simple example.
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Let’s consider an application of the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method. Suppose that T in-
cludes the following postulate:
(5) Point i instantiates N , and this entails an observable state of affairs O such that Ni , O;
that is, Ni&(Ni ⊃O)&Ni ,O.
N is the theoretical term which refers to an atomic Non-Humean property; i and O are terms in
the O-language. We can Ramsify this postulate, yielding
(6) ∃X(Xi&(Xi ⊃O)&Xi ,O).
Note that (6) is, effectively, just saying that the definition of an atomic Non-Humean property is
satisfied. But of course, we can say this in our ordinary language without explicitly appealing to
the process of Ramsification; this is precisely what the conjunction of AN and S tells us. Stating
the definition in theO-language is quite helpful; it does everything that Ramsification does. Thus,
practically speaking, we can often bypass the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method. If we go about our
metaphysics in the right way, taking care to precisely define all concepts using only terms from the
O-language (as the good empiricist should be doing anyway), then we won’t have need to apply
the technical method itself. This is not to say that the method isn’t important; in fact, the method
helps us to set the criteria for forming suitable definitions of theoretical entities using only terms
in the O-language. After all, this is effectively what the process of Ramsification accomplishes (as
does Lewis’s improved version of the method, with a greater degree of precision).
Thus far, I have assumed that the purpose of the method just explained is to explain how a
realistic construal of theoretical terms is possible. However, it is important to note that the method
itself is not prejudiced against anti-realist or reductionist construals of the referents of theoretical
terms. Nothing in the method itself guarantees that theoretical terms have a denotation; one could
use the method to define (that is, explain how we understand) the terms without holding that the
theory is true. If the theory isn’t true, we aren’t forced to say that the terms denote anything. Thus
anti-realism is consistent with the method. Furthermore, nothing in the method itself guarantees
that there is no analysis or reduction of theoretical entities in terms of the properties and relations
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of observable objects; thus, reductionism is consistent with the method.19 This is not to say
that all theories generated by the method are consistent with Descriptive Humeanism. Some are
not. I believe that Hume was right to demand an analysis of nomological concepts in terms of
concepts that are, ultimately, non-nomological. However, the empiricist’s preference for analysis
of all concepts in terms of those that are immediately given in sense experience entails neither
Humean Anti-Realism nor Humean Reductionism nor Descriptive Humeanism. We have in hand
a method of defining theoretical terms that is consistent with a realistic construal of theoretical
entities.
2.4.3 The Method of Confirmation
We have a method that allows us both to understand our theories and to determine their
empirical implications. But how do we use empirical observations to confirm one theory (or set
of theories) over the others? I shall quickly set out and defend a Bayesian method of confirmation
(this is our fourth method consistent with empirical foundationalism).20 It might be thought
that this method is so well known that an explication of it is unnecessary. However, there are
certain features of the method that have been, from the perspective of philosophers of science,
unsatisfactory with regard to the confirmation of scientific theories. Specifically, some philoso-
phers of science (and many scientists) have adopted a falsificationist view of scientific theories
according to which theories cannot be confirmed, but merely falsified (see (Popper 1959)). To a
certain extent, the questions with which we shall be concerned avoid this criticism entirely, so it
is worth explaining how the Bayesian method of confirmation may be applied to our subject in a
way that will satisfy the falsificationist.
Popper (1959) believed that scientific hypotheses could be falsified, but that they could not
be confirmed. That is, he believed that empirical investigation could provide evidence against a
19 Of course, the content of T might be such that, if T is true then reductionism is false. But this is a desirable
consequence.
20 By ‘Bayesian’ I just mean the method that involves updating probabilities in light of evidence in accordance with
the theorems of the probability calculus. I do not mean to be advocating a subjective interpretation of probability; that
matter is discussed in the next section.
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hypothesis, but that it could not provide evidence for a hypothesis. The basic reason was that
Popper thought that genuine confirmation required a solution to the problem of induction—a so-
lution which we do not have. There are, however, circumstances in which confirmation is possible
within a falsificationist framework even if one lacks a solution to the problem of induction. Con-
sider, for example, the rule of disjunctive syllogism in classical logic. This rule says that, given a
disjunction and the negation of one disjunct, one may infer the other disjunct. Let H1 and H2 be
competing hypotheses, and suppose one knows that eitherH1 orH2 is true. Now suppose that one
learns that H2 is false due to its incompatibility with empirical evidence. H2 has been falsified,
H1 has not; this entails that H1 has been confirmed, and no appeal to induction is required. So
says disjunctive syllogism. If our situation is like this—namely, that we know that the disjunction
is true, and then we come to have evidence against one of the hypotheses—there is no problem
of explaining, in general, how confirmation works. This sort of confirmation is acceptable to the
falsificationist.
There are two major difficulties that must be met in order for one to employ the rule of dis-
junctive syllogism to confirm a theory. First, one must be justified in believing that the disjunction
is true; unfortunately, this often requires the set of competing hypotheses to be exhaustive, and
its members exclusive. This poses a serious problem for the scientist. The reason is that scien-
tific theories are very complex. The degree of complexity and precision of a hypothesis is directly
related to the number of competing hypotheses. For example, the hypothesis that the force of
gravity is represented by Newton’s formula
F = G
m1m2
r2
is much more precise that the hypothesis that there is some force involving the mass of physi-
cal objects. There are infinitely many competitors of the same level of generality as the former
hypothesis (G could be replaced by any number); there is only one competing hypothesis of the
same level of generality for the latter: the hypothesis that there is not any force involving the mass
of physical objects. The more general hypothesis is much simpler, and much easier to confirm,
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than the more specific hypothesis. Unfortunately, the more general hypothesis is virtually use-
less. Scientists won’t care much about it at all. But the metaphysician might. The metaphysician
is interested in a different sort of question entirely. She may not care whether her theory ever
leads to successful predictions. That’s not the (primary) purpose of metaphysics. She is interested
in whether her theory is true.21 It may be the case that we metaphysicians must settle for very
general metaphysical hypotheses. But, of course, most of the hypotheses we are interested in are
quite general: Is naturalism true or false? Does God exist or does he not? Do we have free will or
do we not? Is causation a real feature of the world or do we merely imagine it? I would count the
discipline of metaphysics a success if it could provide answers to questions such as these.
Fortunately, solving this difficulty is a rather simple matter for the metaphysician; she can
just define her theories in such a way to guarantee that this condition is met. The metaphysician
defines the relevant hypotheses so as to form a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hy-
potheses. Thus, the disjunctive syllogism schema can be used to genuinely confirm metaphysical
hypothesis without a solution to the problem of induction.
The second difficulty is that hypotheses are rarely falsified in the strict sense explained
above. It is rare to find empirical evidence that flat-out contradicts the implications of a hypothe-
sis. Such a contradiction usually is derivable only with questionable auxiliary assumptions. (Note
that this will not be an issue if the theories compared are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaus-
tive.) Thus, it is generally thought that evidence is probabilistic. For example, we think it merely
unlikely that Newtonian physics is true in light of the Eddington experiments, not impossible.
Fortunately, there is another formal system that can be applied to our purposes. This is the
probability calculus.22 The theorems of this system are no weaker, no less reliable than those of
classical logic; though they concern probabilities, they do not rely on a solution to the problem of
induction. For our purposes the most important theorem of the calculus is Bayes’ theorem, which
21 Of course, the scientist may be interested in this same question. But it is important to note that the scientists is
also interested in the predictive power of her theory, whereas the metaphysician is not.
22 See (Howson and Urbach 2006, Chapter 2) for an accessible introduction to the probability calculus.
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is often stated in the following form:
P (p|e) = P (p)P (e|p)
P (p)P (e|p) + P (∼ p)P (e| ∼ p)
Bayes’ theorem is important because it describes the degree of support that evidence e has for
a given hypothesis p. Having solved the first difficulty for confirmation, Bayes’ theorem can be
directly applied to metaphysical hypotheses since the questions posed will concern mutually ex-
clusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses. This is a crucial point, since, once again, the application
of Bayes’ theorem does not presuppose a solution to the problem of induction. The basic idea here
is this. Though sometimes evidence against a theory is not strong enough to falsify that theory, it
can nevertheless make the theory less likely than it would have been in light of different evidence,
or no evidence. If the theories are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, evidence against one
theory—even if it is merely probabilistic evidence—constitutes evidence in favor of the other. So
says Bayes’ theorem. Thus, the general spirit of the disjunctive syllogism schema is preserved in
probabilistic cases. (Again, the metaphysician has an advantage over the scientist here, since she
can just define her theories so as to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.)
Of course, we can’t apply Bayes’ theorem to determine whether an observation is evidence in
favor of one hypothesis or another unless we know the degree to which the competing hypotheses
predict that evidence—that is, unless we know the conditional probabilities on the right-hand
side of Bayes’ theorem; furthermore, we can’t apply Bayes’ theorem to determine the probability
of a hypothesis given the evidence unless we know the prior probabilities of the hypotheses in
question. The theorems of the probability calculus are useless to our purposes unless we have
a method of assigning the relevant probabilities in the first place. Such a method is called an
interpretation of probability. In the next section, I explain and defend the method I prefer.
2.4.4 Assigning Probabilities
There is a fair amount of controversy as to how probability should be interpreted. I shall
begin by explaining the relevant concept of probability as a sort of epistemic probability. I then
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set out my preferred approach to assigning epistemic probability: a version of the logical inter-
pretation of probability set forth by Carnap (1962). Then I shall discuss some objections to the
logical interpretation, discuss alternatives, and explain why the general approach that underlies
the logical interpretation is the most satisfactory.
2.4.4.1 Preliminaries
There are different ways to understood statements about probability. My explanations are
based on those given by Mellor (2005, Chapter 1). First, statements of probability may be under-
stood as expressing degrees of belief, or epistemic credences. An epistemic credence tells us how
strongly one believes a proposition. This is the best way to interpret statements involving betting
odds: a rational person is willing to place a bet at certain odds if and only if one’s degree of belief
differs from the odds in question. For example, if a bookie tells you that the odds are 1:1 that X
will win, you will place a bet on X only if you believe that there is a greater than 50% chance that
X will win.
Second, statements of probability may be understood as expressing the (objective) epistemic
probability of a hypothesis in light of evidence (or lack of evidence). Epistemic probabilities “mea-
sure how far evidence confirms or disconfirms hypotheses about the world. . . But they are not
mere matters of opinion: whether, and to what extent, evidence counts for or against a hypothesis
looks like an objective matter” (Mellor 2005, 8). To say that an epistemic probability is objective is
to say that two (equally imaginative and equally intelligent) individuals with all the same back-
ground information and same evidence would not be justified in assigning different probabilities
to the proposition in question. Within the context of empirical foundationalism, it is easy enough
to explain why these statements are objective: they will ultimately be grounded in one’s language
that is generated in an empirically respectable way (but more on this later). For example, propo-
sitions about the likelihood that God exists given the fine-tuning of the universe are plausibly
interpreted to be statements of epistemic probability.
Third, statements about probability may be understood as expressing objective chances, or
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real probabilities that hold in the world. For example, the probability that a coin will land heads
is usually thought to express an objective chance. There are cases in which these three forms
of probability come together. In the case of a fully-informed ideal epistemic agent, they should
coincide. But since we are not ideal epistemic agents, it will be best to treat them separately.
I shall be concerned primarily with epistemic probabilities. The reason is that our ultimate
concern is with metaphysical statements such as the hypothesis that Non-Humeanism is true or
that the probability of Humeanism given natural regularities is low. I shall avoid epistemic cre-
dences for the simple reason that we are trying to determine what our epistemic credences should
be. To begin with epistemic credences would be to put the cart before the horse. I shall avoid
objective chances for two reasons. First, it is not obvious (at this point) that we have epistemic
access to the objective chances of the world itself. Second, many philosophers have thought that
many of the metaphysical hypotheses under consideration are either necessarily true or neces-
sarily false; this is to say that their objective chance of obtaining is either 1 or 0. But this will
be of little help. For example, Goldbach’s Conjecture has an objective chance of either 1 or 0
(since it is either necessarily true or necessarily false). But for our purposes, it will be best to treat
such statements as expressing epistemic probabilities, such as the likelihood from our epistemic
perspective that Goldbach’s conjecture is true (note that this is actually a disguised conditional
probability; hence, it fits the definition of epistemic probability given above). This allows for the
full range of probabilities (greater than or equal to 0, less than or equal to 1); we can assign a num-
ber other than 0 or 1 to this hypothesis. In this sense, one can say, for example, that the epistemic
probability that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true equals .5. In my opinion, this is the only satisfac-
tory way to treat metaphysical hypotheses, at least if one is interested in the project of evaluating
these hypotheses with respect to their fit with evidence. (However, it will turn out that, if my
preferred method of practicing metaphysics is correct, certain epistemic probabilities match up
with objective chances.)
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2.4.4.2 The Logical Interpretation of Probability
I shall utilize a logical interpretation of probability to assign epistemic probabilities. This
is our fifth method. According to the logical interpretation, objective epistemic probabilities
may be assigned through logical and semantical analysis, so it is an (analytic) a priori method.
This subsection explains the basic features of this interpretation—modeled after Carnap’s (1962)
interpretation—and shows how it may be developed to accommodate the debate between our four
theories of laws explained in Chapter 1.
The logical interpretation of probability is based on the idea that one can determine the
epistemic probabilities of competing theories by comparing the number (and perhaps kind) of
epistemic possibilities countenanced by the competing theories. How can an empirical founda-
tionalist give an account of the concept of an epistemic possibility? Carnap’s basic proposal, which
I shall adopt, is that epistemic possibilities are determined by logical and semantical analysis. We
are given a set of basic individual terms Σ and basic predicate terms Φ . We stipulate that these
terms are those formed in accordance with the principles of empirical foundationalism. Carnap
calls a maximal consistent permutation of the members of Σ and Φ (with the members of the
former instantiating the members of the latter in the familiar way) a state description. State de-
scriptions are our epistemic possibilities.
Put another way, a state description is a proposition describing an epistemically possible
state of affairs or a set of epistemically possible states of affairs. (As a heuristic, we can think
of a state of affairs as being an instantiation of a property or relation by some thing or ordered
tuple of things,23 but this definition is not intended to impart any ontological commitment.) Our
interpretation of probability must tell us two things: how to determine what state descriptions
there are, and how to assign probabilities to these state descriptions.
In one sense, settling the first issue—the matter of determining which state descriptions
there are—appears simple: since we are concerned with objective epistemic probability, the state
23 The neutral term ‘thing’ is used instead of ‘individual’ so as not to rule out higher-order states of affairs.
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descriptions are just the epistemically possible ones. However, we need to say a little bit more
about what constitutes an epistemically possible state description by saying more about the pa-
rameters Σ and Φ . Carnap assumes that the predicates in Φ must be monadic, that only indi-
viduals of order 0 satisfy predicates, and that all predicates are of order 1. I do not adopt these
assumptions. The result is a language that has more descriptive power and is more complex
than Carnap’s. Further, we shall ultimately be interested in the general question How many state
descriptions are there, period? To answer this question, the two parameters must be allowed to
“float” over the range of possible values. Thus the quantity of state descriptions (that is, epistemic
possibilities) is a function of a range of epistemically possible values for Σ and Φ .
This is all well and good, but as explained it is not clear how the system will allow us to
describe Non-Humean state descriptions—that is, to describe all of the epistemic possibilities rel-
evant to the debate concerning laws of nature. We can remedy this problem with two simple aug-
mentations of the system, corresponding to two different theories of laws. (Both options introduce
synthetic necessities, but in the next chapter I shall argue that the required concepts of synthetic
necessity are unproblematic.) First, the set of predicates in the language may be augmented by
adding Non-Humean ones (that is, by adding predicates that involve synthetic necessities, such
as predicates that refer to bare dispositions). Call this modification of the interpretation NHΦ+.
Second, an entirely new parameter may be introduced: a set Ω of Non-Humean synthetic neces-
sary connections postulated to hold between predicates (members of Φ).24 Call this modification
of the interpretation NHΩ. The basic idea is that NHΦ+ allows us to describe Descriptive Non-
Humean possibilities whereas NHΩ allows us to describe Governing Non-Humean possibilities,
but more on this later.25 Either way, the total number of state descriptions according to NHΩ is
24 I am speaking here of predicates rather than properties since state descriptions are linguistic (or propositional)
entities. If Non-Humeanism is true, these connections between predicates hold in virtue of connections between prop-
erties.
25 Are there reasons to prefer one Non-Humean modification to the other? I believe that neither modification suffices
for the characterization of all versions of Non-Humeanism (though together they appear to do so). NHΦ+ appears to
offer an excellent characterization of Descriptive Non-Humeanism, whereas NHΩ appears to offer an excellent charac-
terization of Governing Non-Humeanism. Here is a quick argument which suggests that NHΩ entails Governing Laws:
the members of Φ represent Humean properties; a necessary connection in Ω represents a necessary connection be-
tween two or more Humean properties represented by Φ ; such a necessary connection between properties constitutes
a higher-order state of affairs distinct from regularities that entails regularities; hence versions of Non-Humeanism
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a function of the ranges of epistemically possible values for the parameters Σ, Φ , and Ω.
Before continuing, it will be helpful to say a little more about the version of the interpre-
tation capable of accommodating Non-Humeanism. A state description is Humean if and only
if both Ω is empty and all predicates (members of Φ) are Humean. A state description is Non-
Humean if and only if either Ω is non-empty or some predicate (member of Φ) is Non-Humean.
The synthetic connections in Ω function in a special way. Consider the predicates ‘bachelor’ and
‘unmarried’. These predicates are logically dependent in such a way that every object that is a bach-
elor is also unmarried. The members of Ω are similar, except that the connections are not subject
to analysis in the manner that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ are; the Non-Humean connections are
basic and irreducible. Thus, for example, the relation of necessitation (a non-symmetrical relation)
is such that if P stands in the relation of necessitation to Q, any individual which instantiates P
must instantiate Q on pain of inconsistency.26 It seems unnecessary27 to specify the nature of
the function from Σ, Φ , and Ω to the number of state descriptions; what is necessary is to stip-
ulate that, whatever this function is, its output is the set of all and only the maximal consistent
state descriptions. Of course, this system is relativized to a language: ours will be the language
generated by our experiences consistent with the methods of empirical foundationalism.
Now that our method has told us how to determine which state descriptions there are, we
need to be told how to assign probabilities to them (the second issue). One proposal for assigning
basic probabilities is to give equal weight to each state description:
Equiprobability of state descriptions: for any class of state descriptions that fall within a certain
range of values for Σ, Φ , and Ω, the probability that a given state description is satisfied
is 1/[the number of state descriptions specifiable within the ranges of Σ, Φ , and Ω].
This postulate entails that every state description (that is, every epistemically possible world)
characterized by NHΩ are versions of Governing Non-Humeanism. In the the case of Descriptive Non-Humeanism,
it is the essential natures of properties themselves that (purport to) give rise to regularities. The natural suggestion,
of course, is that the Non-Humean predicates added to yield NHΦ+ describe dispositional predicates, since predicates
involving synthetic necessity in right way will satisfy the definition of dispositions introduced in the next chapter.
26 Note that we get Governing Humeanism if the necessary connections in Ω turn out to be reducible or analyzable
in terms of Humean-consistent entities.
27 I say ‘it seems unnecessary’ because my later arguments do not require a specification of this function.
35
is a priori equally likely. It also entails, for instance, that each member of the set of all and
only Humean state descriptions is equally likely and that each member of the set of all and only
Non-Humean state descriptions is equally likely. However, Carnap (1962, 565) thought that this
postulate was unsatisfactory since it appears to have the unwelcome consequence that one cannot
learn from experience.28 He proposed that equal weights be assigned to structure descriptions,
where a structure description is a set of state descriptions that are structurally the same but differ
only in their permutations. Thus, for example, if one flips a coin ten times, the following state
description (sequence)
(7) H H T T H T H H H T
is one instance of the structure description
(8) 6 heads, 4 tails.
Precisely, we have:
Equiprobability of structure descriptions: for any class of state descriptions that fall within a certain
range of values for Σ, Φ , and Ω, the probability that a given structure description is satis-
fied is 1/[the number of structure descriptions specifiable within the ranges of Σ, Φ , and
Ω]. Weighted probabilities are then distributed equally over the state descriptions that
are members of a given structure description.
These two equiprobability postulates correspond to opposite ends of a continuum of inductive
methods (the λ-continuum) that includes infinitely many intermediate postulates.29 The func-
tion that specifies this continuum is monotonic, and thus if both of the above equiprobability
postulates entail some proposition P, every equiprobability postulate along the continuum en-
tails P.30 Rather than arguing for the correctness of a particular equiprobability postulate, I shall
28 He proved that this result held for his version of the interpretation; however, it is not at all clear that the same
result holds for the version explained here since the possibility of governing laws (or, for that matter, of Non-Humean
properties) may be relevant to the problem of induction.
29 Explained in (Carnap 1952); see also (Howson and Urbach 1993, 66–72).
30 See Michael Tooley’s explanation in (Plantinga and Tooley 2008, 145-6). Note: Since these methods ultimately
concern the degree of support that evidence confers upon a hypothesis, I do not think that the complication introduced
by the parameter Ω affects the monotonicity of this function.
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assume that the premises of a metaphysical argument must follow from both equiprobability
of state descriptions and equiprobability of structure descriptions. If this can be accomplished,
a fully specified interpretation of probability is unnecessary, and we are thus part way towards
avoiding the charge that an equiprobability postulate can only be selected on the basis of intuition
or synthetic a priori reasoning. (Note: I have come to believe that these equiprobability postulates
cannot satisfactorily handle probabilistic laws; I discuss the consequences of this in 5.6. I do not
discuss this worry in this chapter because the required equiprobability postulates will be very
much in the spirit of Carnap’s λ-continuum.)
2.4.4.3 Competing Interpretations
In this subsection, I shall very quickly discuss some of the main competitors to the logical
interpretation of probability and argue that the logical interpretation provides the best method
of assigning objective epistemic probabilities to metaphysical hypotheses. These arguments are
not intended to be conclusive. A proper treatment of these issues would require (at least) its own
book. However, I hope to suggest at the very least that my approach is promising. There are four
primary interpretations of probability in addition to the logical interpretation.
Like the logical interpretation, the classical interpretation of probability holds that proba-
bilities may be assigned by examining the space of possibilities through logical and semantical
analysis. This interpretation is best understood as a narrow version of the logical interpretation
that accepts equiprobability of state descriptions (by way of accepting a version of the principle of
indifference), and so will not be considered further.
Frequency interpretations attempt to assign probabilities by measuring actual frequencies.
For example, if one wants to know the half-life of a radioactive element, one simply observes the
rate of decay over the long run. If one wants to know the probability that an average American will
contract heart disease between the ages of 40 and 60, one simply looks to see what proportion of
Americans (in recent times) have suffered from heart disease between the ages of 40 and 60. Un-
fortunately, frequency interpretations are ill-equipped to deal with metaphysical hypotheses for
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the simple reason that many metaphysical hypotheses concern unobservable phenomena. More-
over, many observations relevant to the sorts of metaphysical hypotheses in question constitute
single-case uniformities: for example, the observation that the world is full of natural regulari-
ties. But there are well-known problems for frequency interpretations associated with single-case
uniformities. For example, the sequence of hands dealt in every game of poker in history, Poker
Sequence, would appear to be a single case uniformity. Poker Sequence is being treated as a single
event, and there are no other events of that type. Thus the frequency with which Poker Sequence
occurs in events of the type of Poker Sequence is 1. But clearly the objective epistemic probability
of Poker Sequence is much less than 1. Hence the frequency interpretation is ill-equipped for
cases such as these.
Propensity interpretations hold that probability is to be explained in terms of (usually) phys-
ical properties of objects in the world. For example, the fact that the probability of a certain coin
flip coming up heads is (approximately) .5 is to be explained in terms of a certain propensity or
disposition of the coin. However, an account of these propensities or dispositions is required in or-
der to make sense of this proposal. If propensities are reducible, the propensity interpretation ap-
pears to suffer from the same problems as the frequency interpretation, since a reductive account
of propensities will ultimately be grounded in actually observed frequencies.31 If propensities
are irreducible, then the interpretation has taken a serious stance on an important metaphysical
issue: namely, it assumes a Non-Humean ontology. Such an assumption is inappropriate for our
purposes.
Of the major interpretations, only the subjective interpretation remains. In my opinion, this
is the most serious competitor to the logical interpretation. The general idea behind the subjective
interpretation is this: there is one basic rule that one must obey when assigning probabilities, and
that is to obey the theorems of the probability calculus (see (Howson and Urbach 1993) for an
important defense of subjectivism). The reason that this rule has a very special status is that it is
31 Matters are rather more complicated than this, since there are different ways of reducing propensities; here, the
relevant reduction involves a reduction to Governing Humean laws of nature. However, since I will later argue that
Governing Humeanism is incoherent (in Chapter 5), I shall ignore this possibility.
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required for one to have consistent beliefs. Assigning probabilities in a way that fails to respect
the theorems of the probability calculus is just as bad as believing propositions that fail to respect
the theorems of classical logic. But how does the subjectivist then assign probabilities? At this
point, no interpretation has been offered at all.32
In my opinion, there is no reason to accept the subjective interpretation of probability (in-
sofar as we are concerned with metaphysical hypotheses) unless it can be shown that there are
serious problems with the logical interpretation. I say this for a number of reasons. To begin, let’s
recall that the logical interpretation does two things: it tells us how to determine the epistemic
possibilities, and it tells us how to assign probabilities to those epistemic possibilities.
First, the logical interpretation provides such a good model for describing epistemic possi-
bilities that any competitor (in this respect) must be incorrect. Imagine an interpretation accord-
ing to which the following state description wasn’t considered to be an epistemic possibility: the
world is exactly as it currently is, except that this chapter contained a(n additional?) grammatical
error. On what grounds could such a state description be ruled out? It seems that there is none.
We certainly don’t want an interpretation that simply fails to recognize epistemic possibilities,
and it is perfectly reasonable to think that the logical interpretation succeeds in its first task—that
is, in describing the epistemic possibilities for a given language.
Second, once we have our epistemic possibilities, we want our equiprobability postulates
to be as general as possible. For example, we don’t want to accept an interpretation that simply
ignores perfectly respectable epistemic possibilities by assigning them an epistemic probability of
zero. That would amount to the claim that those epistemic possibilities aren’t really epistemically
possible. The logical interpretation (as I have presented it) respects this criterion by including
fully general equiprobability postulates. This is desirable because, in my view, accepting a ba-
sic equiprobability postulate is very closely related to accepting a basic axiom for a system of
logic. Our justification for accepting, for example, the principle of indifference (in the form of
32 It should be noted that nothing prevents the subjectivist from using the basic method of assigning probabilities
specified in 2.4.4.2.
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equiprobability of state descriptions) will be very similar to our justification for accepting the
law of non-contradiction. If the assumption that we have justification for accepting a system of
logic isn’t troubling, the assumption that we have justification for accepting a system of logical
probability shouldn’t be troubling either.
For these reasons, I believe that we should accept the logical interpretation unless it can be
shown that it is subject to serious criticisms. There are three primary objections leveled against
the logical interpretation of probability.
The first objection is related to the point just made, and it is that there is no justification
for choosing one equiprobability postulate over another. This objection is partially avoided by my
approach, since the method I have specified requires that arguments succeed on both extremes
of the λ-continuum. We are concerned only with postulates on the continuum because those
postulates concern, with a great deal of generality, the degree of support that evidence has for a
hypothesis, and thus it is somewhat reasonable to suspect that equiprobability postulates outside
of the continuum may be ad hoc. Matters are complicated somewhat, as there have been defenses
of equiprobability postulates (or continuums including postulates) that lie outside of Carnap’s λ-
continuum.33 It isn’t clear to me that the defenses of such methods pose a serious threat to my
approach, but I haven’t investigated matters sufficiently to make an informed judgment on this
matter.34 Though a proper discussion of these various approaches is ultimately required for the
justification of the method I defend in this project, my focus here is on more general features of
the method itself, so I hope that the reader will forgive me for omitting these considerations here.
The second objection is that the interpretation leads to Bertrand paradoxes, and thus that it
must be false. Here is an example of one such paradox found in (van Fraassen 1989, 303).
Cube: A precision tool factory produces iron cubes with edge length ≤ 2 cm. What is the probabil-
ity that a cube has edge length ≤ 1 cm, given that it was produced by the factory? Suppose
we choose edge length as our parameter and assume a uniform distribution. Then the an-
33 See, for example, (Hintikka 1965, 1966).
34 I hope to do so in a future project.
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swer will be 12 . Suppose we choose instead area of side as our parameter? Then the answer
will be 14 . Suppose we choose instead cube volume as our parameter? Then the answer will
be 18 . The principle of indifference leads to three incompatible answers.
In the case of Cube (and other Bertrand paradoxes) the interpretation of probability does not yield
a single determinate verdict. That is what is taken to be paradoxical. But what are the implications
of this paradox? Does it show that the (version of the) logical interpretation (in question) is false,
or merely that it isn’t well-defined for certain questions?35
I think that the latter is the correct response: Bertrand paradoxes merely show that the
relevant notion of logical probability is not well-defined in certain contexts. I say this because it
clearly is well-defined in others, and has a celebrated history in the application to certain domains,
such as classical games of chance. Bertrand paradoxes arise when we lack sufficient information
relevant to the case at hand—when the equiprobability postulate in question can be applied in
multiple ways corresponding to different variables. (The paradox wouldn’t arise in for Cube if
we knew the mechanism by which the machine selects cube size.) That’s why, in such cases, the
interpretation of probability fails to yield a single verdict. If our question is such that we possess
all of the necessary information, Bertrand paradoxes just don’t arise. Thus, if we can avoid such
scenarios, logical probability will be well-defined.
If we are careful about the questions we ask, we can ensure that we always possess sufficient
information. The central idea, which I hope to defend more carefully elsewhere, is that the in-
terpretation of probability I have set out is properly analogous to a classical game of chance. For
example, we all agree that Bertrand paradoxes do not arise for the application of the classical in-
terpretation of probability to games of cards. Consider a deck of cards. Each card is determinately
classified by two variables: suit and number. There are no other basic ways of classifying a given
card; all other ways of classifying a given card are derivative on the basic criteria of classification.
The number of cards is a function of suit and number. Since there are four suits and thirteen
35 Some have argued that neither is the case, since such paradoxes can be avoided by more precise statements of the
equiprobability postulate in question. For a recent example, see (Mikkelson 2004).
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numbers, there are exactly fifty-two possible cards in a true deck. Once we’ve described a card in
terms of both suit and number there is nothing more to say about its intrinsic nature. Further, we
know exactly which cards there are.
Now consider some possible hypotheses: the next card will be a spade, the next card will be an
ace, and the next card will be the ace of spades. These can be rephrased as follows: the next card will
be a member of the set of spades, the next card will be a member of the set of aces, and the next card will
be a member of the singleton set whose member is the ace of spades. Loosely speaking, we can identify
hypotheses with the relevant sets.
Why don’t Bertrand paradoxes arise in applications of the classical interpretation of proba-
bility to games of chance? There are two features:
(9) The basic means of describing each card leaves out no information (it provides a complete
description of the card in question).
(10) We know exactly which cards there are.
Put (9) and (10) together, and there’s no way to restrict information in a way that gives rise to
a Bertrand paradox. Every hypothesis—every way of describing the “world” (the state of the
deck)—depends on (9) and (10). The result is that there isn’t the sort of missing information that
gives rise to Bertrand paradoxes.
The central idea is to show that the position of the empirical foundationalist is analogous
to our position with respect to games of chance. Consider the set of state descriptions for a given
language L. Each state description is determinately classified by its assignments of individuals,
properties, and modal connections. There are no other basic ways of classifying a given state
description; all other ways of classifying a given state description are derivative on the basic crite-
ria of classification. The number of possible state descriptions is a function of Σ, Φ , and Ω. Once
we’ve described a state description in terms of these parameters there is nothing more to say about
its intrinsic nature. Further, employing our interpretation of probability we know exactly which
state descriptions there are.
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Now consider some possible hypotheses: the world is Humean and the world is Non-Humean.
These can be rephrased as follows: the actual world is described by a member of the set of Humean state
descriptions and the actual world is described by a member of the set of Non-Humean state descriptions.
Loosely speaking, we can identity metaphysical theories with the relevant sets.
My suggestion is that the set of state descriptions is perfectly analogous to a deck of cards.
Above we had (9) and (10). Compare them to (11) and (12).
(11) The basic means of describing each state description leaves out no information (by defini-
tion, state descriptions are complete).
(12) We know exactly which state descriptions there are. (for language L)
More needs to be said about L, obviously, to show that (12) and (10) are analogous.
As it turns out, this is in principle easy to do. The language used to describe the case of the
cards is one possible candidate for L. I have suggested that the language L relevant to metaphysics
is a language with basic terms (those specified by our three parameters) and recursive rules. (For
the moment, whether it is empirically-respectable does not matter.) It may be difficult for beings
like us to determine the nature of each individual state description, and even more difficult to
determine which state descriptions there are. However, it is possible in principle. Since it is
possible, our position is like that in the card scenario. Since Bertrand paradoxes don’t arise there,
they don’t arise here either. That’s the idea anyway. While it warrants more careful scrutiny than I
have provided here, I hope that the above is sufficient to motivate the claim that, if we are careful,
we can avoid Bertrand paradoxes. As in the case of classical games of chance, the idea is that there
won’t be the sort of missing information that gives rise to the paradoxes.
However, sometimes it is assumed that Bertrand paradoxes arise for every possible question,
that there are always different variables to which our equiprobability postulates can be applied,
that logical probability is never well-defined. This objection is based on Goodman’s new riddle
of induction (see (Goodman 1955)). The crucial version of this objection is discussed in Chapter
5, so I’ll wait until that point to discuss it in any detail, but for now I’ll just say that it depends
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on a way of defining basic predicates which allows for the following condition to obtain: the
equiprobability postulates can be applied with respect to multiple (and differing) variables such
that the relevant concept of logical probability is not well-defined. My response won’t be surpris-
ing: Goodman’s predicates are unsuitable from my methodological approach; we can reject them
in a way that allows for logical probability to be well-defined for the questions we are interested
in asking. But again, I’ll wait until Chapter 5 to explain this response in any detail.
The third objection, which is closely related to the second, is that there is no principled way
to select a language that specifies the space of epistemic possibilities. For example, Howson and
Urbach (1993, p. 70) have argued that
elementary possibilities are elementary only relative to some language, and lan-
guage is a human artifact whose ultimate categories stand on a footing of equality
only as a result, therefore, of a collective decision that they should do so, a decision
which may consequently be revoked.
The problem with this position is that we do have a principled reason for selecting a language,
and thus a space of epistemic possibilities. It is specified by our empirical foundationalism, and
thus is not dependent on a collective decision to accept some language over another. Within this
epistemological framework, the logical interpretation properly specifies the space of epistemic
possibilities. They are objective in the sense that the probabilities do not depend in any way on
the particular individual that conceives of them; they are completely specified by the language.
It seems that the objection would be effective if the claim were that the logical interpretation
properly assigns objective chances, but since it is concerned with epistemic probabilities the objection
loses force.
In sum, I do not believe that the objections to the logical interpretation are successful. I have
not offered anything like a complete vindication of the logical interpretation—that would be a
monumental task—but I have attempted to provide some prima facie justification for accepting it.
For the remainder of this project, I shall assume that the logical interpretation as I have explained
it (along with its claim to be offering an objective characterization of epistemic probabilities) is
correct.
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At this point, it will be helpful to review the progress thus far. In 2.4.2, I argued that
the metaphysical hypotheses of this project require theoretical analysis, and I then explained the
method of providing such analysis. In 2.4.3, I outlined a method of confirmation that, in principle,
allows for the confirmation of hypotheses (even those containing theoretical vocabulary). In 2.4.4,
I explained how probabilities are to be assigned to the sorts of hypotheses that are in need of
confirmation. These three steps constitute the foundational methods of this project.
2.5 The Method
With the above resources in hand, I can now explain my method and show how it is immune
to the sort of anti-metaphysical argument presented in 2.3.
Step 1: Apply the first method, the relevant principles of empirical foundationalism, to ensure
that we stand in a privileged epistemic relation to all of our basic O-concepts (namely,
those which are analytically basic).
This step provides us with the appropriate epistemological foundation. It is this step, and only
this step, that implies that concept empiricism is correct. If one accepts doxastic empiricism but
rejects concept empiricism, all that is required is a slight modification of this step so as to allow for
basic descriptive concepts not given through immediate experience. Such a change has no impact
on the method’s ability to satisfy the requirements of doxastic empiricism.
Step 2: Apply the second method, the empirical foundationalist method of non-theoretical anal-
ysis, to ensure that we stand in a privileged epistemic relation to all of our complex O-
concepts.
Together, Steps 1 and 2 are required to explain our privileged epistemic relation to our ordinary—
that is, non-metaphysical—concepts; this privileged relation allows us to analyze logical and se-
mantical connections holding between O-concepts.
Step 3: Apply the third method, the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms,
in the construction of all metaphysical theories to ensure that unobservable entities are
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given a fully relational analysis using empirically respectable terms as specified by Step 1
and Step 2.
This step ensures that theoretical concepts are empirically respectable, and thus ensures that we
have maintained our privileged epistemic relation to the content of our theoretical concepts. Just
as importantly, it allows for the possibility that different theories have different observational con-
sequences (usually given in probabilistic terms). This entails that if we have a method of genuine
confirmation and suitable observations then we can be justified in believing that some theories
are more likely to be true than others. The consequence of this conditional is paradigmatic of a
genuine metaphysics. Thus, the method satisfies both concept empiricism and doxastic empiri-
cism: all concepts generated by the method are empirically respectable, and it is ultimately the
comparison of the observational consequences of a theory with actual observations that provides
the synthetic bridge between appearance and reality.
Step 4: Define theories in such a way that the theories under consideration are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive.
This step places a constraint on the process of theorizing (defined in Steps 1, 2, and 3) and is
required for the later application of the method of confirmation.36 It is this step that ensures that
the following relationship holds between the world of concepts (appearances) and the world itself
(reality): it is impossible for there to be a way the world could be that does not fall under one of
our theories; there are no gaps, no missing theories, and thus whatever the conclusion is, it must
apply to the world outside of our concepts.
Step 5: Utilize the fifth method, the logical interpretation of probability, (i) to assign a priori
probabilities to the theories in question, and (ii) to assign conditional probabilities of
relevant possible observations given each theory.
For some metaphysical disputes, further steps may not be required. For example, there may be
non-probabilistic cases where some theory in question is determined to be analytically false by (i)
36 This step ensures that the method avoids Popper’s worries about confirmation, and, in addition, the Quine-Duhem
problem.
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of Step 5. In probabilistic cases, both (i) and (ii) are required for the application of the method of
confirmation.
Step 6: Apply the fourth method, the method of confirmation, to determine the probabilities of
the theories conditional on each of the relevant possible observations.
The method of confirmation, of course, is content-neutral and does not assume a solution to the
problem of induction. It is part of the logical system already in place. Taken together, Steps 1
through 6 establish analytic linking principles of the form P (T |O), where T is the proposition that
a given metaphysical theory is true and O is a(n) observation statement(s).37 The final step is as
follows:
Step 7: Observe! Then compare the observations with the linking principles to determine the a
posteriori probabilities of the theories under consideration.
Together with the preceding steps, the result is as follows. The empirical foundationalist can
practice metaphysics so long as the following conditions are met: a proper defense of the relevant
interpretation of probability can be provided, and Steps 1 through 7 are satisfied. If empirical
foundationalism does not require synthetic a priori reasoning then neither does this method as a
whole.
Each step is required for the method as practiced by the empirical foundationalist.38 With-
out Steps 1 and 2, the method would fail to be empirically respectable. Without Step 3, meta-
physics would merely be conceptual analysis. Without Step 4, the method of confirmation would
not be possible, and there would be no guarantee that the method tells us something about the
world itself (that is, about reality rather than mere appearance). Without Steps 5 and 6, the scope
37 Readers less familiar with conditional probability can think of the linking principles as having the form of con-
ditionals: O ⊃W (where O is some possible empirical observation statement and W is some proposition about the the
probability that a theory about the world itself is true).
38 This method is similar in some respects to Michael Tooley’s basic approach to practicing metaphysics, most clearly
outlined in (Tooley 1987). He endorses something very much like empirical foundationalism, he appeals to the Ram-
sey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms, and he appeals to Carnap’s logical interpretation of probabil-
ity. The version defended here is intended to be an improvement over Tooley’s in multiple primary respects: first, it
incorporates additional elements so as to be more precise (Step 4 is the most important); second, it is constructed to
allow for an explicit demonstration that the results of the method are characteristic of genuine metaphysics.
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of genuine metaphysics would be extremely limited; one could reject theories that are internally
inconsistent, or those that entail a contradiction when conjoined with some empirical observa-
tion, but that is all. Without Step 7, (at best) one could only determine the a priori probabilities
of theories.
Before continuing, it may be helpful to explain explicitly how the method results in justi-
fied beliefs. We have justification for all beliefs generated in accordance with Step 1. These are
just those justified non-inferentially through immediate experience. To simply, following Carnap,
let’s call such beliefs protocol sentences. We have justification for all beliefs generated in accordance
with Step 2. These are just those justified inferentially through the conjunction of the system of
non-theoretical analysis plus the protocol sentences. We have justification for all beliefs generated
in accordance with Step 3. These are just those justified inferentially through the conjunction of
the system of theoretical analysis plus those complex beliefs from Step 2 and the protocol sen-
tences. Step 4 merely places a constraint on the way in which theories are generated using Steps
1 through 3. It yields a set of propositions B that is a subset of those that can be generated by 1
through 3. Since beliefs in the latter can be justified, so can belief in those propositions B. Step
5 merely applies a set of logical principles to B in order to assign probabilities, forming a set of
beliefs about probabilities P . Since these principles are justified, and beliefs about B are justified,
the resulting beliefs about P are justified. Step 6 merely applies the theorems of the probability
calculus to P , transforming the relevant beliefs into our analytic linking principles. Since we are
justified in accepting these theorems, and justified in accepting P , so we are justified in accepting
the linking principles. Step 7 merely takes the protocol sentences from Step 1 and applies them to
the linking principles of Step 6 in order to derive rational beliefs about the world given one’s total
evidence. If we thought of the linking principles as conditionals rather than as atomic statements
of conditional probability, this would be a straightforward application of modus ponens. Since the
linking principles are actually atomic statements of conditional probability, matters are somewhat
more complicated. The linking principles state the probability of metaphysical theories given pos-
sible observations; that is, a given principle effectively says “if we were to observe O, the posterior
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probability of theory T given O would be k.” The final step tells us what our actual observations
are; it tells us which linking principles are relevant; it tells us which principle to accept as provid-
ing the posterior probability of the theory given actual observations. Though technically different
from an application of modus ponens, the effect is the same as far as justification is concerned.
This is a very interesting result. Contrary to Hume, empirical foundationalism (British
empiricism, more or less) does not lead to metaphysical skepticism. In principle, immediate ex-
periences are relevant to metaphysical theories. If we reject empirical foundationalism because we
reject empiricism, a subtle modification of the method—one which makes the relevant changes to
Steps 1 and 2, plus adds any conditions necessary to weigh the conclusions of this method against
those provided by any other relevant method of practicing metaphysics—will yield the result that
metaphysics can be informed by immediate experience. Again, a very interesting result.
2.6 Conclusion
I have argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, empirical foundationalism (which is
essentially British empiricism) does not lead to skepticism of matters metaphysical. Further, I
have shown precisely how empirical foundationalists can practice metaphysics in a way that as-
sures that their conclusions will be about the world itself (reality) rather than our concepts of the
world (appearances). In Chapters 3 through 6 I shall argue that our observations of the physical
world constitute strong evidence in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism. These chapters may be
considered a sample application of the method, but their arguments are sufficiently general that
they may be adopted by philosophers rejecting many of the central epistemological and method-
ological assumptions of this project. It is my hope that, in part, the success of those arguments
will convince philosophers that the method defended in this chapter is promising.
That being said, here is where I think the method currently stands. Though it is promising,
it is not yet fully vindicated. It must be demonstrated that we are justified in believing some par-
ticular system of logic to be correct, and I do not know whether this can be achieved in a manner
consistent with the empiricist spirit of empirical foundationalism. However, as mentioned earlier,
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I am willing in principle to allow for the possibility of synthetic a priori reasoning as applied to
issues such as these; I think, for example, that the law of non-contradiction is rather more privi-
leged than, for example, the principle that all causes are prior to their effects. Further, more work
is required to demonstrate that the logical interpretation of probability is correct (or, at least, that
there is some correct method of assigning objective epistemic probabilities). And, of course, em-
pirical foundationalism must be established as the correct epistemic theory (no small task here,
either). I have not satisfied these burdens here (though I hope to do so elsewhere). If these bur-
dens can be satisfied, metaphysics is possible without synthetic a priori reasoning. If they cannot,
the method is still of great value. It clearly demonstrates that metaphysics can be empirically in-
formed by immediate experiences. Even if we do possess synthetic a priori reasoning, metaphysics
need not be an exercise in synthetic a priori reasoning only.
2.7 Appendix: Miscellaneous Methodological Criteria
The purpose of this section is to discuss two common methodological criteria and explain
their relevance to my methodology.
2.7.1 Ontological Economy and Occam’s Razor
Many philosophers have thought that ontological economy—the degree of ontological sim-
plicity of a theory in terms of both types of entities (quality) and number of entities (quantity)—is
closely related to the likelihood that a theory is true: simple theories (those with fewer entities or
types of entities) are thought to be more likely to be true than more complex theories. Or, to put
the matter simply, some philosophers have thought that theories involving robust ontologies are
simply unlikely to be true. This, I believe, is a mistake. Though there are clear-cut cases in which
changes in ontological economy (and nothing else) affect the a priori probability of a theory, it
is a mistake to generalize on the basis of these cases that ontological economy itself ought to be
privileged. I shall argue that we needn’t try to formulate some principle concerning ontological
economy; the method above already takes this matter into account.
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I shall start by offering an example.39 Let R be the proposition that there are cosmic reg-
ularities. Let G be the proposition that there are governing laws understood as states of affairs
that entail R. The method entails that the a priori probability of R&G is less than that of R, since
R could be satisfied even if G were not the case. (After all, R is equivalent to (R&G)∨ (R&¬G).)
The relevant difference between G and R is that G contains a more robust ontology. This sort of
example has led some philosophers to hold that robust ontologies are less likely to be true than
sparse ontologies. The problem with this approach is that hypotheses R and G are hypotheses of
different levels of generality. The hypotheses that are really in need of comparison are the follow-
ing: R&G and R& ∼G. These are the two hypotheses that make substantive metaphysical claims.
R, on its own, does not; it is an empirical statement. G and ∼G do not share this feature. Thus, a
generalization from the fact that P (G&R) < P (R) to the conclusion that ontological economy affects
the probability of a hypothesis simply misses the point. Through careful exploration, one might
discover that a certain hypothesis allows for fewer state descriptions than its competitor. This
would give one a reason to think that the former is less likely than the latter (this sort of approach
will be utilized in Chapters 3, 5, and 6). But, in fact, this is not what proponents of ontological
economy usually do.
(The example above concerns the economy of quality. The matter may be somewhat dif-
ferent for economy of quantity. However, I shall ignore this issue since most metaphysical issues
primarily differ with respect to quality; the theories considered here do not differ considerably
with respect to the quantity of entities they postulate.)
A justification of the preference for ontological economy requires something else entirely.
But what? No doubt there are epistemological concerns. For example, Schaffer (2008, p. 96)
summarizes (though he ultimately rejects the argument):
The idea is that our nomic knowledge is ultimately based on our observation of
regularities in history, so that if laws were more than such regularities, we could
have no access to this further feature. So the ontologist should just drop the fur-
ther feature and limit herself to the regularities.
39 I thank Michael Tooley for suggesting this particular example.
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But such concerns are based on the failure to recognize the methods of determining the observable
implications of metaphysical hypotheses and confirmation of such hypotheses; they simply fail to
recognize the methods set out in this chapter. Therefore, this sort of epistemological worry does
not justify the bias towards ontological economy. And, of course, one who endorses something
like Humeanism on the basis of this argument is not limiting himself to the regularities; he is also
endorsing a controversial metaphysical hypothesis.
The remaining justification (of which I am aware) of ontological economy is based on the
idea that certain metaphysical entities are strange or mysterious (see for example (Mackie 1977)
and (Sider 2001)).40 I am sympathetic to the idea that we shouldn’t utilize concepts that we
don’t understand. If mysteriousness is just a property of poorly-defined concepts, then I have no
objection to this idea. But our method of defining theoretical terms and referring to theoretical
entities eliminates mystery since it ensures a proper understanding of the relevant concepts. If
mysteriousness is something else, then it is very difficult to see what can be said in defense of
ontological economy.
To sum up, if there is a role for ontological economy (and I’m not sure that there is one), it
is this: ontological economy can act as a rule of thumb. If we look at two theories, and cannot say
whether one has more explanatory power than the other, and don’t know enough about them to try
to determine their prior probabilities via the method outlined in 2.4.4, then we can provisionally
select the simpler of the two theories. Or, if we have a set of equally explanatory theories, one
more robust than the other, we can select the sparsest one. Ultimately, however, we shall see that
such situations rarely obtain. Once serious philosophical investigation takes place, we have little
or no use for such rules of thumb. The method of assigning probabilities already accomplishes
exactly what we should like to accomplish. There is no need—and no room—for unmotivated
additions that conflict with the method.
40 Mackie’s prejudice is against normative properties; Sider’s is against modal properties.
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2.7.2 The Status of Modal Intuitions
Some philosophers believe that we have special epistemic access to matters metaphysical—
that we have certain intuitions (or seemings) that are reliable indicators of the way the world is.
The relevant intuitions here are not intuitions that a certain object or class of object “falls under”
a certain concept; rather, they are intuitions that a given theory or proposition is true or possible
or necessary, et cetera. Modal intuitions are of particular relevance to this project since most
explanations of natural regularities include modal elements. For example, we might ask ourselves
whether it is possible for there to be uninstantiated laws of nature—that is, a law for which there is
no corresponding regularity. Some philosophers (Tooley (1977; 1987) and Carroll (1994)) believe
that it is possible.41 They do so by describing state descriptions in which there is such a law that
seem (to them at least) to be possible. Others (Beebee (2000)) believe that uninstantiated laws
are not possible. Whatever the arguments of these philosophers, our question is just whether the
presence of a modal intuition that P provides one with epistemic reason to believe that P is the
case.
The appeal to modal intuitions is sometimes a veiled way to invoke synthetic a priori reason-
ing. Many of our intuitions concern synthetic principles: for example, the principle that a given
state description S is possible. But what is the sense of possible being used here? We generally
have good epistemic access to the matter of whether something is epistemically possible. But do
we have good epistemic access to the matter of whether something is metaphysically possible—
that is, genuinely possible, possible simpliciter, possible in the world itself ? To make the latter claim
is to say that one has some reason for believing a synthetic principle with no empirical evidence.
In other words, it is to accept synthetic a priori reasoning. It would be nice if our intuitions
could be granted some special epistemic status, but I’m not sure how such status can be granted.
Of course, it may be that they provide the only possible justification for e.g. believing that one
system of logic is more likely to be correct than another. However, I believe that our modal in-
41 I have in mind Tooley’s ten-particle case and Carroll’s mirror case. To be fair, it isn’t clear that Tooley intends for
the operative sense of possibility to be metaphysical possibility, but this seems to be a way in which many philosophers
view cases like these.
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tuitions concerning cases such as these are rather different from our modal intuitions concerning
the metaphysical possibility/impossibility/necessity of complex state descriptions—the former
are less susceptible to problems of intersubjectivity than the latter. Thus, in this project I shall do
my best to avoid appeals to intuition entirely, while acknowledging that my project may require
them at the foundational level.
Chapter 3
Non-Humeanism
3.1 Introduction
In the empiricist tradition, necessity is often given the following reductive account: a propo-
sition is necessarily true (false) if and only if it is true (false) in virtue of its meaning or logical
form—that is, if and only if it is analytically true (false). This definition is consistent with empiri-
cal foundationalism in that the resulting form of necessity is perfectly intelligible even to the strict
empiricist. However, this account entails that there is no synthetic necessity in the world; it is the
paradigm statement of Humeanism. On this reductive account, propositions such as 2+2=4, p ∨
∼p, and no bachelors are married are necessarily true, but propositions such as all objects with mass
are attracted to one another and light travels faster than anything else are not. The propositions that
are necessarily true according to Humeanism are interesting, but they don’t seem to be the sorts
of necessary truths that are relevant to natural regularities; that is, they don’t seem to have ex-
planatory power with respect to the regularities of the natural world. Thus, the reductive account
of necessity seems to rule out any explanation of regularity that entails the following schema:
regularities occur because they must. (Whether or not it does in fact rule out such explanations
is, for the moment, an open question; it will be examined carefully in Chapter 4, the chapter on
Governing Humeanism.) This sort of explanation seems to require a different sort of necessity
altogether: synthetic necessity—irreducible necessity that resides in the world itself. We must
determine whether this sort of necessity is intelligible.
As discussed in the last chapter, irreducibly modal features of the world are not immediately
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observable. Hence, if the concept of synthetic necessity is to be analyzed at all, it must be given a
theoretical analysis. The first goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that the concept of synthetic
necessity (and thus Non-Humeanism) is intelligible according to empirical foundationalism. The
second is to argue that the postulate of synthetic necessity has no negative effect on the a priori
probability of a theory. In short, this chapter offers a preliminary defense of Non-Humeanism,
specifically Governing Non-Humeanism.
This chapter is organized as follows. 3.2 constitutes my analysis of synthetic necessity. I
start this section by offering an analysis of the concept of metaphysical possibility. Humeanism and
Non-Humeanism are then distinguished with respect to their treatment of metaphysical possibil-
ity. 3.3 considers a priori objections to a well-known version of Non-Humeanism, the view that
there are bare dispositions. I find these a priori arguments inconclusive. 3.4 considers the a priori
probabilities of Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism, and it is argued that Governing
Non-Humeanism is a priori just as likely as Humeanism.
3.2 A Theoretical Analysis of Synthetic Necessity
The following subsections provide the theoretical analysis of synthetic necessity. The first
provides the stipulative analyses of metaphysical possibility and synthetic necessity. The remain-
ing subsections consider implications of the analyses and respond to issues brought up by the
analyses.
3.2.1 The Analysis of Metaphysical Possibility
Some philosophers (van Inwagen 1998) define metaphysical possibility as possibility sim-
pliciter, or possibility period. In Chapter 2, I explained how the logical interpretation of prob-
ability provides a concept of epistemic possibility, which may be more carefully developed as
follows. Logic gives us a notion of formal consistency. A formal system implies that contradic-
tory sets of propositions are impossible, but, since it lacks content, it doesn’t do much else for
the pursuit of metaphysics. This problem is remedied by adding meanings to terms in a formal
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language. This is the role of a semantics, which gives rise to a new concept: semantical consistency.
For example, in natural English the proposition the cat is on the mat is semantically consistent,
but the proposition the bachelor is married is semantically inconsistent. Logical/semantical consis-
tency is just the intersection (the overlap) of formal and semantical consistency; a proposition
is logically/semantically consistent if and only if it is both logically consistent and semantically
consistent. Different languages will obviously yield different sets of logically/semantically con-
sistent propositions, but the assumption here is that empirical foundationalists will apply their
own language as generated by methods 1 through 3 explained in Chapter 2. From this discussion
it should be clear that Carnapian state descriptions just are logical/semantical possibilities. I in-
troduce this concept because it will be helpful to compare the analysis of metaphysical possibility
with the analysis of logical/semantical consistency.
It is an open question whether metaphysical possibility (whatever that is) is the same thing
as logical/semantical consistency. It is not initially obvious that the concept of metaphysical pos-
sibility is analyzable (notice I do not say reducible) within empirical foundationalism. The same
goes for the concept of synthetic necessity. These concepts probably weren’t analyzable within
empirical foundationalism during Hume’s time, since he lacked the technical resources that are
constituents of the method explained in Chapter 2. My goal is to show that these technical re-
sources do in fact make the crucial difference: they allow for a theoretical analysis of metaphysical
possibility and synthetic necessity that can be offered in empirically respectable terms.
I wish to emphasize three important points before continuing. First, it should be understood
that my analyses of metaphysical possibility and synthetic necessity are stipulative; I do not claim
that this is how other philosophers have understood these concepts (though I do think that it is
how many of them have understood them). Second, the goal of section 3.2 is merely to show
that the claims of Non-Humeanism are perfectly intelligible to the empiricist; the goal is not to
argue that metaphysical possibilities are distinct from logical/semantical possibilities; the goal is
not to argue that the Non-Humean conception of metaphysical possibility is better than, or more
accurate than, the Humean conception of metaphysical possibility (in fact, the concepts are the
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same); the goal is not to argue that there are synthetic necessities. I am merely arguing (in this
section) that Non-Humeanism is intelligible. Third, I do not here attempt to explain either the
ground of synthetic necessities or our epistemic access to these necessities. The former appears
to be impossible if doxastic empiricism is true; the latter is explained by the arguments of later
chapters, which rely on the method set out in Chapter 2.
My explanation of the concept of metaphysical possibility is given in three steps. The first
step is to provide a semantics for modal logic. The well-known possible worlds semantics will
suit our purposes just fine.1 (I assume a basic familiarity with this semantics, and thus my
explanation of its basic features is extremely brief.) A statement such as ‘it is necessary that’ is
analyzed in terms of possible worlds. What is a possible world? For the purposes of a logical system,
it doesn’t matter. Philosophically, however, this is a very controversial matter. Fortunately, we
already have a suitable, empirically respectable candidate for possible worlds: Carnapian state
descriptions. Thus, for our purposes, a possible world is nothing more and nothing less than a
logically/semantically consistent state description. The semantics uses possible worlds to define
the standard modal operators,  and , by appealing to an interpretation, where an interpretation
is a specification of a set of possible worlds (for the moment, I ignore accessibility relations for
simplicity). A proposition that is prefixed with  (is necessarily true) is true if and only if it is
true at every world in the interpretation; a proposition that is prefixed with  (is possibly true)
is true if and only if it is true at at least one possible world in the interpretation. The empirical
foundationalist has no trouble understanding  and  for the simple reason that the empirical
foundationalist has no trouble understanding (a) the concept of a possible world, (b) the concept
of an interpretation, and (c) the terms used in the definitions of  and .
For the purposes of illustration, I shall now demonstrate how an empirical foundational-
ist understands analytic necessities within the context of the possible worlds semantics. Since
an interpretation is constructed out of state descriptions, and since all state descriptions are by
1 This version of the semantics is due to Kripke (1963). For a clear and accessible introduction to possible worlds
semantics, see (Forbes 1985).
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definition logically/semantically consistent, no interpretation includes any impossible state de-
scriptions. By definition, analytic necessities are true according to every state description. Hence,
every analytic necessity is true in every possible state description. Hence, every analytic necessity
is true in every state description in every interpretation. Hence, every interpretation makes all
analytic necessities necessarily true.
Synthetic necessities, if there are any, are not like that. All synthetic necessities are, in some
sense, conceivably false; they are not logically/ semantically necessary, and thus the sense in which
they are necessary can only be the metaphysical sense. Hence, for every synthetic necessity, there
is a logically/semantically consistent state description that entails (more precisely, would entail if
it were part of the relevant interpretation) that it is false. If such a state description is included in
the interpretation, the synthetic necessity in question will fail to hold. Thus, synthetic necessities
hold only on restricted interpretations: those interpretations in which the epistemically possible
state descriptions which constitute counterexamples to the synthetic necessity (or necessities) in
question are omitted.
In light of this, the second step is to demonstrate that the empirical foundationalist is ca-
pable of understanding the concept of a restricted interpretation. This is very simple. A restricted
interpretation is nothing more than a set of logically/semantically consistent state descriptions, so
of course there is no trouble in understanding this concept. Here is a simple illustration. Suppose
that one has a very simple language: this simple language permits only four state descriptions: α,
β, γ , and δ. These are the logical/semantical possibilities. Now consider interpretations A and B:
A: {α,β,γ,δ}
B: {α,β}
Both interpretations are perfectly intelligible. One can simply apply the definitions of  and 
to determine which propositions are possible and which are necessary on the two interpretations.
Given the nature of α, β, γ , and δ, it may turn out that B includes some necessary truths not
included in A. For instance, α, β, γ , and δ may be state descriptions generated by a language
59
with two possible sentences, P and Q, such that α = {P ,Q}, β = {P ,∼Q}, γ = {∼P ,Q}, and δ =
{∼P ,∼Q}. In this case, P is true on interpretation B, the restricted interpretation, but not on A,
the unrestricted interpretation.
The third step is to demonstrate that the empirical foundationalist is capable of understand-
ing the concept of an interpretation’s being the actual interpretation, that is, the interpretation
that “correctly describes” the world. Note that Humeanism already includes the concept of an
interpretation’s being actual; it holds that the unrestricted interpretation is actual.2 Not explicitly,
perhaps, but this is entailed by the Humean’s claim that propositions are necessarily true only if
they are analytic. Humeanism is, after all, a theory about the world. And so the Humean can
hardly criticize the Non-Humean for including this same concept.
(There are additional reasons for thinking that the concept of a restricted interpretation’s
being actual is a familiar concept to us, but these are discussed in the next subsection. There,
I shall also discuss the important charge that there is something wrong with the application of
“actuality” to interpretations—that is, with the concept of an interpretation’s being the actual
interpretation.)
Here, then, is the analysis of metaphysical possibility:
MP: P is metaphysically possible =df P is part of a state description that is a member of the inter-
pretation I that is actual.
This definition is rather “thin.” It only depends upon the concepts of state description, possible
worlds semantics, interpretation, and actuality. But this is a desirable result from the perspective
of empirical foundationalism. The above definition doesn’t explain how metaphysical possibility
is related to logical/semantical consistency, nor should it; that would be to stipulate a solution
to an important philosophical issue. It doesn’t explain what our epistemic access to the meta-
physically possible is. It doesn’t assume either Humeanism or Non-Humeanism. It leaves these
matters open, which is exactly what we want, given that it is, at the moment, an open question
2 In the next section, we shall see that in fact the Humean’s concept of an interpretation is also restricted, but in a
slightly different sense.
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whether Humeanism or Non-Humeanism is correct. Additionally, it is consistent with the view
that metaphysical possibility is possibility simpliciter.
We are now in the position to complete our analysis of synthetic necessity. We saw above that
there are synthetic necessary truths if and only if the actual interpretation is restricted. Thus the
empirical foundationalist can distinguish Humeanism and Non-Humeanism as follows:
Non-Humeanism is true (that is, there is synthetic necessity) =df the actual interpretation is re-
stricted.3
Humeanism is true (that is, there is no synthetic necessity) =df the actual interpretation is unre-
stricted.
I wish to stress once more that the definition of metaphysical possibility is neutral between
Humeanism and Non-Humeanism. It is important to recognize the limited nature of my claim in
this section. In saying that Non-Humeanism is intelligible, I am merely saying that we all under-
stand what the Non-Humean means when he says that a state description cannot obtain (or that it
must obtain). There is nothing mysterious or confusing about the Non-Humean’s claim. Though
there might be something mysterious about the source and ground of the necessity posited by the
Non-Humean, that is an entirely separate issue, and does not affect in any way the content of the
claim itself.4
3 Note that Governing Non-Humeanism (NHΩ) and Descriptive Non-Humeanism (NHΦ+) provide different meth-
ods of restricting interpretations.
4 Robert Hanna has helpfully suggested that further work is required to show that the analysis provided here con-
stitutes an analysis of synthetic necessity. The basic charge is that a more careful discussion of the relevant semantics is
required. After all, I have said that a proposition is analytic if and only if it is true in virtue of meaning or logical form,
but I have said little about what it is for a proposition to be true in virtue of meaning. The idea is then that different
languages can include different meaning postulates, with the result that different languages can include different ana-
lytic propositions. Though I have yet to investigate this matter carefully, my hope is that the worry can be avoided by
carefully specifying the conditions under which an empirical foundationalist is justified in accepting a given meaning
postulate. Some meaning postulates may turn out to be analytic in virtue of being rules that merely state purely logical
connections between simple concepts and more complex ones. Others may turn out to be themselves synthetic. The
idea will be to distinguish these different sorts of meaning postulates, and then argue that “analytic” propositions gen-
erated by synthetic meaning postulates count as synthetic propositions in the sense we care about here. For example,
suppose we introduce the meaning postulate no shade in the spectrum of colors is a distinct shade in the spectrum of colors.
According to this postulate, the following proposition is analytic: no shade of red is a shade of green. However, since the
meaning postulate itself appears to be synthetic, the sense in which the latter proposition is analytic isn’t the same as
the sense in which propositions such as p ∨ ∼p or all bachelors are unmarried is analytic.
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3.2.2 More on the Concept of Actual Restricted Interpretations
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on my claim that the concept of a restricted
interpretation’s being actual is intelligible. To do so, I wish to point out two areas in which the
concept is already familiar.
First, possible worlds semantics are usually more complicated than described above. In
addition to the above components, most systems include a set R of accessibility relations, relations
that allow for a system to capture the idea that that which is possible at one world may not be
possible at another. As before, the semantics uses possible worlds to define the standard modal
operators,  and , by appealing to an interpretation. However, in this case an interpretation is a
specification of a set of possible worlds plus accessibility relations between worlds. A proposition
that is prefixed with  (is necessarily true) at a worldw is true if and only if it is true at every world
in the interpretation that is accessible from w; a proposition that is prefixed with  (is possibly
true) at w is true if and only if it is true at at least one possible world that is accessible from w.
How is this relevant? The view that the actual interpretation is unrestricted is consistent
with only one characterization of R: that every world is accessible from every world. But certainly
we understand systems in which R has a different set of relations. We understand exactly how
they work, and what their proponents claim. And we have examples in which different character-
izations of R correctly and completely describe some portion of reality. For example, the way in
which it is possible for the king to move in a game of chess depends on the state of the game—
specifically, the king can be castled only if there are no pieces between the king and the rook in
question, and neither the king nor the rook have previously moved. This rule is perfectly intel-
ligible. So certainly the concept of a restricted interpretation’s being the actual interpretation is
intelligible.
Second, those philosophers (Humeans included) who accept something like classical logic
(C) (or, for that matter, pretty much any widely studied system of logic) already accept a restricted
interpretation. Consider a system of classical logic L minus one fundamental rule of inference. C
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includes some theorems that L does not. C allows for the derivation of contradictions not deriv-
able in L. Thus, the set of logically/semantically consistent state descriptions in C is a proper
subset of the set of logically/semantically consistent state descriptions in L. But many philoso-
phers (empiricists included!) accept the “move” from L to C, so they must be familiar in some
sense with the concept of the actual interpretation’s being restricted. Their concept of the actual
interpretation is a restricted interpretation. I cannot see how the move from Humeanism to Non-
Humeanism is any more problematic (insofar as we are concerned with intelligibility) than the
move from L to C. This problem generalizes. There is nothing unique (relevant to our purposes)
from the move from L to C. The same can be said for the acceptance of virtually any system of
logic at all. Those philosophers who think that some logical axioms are true (regardless of what
those axioms are) will be in the same boat.
Of course, we might question one’s motives in moving from L to C. There are a number
of difficult epistemological worries that arise in making such a move. But none of these issues
are relevant to whether or not the move is intelligible, and the move from Humeanism to Non-
Humeanism is not problematic in any additional way. The problem of understanding the concept
of an interpretation’s being actual is exactly the same for any restricted interpretation, whether
the restriction is from S5 to S4, L to C, or from Humeanism to Non-Humeanism.
This argument may be summed up by the following dilemma: either we have reason to
accept that a system of logic (or a set of logical principles) is correct or we do not; if we do, then
we are perfectly comfortable with the concept of a restricted interpretation; if we don’t, then we
cannot form any complex concepts nor can we ever have justification for any belief involving
complex concepts. The reason is that, as empirical foundationalists, in order to form complex
concepts and justify inferentially justified beliefs we need to be justified in believing that our
system of analysis is truth-preserving. Our system of analysis is our system of logic. Thus rejecting
the concept of a restricted interpretation’s being actual has disastrous skeptical consequences. The
only recourse for those who reject it is to adopt a thoroughgoing pragmatism. This is an option
that must be dealt with at some point, but for this project I have assumed that empiricists can be
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justified in their logical beliefs. Here I have demonstrated that if empiricists can be justified in
their logical beliefs, they are also capable of possessing the concept of synthetic necessity.
3.2.3 Synthetic A Priori Reasoning and Restricted Interpretations
Suppose for the moment that we possess a faculty of rational intuition that allows for syn-
thetic a priori reasoning. Through the use of this faculty, we come to believe that necessarily, no
shade of red is a shade of green. Of course, this proposition entails that the actual interpretation
is restricted since (according to conventional wisdom) the proposition is not analytic. The actual
interpretation doesn’t include any state descriptions in which a shade of red is a shade of green,
despite the fact that such state descriptions are logically/semantically consistent.
If we are able to entertain this thought experiment, what reason can we have for thinking
that the concept of a restricted interpretation’s being actual is unintelligible? My point is merely
that the claim that Non-Humeanism is unintelligible has far-reaching consequences.5 Here, it
seems to suggest that we do not even understand the debate between rationalism and empiricism.
3.2.4 An A Priori Argument Against Humeanism?
There is an a priori argument that attempts to show that Humeanism is contradictory. My
reasons for including it in the section concerned with the intelligibility of Non-Humeanism will
become apparent shortly. Consider again the Humean’s account of necessity: a proposition is
necessarily true (false) if and only if it is true (false) in virtue of its meaning or logical form. Our
question is whether this account of necessity is necessarily true.
If Humeanism is the position that the above account of necessity is necessarily true, then
Humeanism is contradictory. Why? The proposition only analytic propositions are necessarily true
is synthetic, and thus self-contradictory.
If Humeanism is only contingently true, then Humeanism allows for the possibility of syn-
thetic necessities. But the position that there are no synthetic necessities, though there could be, is
5 Readers who find this sort of consequence unappealing will also be interested in Carroll’s (2004, Chapter 1)
centrality thesis, according to which almost all of our everyday concepts have nomological commitments.
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a bit strange—perhaps unintelligible. There is, however, a way to make sense of it. But it involves
accepting a restricted interpretation—one in which there are worlds not accessible from the actual
world but accessible from some possible worlds. For example, suppose that w is the actual world,
and thatw, u, and v are worlds accessible fromw, and that onlyw and u are accessible from u, and
that the result is that some synthetic proposition P is necessarily true in u (for example, because
P is true in both w and u but not v). v is not accessible from u, but it is accessible from w, and
hence P is not necessarily true in w though it is necessarily true in u.
The upshot? Humeanism, if it is to be intelligible, includes the concept of the actual inter-
pretation’s being restricted.
In this section, I have merely tried to show that we understand the claims of the Non-
Humean, and it is important to recognize that understanding the claims of the Non-Humean does
not entail understanding the “source and ground” of synthetic necessity. Whether we have any
reason to accept Non-Humeanism is the project of the final section of this chapter and the later
chapters of this project.
3.2.5 Implications and Further Discussion
I have not actually given a complete, positive empirical analysis of the relevant concept of
actuality. However, I have shown that it is a concept with which most empiricists are familiar.
Consider some arbitrarily chosen state description S. A Non-Humean might explain his position
as follows:
S is perfectly intelligible, perfectly consistent. It is certainly conceivable. Nonethe-
less, there is a theory T that says that S just cannot obtain. I don’t claim to know
what it is about S that makes it the case that it cannot obtain. I’m not trying to
explain what sort of reasons we might have for accepting T . I’m just saying that
we understand T . That’s all.
I don’t think that there’s anything confusing about this position for the same reason that I don’t
find anything confusing about the following claim: there is a system of logic with certain axioms,
and it turns out that some of those axioms are false. Of course, we might wonder what reasons
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one could possible have for accepting it, but we don’t, I claim, find it unintelligible. The analysis
implicit in this quote is a negative one. It merely suggests a necessary condition for something’s
being metaphysically possible. But we understand it. And that is enough for our purposes.
The analysis of synthetic necessity provided above does have some interesting implications.
Since synthetic necessity is not mysterious, we can entertain conflicting synthetic necessities. For
example, we can entertain both
(1) Necessarily, nothing travels faster than the speed of light.
and
(2) Necessarily, something travels faster than the speed of light.
Of course, (1) and (2) are logically inconsistent. Though they are both epistemically possible (we
can understand entertain both propositions), they cannot both be metaphysically possible. The
upshot is that we can specify different versions of Non-Humeanism, many of which are inconsis-
tent with one another. However, as long as each version offers an internally consistent restriction
of the interpretation, each is logically/semantically consistent.
This phenomenon is by design. We want our analysis of synthetic necessity to ensure that
the set of logical/semantical possibilities is a superset of the set of metaphysical possibilities in
order to justify our inferences from the former to the latter. The above account helps to ensure
that this condition is met.
Another interesting implication of this account is that it allows for the possibility of distinct
state descriptions that are categorically equivalent. Roughly, the idea is that two state descriptions
are categorically equivalent if and only if they have all the same non-modal features, but this
term is defined most perspicuously through reference to features of the logical interpretation of
probability set out in Chapter 2. Two state descriptions are categorically equivalent if and only
if their assignments of individuals (from parameter Σ) and Humean predicates (from parameter
Φ) are the same and they differ only with respect to their Non-Humean predicates (from Φ) or
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their Non-Humean connections (from parameter Ω). Thus, for example, the following two Non-
Humean state descriptions are categorically equivalent, and each is internally consistent.
(3) Fa,Ga,Fb,Gb, and F-ness necessitates G-ness.
(4) Fa,Ga,Fb,Gb, and G-ness necessitates F-ness.
These examples are versions of Governing Humeanism since they are characterized in terms of
NHΩ, but similar examples can be given using the other characterization. One virtue of this
characterization is that it offers a very clear picture of the fact that state descriptions can be cate-
gorically equivalent but modally distinct.
I have argued that empiricists can provide an analysis of Non-Humeanism. The question
now is whether there is any reason to accept a Non-Humean ontology over a Humean ontology.
In 3.3, I examine three arguments against a prominent version of Non-Humeanism: the view that
there are bare dispositions. Even if Governing Non-Humeanism can dispense with bare dispo-
sitions altogether (whether this is so is not clear to me), the arguments against bare dispositions
are worth considering since they rely on the modal features of bare dispositionalism. I find that
these arguments are inconclusive at best. In 3.4 I consider the a priori probabilities of Descrip-
tive Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism, and I argue that we have reason to think that,
prior to any observation at all, Governing Non-Humeanism is just as likely to be true as Descrip-
tive Humeanism.
3.3 Bare Dispositionalism: A Type of Non-Humeanism
Consider the following very basic explanation of a natural regularity. All salt is such that, if
it were placed in water, it would dissolve. Why is this? Salt has the property water-solubility, which
is to say that there is a Non-Humean connection between salt, water, and solubility. That connec-
tion is the ground of the subjunctive conditional in question.6 Now, subjunctive conditionals are
often used to distinguish between dispositional and categorical properties. The traditional way of
6 I shall consider this sort of explanation with much greater care in Chapter 6.
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drawing the distinction is as follows: dispositional properties entail subjunctive conditionals; cat-
egorical properties do not. (Note that I’m going to offer a different distinction.) Since subjunctive
conditionals have modal character, the view that there are irreducible dispositions constitutes a
version of Non-Humeanism. The purpose of this section is to consider a priori arguments against
this version of Non-Humeanism (since they are common and well-known) and argue that they do
not give us reason to reject Non-Humeanism.
Before beginning, I shall make a few notes on my requirements for a theory of dispositional
properties. Since the purpose of this project is to provide an explanation of natural regularities,
I am (here) only interested in dispositional properties insofar as they are relevant to this project.
I shall ignore many interesting and otherwise important distinctions, such as the distinction be-
tween dispositional and categorical predicates. In short, I shall define dispositions in a way that
suits my purposes. This might sound dogmatic. However, here one must be mindful of my guid-
ing methodological criteria. In metaphysics, one usually begins by defining a concept, and then,
and only then, is one in a position to see whether there is anything in the world that satisfies that
concept. I shall simply be concerned with a concept of dispositional properties that promises (so
it would seem) a straightforward explanation of regularity.
3.3.1 The Dispositional / Categorical Distinction and Realism vs. Reductionism
My way of drawing the dispositional/categorical distinction is as follows:
Disposition: D is a dispositional property if and only if there exist a property M and conditions C
such that, necessarily, (∀y)((y has D and y is in C)⊃ y is M).7
Disposition explains why dispositions entail subjunctives; they entail subjunctives in virtue of the
necessity in the analysans. Having stipulated the dispositional/categorical distinction, we must
now ask a further question: are there any basic dispositional properties? There are two ways for
a property to be dispositional (that is, to play the role of D in Disposition). First, it could satisfy
7 I thank Michael Tooley for proposing this type of analysis.
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the right-hand side of the biconditional in virtue of its own intrinsic nature, that is, in a basic
and irreducible way. Call such a property a bare disposition, and call the view that there are bare
dispositions bare dispositionalism. Second, it could satisfy the right-had side of the biconditional in
virtue of features of the world extrinsic to it. Let a categorical property be a property that does not
satisfy D in virtue of its own intrinsic nature. Then a categorical property Q could play the role
of D in virtue of a (necessary) governing law that relates Q to M and C in the relevant manner.
On this reductive view of dispositions all dispositions reduce to or supervene on other features
of the world; usually, these features include (or require) laws of nature. Accordingly, reducible
dispositions cannot be used to justify laws or explain regularities, since it is laws or regularities
(depending on the type of reductionism) that ultimately ground dispositions.8 Our task is now
to consider whether there is anything a priori objectionable about bare dispositional properties.
If so, then one might worry that the arguments can be generalized to apply against all versions of
Non-Humeanism.
It is important to note that Disposition is a (much) stronger analysis of dispositions than
is popular. It can be weakened by replacing the necessity in Disposition with counterfactual
dependence or by changing the analysis so that it permits finks and antidotes (see (Bird 2007) for
a good example of a weaker analysis). However, there is a very good reason for using the strong
analysis here. The central question we are investigating in this chapter is whether the modal
elements of bare dispositions make them a priori objectionable. If objections to bare dispositions
satisfying this strong analysis fail, it is unlikely that objections to bare dispositions satisfying
some weaker analysis will succeed. Thus, for now our interest shall lie with the necessity present
in Disposition.
8 I believe that this is true also for reductive possible worlds accounts of dispositions—that is, ones that rely upon
something like the Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) possible worlds semantics for counterfactual conditionals.
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3.3.2 Three Arguments Against Bare Dispositionalism
In this section I shall consider three arguments against bare dispositions. I argue that none
provide reason to think that bare dispositionalism (or, for that matter, Non-Humeanism in gen-
eral) is in any way problematic or likely to be false.
3.3.2.1 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson
Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (1982) endorse something like Disposition as the ground of
the dispositional/categorical distinction. They argue that every disposition can be analyzed in
terms of its antecedent circumstances (that is, its conditions of manifestation), manifestations,
and causal basis, where by “causal basis” the authors mean “the property or property-complex of
the object that, together with the first member of the pair—the antecedent circumstances—is the
causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation...” (251). It would seem, then, that
the causal basis may be identified with the disposition itself. However, this is explicitly rejected
by Prior et al. (1982). They offer instead the distinctness thesis (or, as MicKitrick (2003) prefers,
the non-identity thesis):
Distinctness: Causal bases are not identical to their attendant dispositions.
The conjunction of Distinctness and Disposition entails that there are no bare dispositions (since
Distinctness is effectively a reductive thesis on its own).9
What reasons are there for accepting Distinctness? Prior et al. (1982) offer three. The first
is that the same disposition can have different causal bases in different objects. For example,
the causal basis of the fragility of a wine glass differs from the causal basis of the fragility of a
ceramic bowl. According to MicKitrick (2003, 358), “we do not have to say that if a disposition
is ever identical to its causal basis, then it has to be identical to all of its possible causal bases.”
In this case, one could claim that one of the causal bases is a bare disposition, but that the other
reduces somehow. I believe that something stronger can be said in response. I see no reason to
9 As MicKitrick (2003, 361fn) points out, it’s not obvious that bare dispositions are the target of Prior, Pargetter, and
Jackson, but their argument can be applied in this way.
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accept the claim that the very same disposition can have different causal bases in different objects,
because I see no reason to accept the individuation of properties required for the truth of this
claim. Specifically, I see no reason to think that the fragility of the glass is the same property as
the fragility of the bowl. Isn’t it more plausible to suppose that we are just subsuming two distinct
properties under one predicate?10 A single word can name different things. ‘Jade’, for example,
refers to the distinct minerals jadite and nephrite. In fact, upon discovering that the fragility of the
two objects is due to distinct causal bases, shouldn’t we conclude that our initial judgment—that
the fragility of the glass and the bowl is one and the same—is mistaken?
The second argument for Distinctness is based on the idea that dispositions can be swamped.
For example, the disposition fragility might normally have as its causal basis the property P . But
what if a glass with P also possessed some “fortifying” property Q, such that it was not inclined
to break when struck? I believe that McKitrick’s (2003, 361) response here is decisive:
As applied to a bare disposition, PPJ’s suggestion amounts to the claim that an ob-
ject x can have a disposition D, but simultaneously x can have some other proper-
ties that stop x from having D. I don’t know how to make sense of this suggestion.
Say you have some object x that is “barely fragile.” You change x’s properties by
adding some fortifying stuff to it, so that it becomes nonfragile. It is not as if, after
it has become tough as nails, x has the bare fragility lingering inside of it. If the
fragility gets “swamped,” then the disposition and the causal basis go away. If a
disposition is its causal basis, you’re never going to be able to lose the disposition
and keep the causal basis.
The third argument for Distinctness is based on the idea that the connection between causal
basis and disposition is a contingent matter (see (Prior et al. 1982, 253-255)). Suppose that names
of properties, for example, ‘fragility’, are rigid designators. In worlds with different laws, a glass
with irregular structure might very well be tough rather than fragile. Identity facts are either
necessarily true or necessarily false. Thus it is necessarily false that having irregular structure
= fragility. Unfortunately, this argument simply begs the question against bare dispositions by
10 Michael Tooley has suggested the following point. It may be the case that there are disjunctive properties even if
there are no bare dispositional properties. Thus, for example, water-solubility might be the property of having one of
a collection of properties P, such that the laws of nature entail that anything with a property member of P is dissolves
when placed in water. In such a case, however, it isn’t at all clear to me why P ought to be treated as the disposition
instead of its members. The latter seems more plausible as a way of characterizing the nature of the world and the
things in it.
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assuming that the connection between causal basis and disposition is, in all cases, contingent.
Though I believe that the example just given is correct, this merely shows that fragility is not a
bare disposition. But few philosophers who accept bare dispositions would claim that fragility is
a bare disposition. Bare dispositions simply won’t be like this.
Prior et al. (1982) do offer a response to this sort of objection. In their view, the success
of this response depends on a posteriori identification of the causal basis and the disposition.
But this is simply incorrect. Most proponents of bare dispositions holds that, in the case of at
least some dispositions, it is a priori that the causal basis and disposition are identified. A good
example is the case of an electron. Electrons are defined theoretically by their causal role. Thus, it
is a priori that the causal basis and the disposition are one and the same. This is important because
the project of explaining natural regularities relies upon dispositions that are defined similarly.11
3.3.2.2 Armstrong
David Armstrong has given an objection to bare dispositions that is based on ontological
economy (perhaps ontological mystery would be more accurate). This is the objection that, if there
were bare dispositions, they would require the existence of Meinongian entities, and that this is
somehow problematic. The argument comes from (Armstrong 1999). Ellis (2001, 133) offers a
concise statement of the argument:
Generally speaking, things do not manifest their causal powers at all times. In-
deed, some things may have causal powers that they never manifest. A causal
power that had no categorical basis, and was never manifested, would have to be
purely dispositional. One could not even give a relational account of it. To be-
lieve in such a property is therefore to believe in a property the essence of which
involves a relation to an event that never occurs. It “points” to its manifestation,
but “the manifestation does not occur.” Such a property is a Meinongian property,
Armstrong says, since its existence entails a relation to a non-existent event.
Why the fuss? Meinongian properties are supposedly ontologically profligate or mysterious.
While I’m generally unsympathetic toward arguments from ontological economy, it is worth en-
11 For a different response to this argument see MicKitrick (2003, 359-360).
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tertaining this one to show where it goes wrong. With this in mind, it should be noted first that
the “Meinongian” properties entailed by bare dispositions are less objectionable if they can be
shown to be consistent with actualism, the thesis that everything actually exists. Thus, the goal is
to demonstrate that the account of dispositions utilized here is consistent with actualism.
Ellis’s response, which I shall appropriate, is essentially this: causal powers don’t point
to a unique manifestation, but rather a whole range of possible manifestations. Since this range of
manifestations is a natural kind (that is, a universal), dispositions do not “point to” something
that is ontologically mysterious; they do not entail the existence of merely possible events; they
just “point to” actual properties. Consider, for example, the disposition fragility. To say that a
glass is disposed to shatter is not to say that there exists some merely possible event of the glass’s
shattering; rather, it is to say that the glass is related to the natural kind (or universal) event
type, shattering. But this natural kind (or universal) actually exists, so Meinongian entities are
not entailed by the postulate of bare dispositions. (See (Ellis 2001, 132-135) for more elabora-
tion.) Finally, it should also be noted that Ellis’s response is consistent with Armstrong’s theory of
immanent (as opposed to transcendent) universals, so long as the relata in question (the natural
kinds) are somewhere instantiated.
The final point does, however, illustrate that bare dispositions have an interesting implica-
tion that Armstrong’s reductive treatment of dispositions lacks. Consider some disposition that
“points to” a property that is not instantiated in the world. For example, there could be a disposi-
tion to M in C, though objects with the disposition never enter into C, and as a matter of chance
no object in the world is M. If such a possibility is taken seriously (as I believe it should be),
then the postulate of bare dispositions commits one to the possibility of uninstantiated, and thus
transcendent, universals (since in the case described M is not instantiated anywhere in the actual
world). Armstrong’s reductionist analysis of dispositions does not have this same implication.12
The result is that bare dispositions may commit one to a transcendent view of properties, but not
to a Meinongian view of properties. Since I believe that the former are intelligible (though the
12 I thank Michael Tooley for explaining this point.
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latter may not be), Armstrong’s objection is not decisive.
3.3.2.3 Tooley
Michael Tooley has proposed an argument (in correspondence) that attempts to demonstrate
that bare dispositions are impossible.13 The argument relies on the following analysis of the
concept of an intrinsic property:
Intrinsicness: Necessarily, a property is intrinsic if and only if it is possible for a state of affairs
involving that property to be the only state of affairs at a world.
The basic idea is that dispositional properties are bare only if they are intrinsic to the objects
that possess them, but that the conjunction of bare dispositionalism and Intrinsicness entails a
contradiction. For simplicity, this version of the argument considers only the class of dispositional
properties that are always under their conditions of manifestation (such as the property of being
disposed to conserve one’s mass).
(5) Consider the bare dispositional property B (that manifests under all conditions) of being
disposed to preserve one’s mass.
(6) B is not intrinsic according to Intrinsicness (since the instantiation of B by any object x
entails the existence of a later stage of x in which x has B).
(7) Consider the following property that can be defined in terms of intrinsic properties plus
relations:
x has the property of mass-constancy (MC) =df if x has a mass = k at any time t, then for
all t* x exists at time t* and has a mass = k at t*.
Since the definition of MC is stipulative it is necessarily true. Thus, (7) entails
13 I thank Michael Tooley for graciously allowing me to cite his argument, and in the very simplified form in which it
appears here. This simplified version is preferable for present purposes since its core idea (and, I believe, the response
to it) can be presented more succinctly.
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(8) Necessarily ∀x (x has MC ⊃ x conserves its mass).
Now recall that in Disposition, the variable D was arbitrarily chosen. Thus, it can be universally
generalized to read:
Disposition: For all properties D, D is a dispositional property if and only if there exist a property M
and conditions C such that, necessarily, (∀y)((y has D and y is in C)⊃ y is M).
MC is a property. Since we’ve stipulated that there can be dispositions like B which have “vac-
uous” conditions of manifestation, any instantiation of MC will also be an instantiation of these
vacuous conditions of manifestation. Thus the conjunction of (8) and Disposition entails that MC
is a disposition. But this is problematic.
(9) Since an object can possessMC by chance (that is, not in virtue of having the bare disposi-
tion B), the possession of MC does not entail the possession of any dispositional property.
(10) Therefore, Disposition is not the correct definition of a dispositional property.
Tooley will then offer the following, revised analysis of what it is to be a dispositional property:
Disposition*: D is a dispositional property if and only if [D is an intrinsic property and there exist
a property M and conditions C such that, necessarily, (∀y)((y has D and y is in C)⊃ y is
M)].
Note that Disposition* does not entail that MC is a disposition; the reason, of course, is that
MC is not an intrinsic property. But now bare dispositionalism faces a serious problem. The
conjunction of (6) and Disposition* entails that B is not a disposition! But B is stipulated to be a
bare disposition. Hence the postulate of bare dispositions is self-contradictory.
Though this argument appears to be powerful, I believe that the defender of bare disposi-
tions has a successful rejoinder. We needn’t accept Disposition*. There are other ways to avoid the
implication that MC is a disposition. Tooley’s argument implicitly relies on the assumption that
if a property is not intrinsic according to Intrinsicness, then it is extrinsic in the following sense:
75
Extrinsicness: Extrinsic properties are those reducible to intrinsic properties plus relations.
But one can reasonably deny that Intrinsicness and Extrinsicness are exhaustive. There may be
some properties that are neither intrinsic nor extrinsic in Tooley’s sense, and bare dispositions
might be properties of this sort. Thus, one could substitute the following analysis for Disposition
and Disposition*:
Disposition**: D is a dispositional property if and only if [D is not an extrinsic property and there
exist a property M and conditions C such that, necessarily, (∀y)((y has D and y is in C)⊃ y
is M)].
According to this analysis, MC is not a (nor does it entail the possession of any) disposition.
The upshot of this analysis is that if there are bare dispositions, they are basic properties that
are neither intrinsic nor extrinsic in Tooley’s sense, that entail extrinsic properties, and where the
entailment in question is synthetic necessary entailment.14
Of course, we want to claim that bare dispositions are intrinsic properties in some sense. If
so, then an alternate analysis of intrinsicness is required. I am not completely certain what such
an analysis should look like, but then I’m not completely certain what reasons would be given
for thinking that something like Intrinsicness is the correct analysis in the first place. Perhaps it
is intuition? If so, then Intrinsicness can be easily modified to accommodate bare dispositions,
preserving the basic idea that an intrinsic property is one that does not depend ontologically on
any other for its instantiation:
Intrinsicness*: Necessarily, a property is intrinsic if and only if it is not extrinsic (in the sense of
Extrinsicness) and the set consisting of a state of affairs involving that property and those
states of affairs entailed by the instantiation of that property constitutes a possible world
(that is, a logically/semantically consistent maximal state description).
14 Does it follow that there can be logical connections between temporally distinct states of affairs? In a word, no. It
follows that there can be necessary connections between temporally distinct states of affairs, but these connections are
synthetic, and hence not logical.
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I’m not convinced that this is the correct analysis of intrinsic properties, but if something like it
is correct (and I see no reason to think that it is not) then one can accept that bare dispositions
are intrinsic properties without contradiction. Moreover, I don’t see any reason why we cannot
simply stipulate that this is the sense in which bare dispositions are intrinsic to their bearers.
My response to Tooley’s argument can be generalized for a number of similar potential ar-
guments against Non-Humeanism. Suppose one argues that a contradiction holds between some
Non-Humean analysis and some other principle, P . Unless one has better empirical reasons for P
(I can think of no empirical reasons to accept Intrinsicness or principles like it) or P is known a
priori, the Non-Humean should just reject P in favor of a slightly different analysis that does not
give rise to a contradiction.15 At this point, I am unaware of any suitable candidates for P that
could harm the Non-Humean position.
3.3.3 Summing Up
To sum up, we have not discovered any serious objections to the basic idea of bare dispo-
sitions (and, a fortiori, Non-Humeanism), however unfamiliar they might seem. Over the next
few chapters, I shall argue that there is very strong empirical evidence that Governing Non-
Humeanism is true. Although I have argued that there are not (at this time) any a priori reasons
to think that Non-Humeanism is impossible, I have not yet argued that there are good reasons
for thinking that Non-Humeanism is a priori as likely as Humeanism. In the final section of this
chapter, I shall just consider the a priori probabilities of Descriptive Humeanism and Governing
Non-Humeanism. The a priori probability of Governing Humeanism is discussed in Chapter 4;
the a priori probabilities of Descriptive Non-Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism are
compared in Chapter 6. How should these be assigned? I do not believe that there are any a pri-
ori arguments that show that either theory is impossible, so we shall have to see what the logical
interpretation of probability tells us about this matter.
15 This sort of method is employed by Helen Beebee (2000) as a response to objections to Humean Supervenience
(that is, to Descriptive Humeanism).
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3.4 The A Priori Probabilities of Descriptive Humeanism and Governing Non-
Humeanism
Since my goal is to defend Governing Non-Humeanism, I shall ignore Governing Humeanism
(until Chapter 4) and Descriptive Non-Humeanism (until Chapter 6), and instead directly com-
pare Descriptive Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism here. I’m providing this com-
parison here (instead of in Chapter 5) because I want to motivate the idea that Governing Non-
Humeanism is on a par with the other theories a priori. The matter of comparing the a priori prob-
abilities of Descriptive Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism is fairly simple, at least in
principle. We simply need to compare the number of state descriptions (if equiprobability of state
descriptions is correct) or structure descriptions (if equiprobability of structure descriptions is
correct) according to each theory. My focus shall be on the number of state descriptions, since the
argument can be easily modified to show that the same result holds if instead it is equiprobability
of structure descriptions that is correct. Note: Since I shall argue in Chapter 4 that Governing
Humeanism is contradictory, I shall assume that Humeanism is just Descriptive Humeanism.
One final disclaimer. At the end of Chapter 5, I shall suggest that our equiprobability pos-
tulates need to be modified in order to assign probabilities to state descriptions involving proba-
bilistic laws. I shall ignore this complication here.
So, how many state descriptions are there according to the each theory? Recall that the
number of state descriptions according to Humeanism or Governing Non-Humeanism is a func-
tion of the range of values given to the parameters Σ (the number of individuals), Φ (the number
of properties), and Ω (the number and type of Non-Humean connections).
Let’s start with a simple example. Note that this example is merely intended to help illus-
trate to the reader how the interpretation of probability is to be employed; this particular example
carries no weight in my argument whatsoever. Suppose that our language L is characterized as
follows:
Σ = {a,b}
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Φ = {F,G}
Ω = {necessitation(→)}
The above assignment of parameters yields the state descriptions represented in Figures 1 and 2
(note that the relation of necessitation allows for four possible characterizations of Ω). An X next
to a row refers to the fact that the state description in question is logically inconsistent; H1 refers
to the first Humean state description, N1 refers to the first Non-Humean state description, and so
on.
Table 3.1: Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = ∅
Fa Ga Fb Gb
H1 X
H2 X
H3 X
H4 X
H5 X X
H6 X X
H7 X X
H8 X X
H9 X X
H10 X X
H11 X X X
H12 X X X
H13 X X X
H14 X X X
H15 X X X X
Here is a summary of the results. The above specification of the parameters yields 15
Humean state descriptions and 19 Non-Humean state descriptions. Though some Humean state
descriptions have no Non-Humean categorical equivalents (for example, H7 and H8) some Humean
state descriptions have multiple Non-Humean categorical equivalents (for example H15, N8, N16,
and N19 are categorical equivalents). This is the case even if there is only one type of Non-Humean
connection. As the number of Non-Humean connections multiplies—one could add a relation of
exclusion, probabilistic relations, and others—the number of Humean state descriptions without
Non-Humean categorical equivalents drops, and the number of Humean state descriptions with
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Table 3.2: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {F→ G}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
X X
N1 X
X X
N2 X
N3 X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
N4 X X
N5 X X
X X X X
N6 X X X
X X X X
N7 X X X
N8 X X X X
Table 3.3: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {G→ F}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
N9 X
X X
N10 X
X X
N11 X X
N12 X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
N13 X X
N14 X X X
X X X X
N15 X X X
X X X X
N16 X X X X
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Table 3.4: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {F→ G, G→ F}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
X X
X X
X X
X X
N17 X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X X X
N18 X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
N19 X X X X
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Non-Humean categorical equivalents increases; furthermore, the number of Non-Humean cate-
gorical equivalents that map to each Humean state description will multiply.
This is all a fancy way of saying something that we knew already: as the number of Non-
Humean connections in Ω increases, the total number of Non-Humean state descriptions in-
creases (the possibility of probabilistic connections is especially relevant here). Humeanism ef-
fectively lacks this third parameter, and thus it shouldn’t be surprising that for at least some ways
of describing the world it countenances fewer state descriptions than Non-Humeanism.
Ultimately, we want to know which of Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism con-
tains more state descriptions (or a higher limiting relative frequency of state descriptions, in case
both contain infinitely many). Calculating the number of state descriptions according to each
theory would be a daunting task. This isn’t a task that we must pursue, although it is important
to distinguish two versions of Governing Non-Humeanism: the version according to which there
cannot be probabilistic connections, and the version according to which there can be probabilistic
connections—that is, probabilistic laws.
Suppose that there cannot be probabilistic laws. Then, as the number of individuals in-
creases, the a priori probability of Humeanism increases relative to that of Governing Non-Humeanism.
The reason is that although Governing Non-Humeanism will allow for multiple state descriptions
that are categorically equivalent to Humean state descriptions—namely, those that have some de-
gree of regularity—Humeanism will allow for many state descriptions that have no Non-Humean
categorical equivalents. For instance, suppose that L is as specified above with the exception that
Σ contains 100 individuals. In that case, the vast majority of Humean state descriptions would
have no Non-Humean categorical equivalents, since the vast majority of Humean state descrip-
tions are such as to include at least one F that is not a G and at least one G that is not an F. Thus, if
there cannot be probabilistic laws then Humeanism would appear to be a priori much more likely
than Governing Non-Humeanism.
The opposite is true if there can be probabilistic laws. In that case, every Humean state
description will have many Non-Humean categorical equivalents. In fact, there will be infinitely
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many: for each Humean state description, there will be infinitely many categorically equivalent
Non-Humean state descriptions. Every specification of Σ and Φ is consistent with every specifica-
tion of Ω that contains merely probabilistic laws. Say we have a probabilistic relation Pm, where
m is the degree to which the possession of a property probabilifies the possession of some other
property (the relation of nomic necessitation N is thus equivalent to the relation P1). m can take
any value between 0 and 1, and for any properties F and G, and all values ofm such that 0 < m < 1,
the resulting law is consistent with every specification of Σ and Φ . Since there are infinitely many
possible values, there are infinitely many state descriptions involving probabilistic laws that cor-
respond to each Humean state description. Thus, if we restrict ourselves to cases in which Σ and
Φ have finitely many members, then there are only finitely many Humean state descriptions and
infinitely many Non-Humean state descriptions. Thus if probabilistic connections are intelligible,
the a priori probability of Non-Humeanism (specifically, Governing Non-Humeanism) is higher
than the a priori probability of Humeanism.16
But which view is correct? Can there be probabilistic laws? One option is to take an ag-
nostic stance. Absent a proof in one direction or the other, we could average the results in the
above two cases, with the result being that the a priori probability of Governing Non-Humeanism
is greater than or equal to the a priori probability of Humeanism. Another option is to try to
demonstrate that the possibility of probabilistic laws involves a contradiction. I do not believe
that this option is likely to succeed, simply because I don’t find anything strange, confusing, or
otherwise mysterious about the idea of a probabilistic law. Moreover, given the present state of
our most highly-respected physical theories, a rejection of probabilistic connections would seem
to be an unwelcome step (though perhaps not too unwelcome, since there are interpretations of
quantum mechanics that dispense with indeterminacy). Finally, I should note that the Humean
cannot simply argue that probabilistic laws are impossible; she must argue that they are unintelli-
gible. The reason, of course, is that the relevant probabilities are epistemic probabilities rather than
16 As mentioned above, this argument ignores an important complication: namely, that the equiprobability postu-
lates in question cannot be directly applied to state descriptions involving probabilistic laws. I postpone discussion of
this matter until Chapter 5.
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objective chances. Thus, such an argument cannot appeal to the synthetic a priori if it is to satisfy
my guiding methodological principles.
Matters are only slightly more complicated if instead it is equiprobability of structure de-
scriptions that is correct (I shall assume the intelligibility of probabilistic laws). It would ap-
pear that Governing Non-Humeanism countenances the same number of structure descriptions
as Humeanism. The reason has already be stated above. I said,
As the number of Non-Humean connections multiplies—one could add a relation
of exclusion, probabilistic relations, and others—the number of Humean state de-
scriptions without Non-Humean categorical equivalents drops, and the number of
Humean state descriptions with Non-Humean categorical equivalents increases.
For every Humean state description H , there is at least one Non-Humean state description that
is categorically equivalent to H (remember that I am assuming the intelligibility of probabilis-
tic laws). Hence Humeanism and Non-Humeanism countenance the same number of structure
descriptions. Equiprobability of Structure Descriptions then says that probabilities are assigned
equally to state descriptions that are a member of each structure description. However, since
we observed that there are significantly more state descriptions according to Governing Non-
Humeanism than Humeanism, the suggestion will be that Governing Non-Humeanism “captures”
more of the weight of each structure description. Again, the result will be that Governing Non-
Humeanism is a priori more likely than Humeanism.
A worry with this explanation is that we do not know exactly how the state descriptions are
distributed among the structure descriptions. Hence we should perhaps opt for a more limited
conclusion. Since we don’t know the precise distribution (I’m not saying that we can’t learn it,
just that as things stand at the moment we don’t know), we shouldn’t conclude that Governing
Non-Humeanism does capture more weight. Absent further investigation, my suggestion is that
we treat the two theories as equal.17
17 I recognize that my failure to explicitly consider this matter is far from ideal. However, my primary goal for this
project is to show that, in principle, the method I have advocated in Chapter 2 may be fruitfully applied to problems
in metaphysics. I believe that this can be accomplished without focusing on the somewhat painful details of the
application of the method to this particular issue.
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Therefore, regardless of the equiprobability postulate employed, Non-Humeanism is not
assigned a significantly lower a priori probability than Humeanism. It has been suggested that
Non-Humeanism is assigned a higher a priori probability than Non-Humeanism if it is assumed
that probabilistic laws are intelligible—an assumption that I see no reason to reject and some
positive reasons to accept.
3.5 Next Steps
This concludes my preliminary defense of Governing Non-Humeanism. I have argued (a)
that Non-Humeanism is intelligible, (b) that a priori arguments against bare dispositionalism—a
prominent version of Non-Humeanism—fail, and (c) that Governing Non-Humeanism is a priori
just as likely as Humeanism. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 constitute my own argument for Governing
Non-Humeanism. In conjunction with the arguments of this chapter, that argument demonstrates
that Governing Non-Humeanism is more likely to be true (relative to the evidence of regularity)
than any of the other three theories under consideration.
Chapter 4
Governing Humeanism
4.1 Introduction
Over the next three chapters I shall compare Governing Non-Humeanism to each of its
three competitors. In this chapter, I consider a careful attempt to provide a Humean-consistent
explanation of the necessary connection between governing laws and regularities, and I provide a
general argument for thinking that no such attempt can succeed. In other words, I argue that Gov-
erning Humeanism is internally inconsistent. Since Governing Non-Humeanism isn’t susceptible
to this sort of argument, it is the superior theory.
This chapter is organized as follows. In 4.2 I discuss Michael Tooley’s attempt to provide
a Humean-consistent account of the entailment between governing laws and regularities, and I
argue that his account faces serious problems. In 4.3 I discuss two contemporary arguments for
thinking that there is no Humean-consistent account of the connection between governing law
and regularity. Though I find these arguments fairly persuasive, they do have some shortcomings.
In 4.4 I present a general argument for the inconsistency of Governing Humeanism that (I hope)
helps to remedy the shortcomings of the other contemporary arguments. Though the argument in
its present form is not decisive (I say that it is not decisive because I do not offer a complete defense
of one of its crucial, but intuitively plausible, premises), it places a heavy burden on Governing
Humeans to show how their view accounts for the entailment between law and regularity. The
upshot is that the acceptance of Governing Laws gives us good reason to accept Non-Humeanism.
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4.2 Tooley’s Version of Governing Humeanism
4.2.1 Preliminaries
The most well-known version of Governing Laws (the DTA theory), due to Dretske (1977),
Tooley (1977, 1987), and Armstrong (1983), holds that laws are states of affairs consisting of
irreducible second-order external relations between universals (hence laws are atomic states of
affairs distinct from regularities) that entail regularities. Consider the regularity that all Fs are
Gs. We can explain this regularity by postulating a relation of nomic necessitation N between
universals F and G, represented as N (F,G). The crucial postulate of the theory is then
NN: For all F and G, N (F,G) entails ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx).
N is defined as the irreducible second-order relation that satisfies NN. It is NN that explains why
N (F,G) explains regularities. Since N (F,G) is distinct from regularities and entails regularities,
N (F,G) is a governing law. Our question is whether states of affairs like N (F,G) are consistent
with Humeanism. As we shall see later, some philosophers (notably, Bird (2005) and van Fraassen
(1989, Chapter 5)) have thought that the entailment between law and regularity is something of a
mystery.
Before continuing, I want to discuss NN’s use of the word ‘entails’. Because of this word
choice, it might be thought that NN is explicitly Humean. If so, the appropriate question is not
whether states like N (F,G) are consistent with Humeanism—in this case they are stipulated to
be—but whether such states of affairs are possible. I prefer to interpret ‘entails’ more broadly,
however, such that ‘entails’ isn’t explicitly Humean, but includes the sort of synthetic necessary
entailment postulated by Non-Humeans. In short, I want to interpret ‘entails’ in a way that is
syntactically equivalent to to the Humean’s interpretation, but that is semantically broader so as
to include synthetic necessary entailment. I think that this broader interpretation is preferable
for the following reason. On the broad interpretation, it makes sense to ask what the relevant
concept of entailment is: is it purely logical entailment, or is it entailment given a restricted
interpretation—that is, synthetic necessary entailment? The answer to this question gives us a
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straightforward answer as to whether N (F,G) is consistent with Humeanism. If it can be purely
logical entailment, this version of Governing Humeanism is consistent. If it cannot be, this ver-
sion of Governing Humeanism is not. Moreover, the broader interpretation doesn’t require us to
introduce new postulates for Non-Humean governing laws, so it simplifies the dialectic.
There is another clarification worth making at this point. It is tempting to think that the
existence of states of affairs like N (F,G)) is consistent with Humeanism on the grounds that it
is true by definition that N (F,G) entails ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)—that is, on the grounds that NN is ana-
lytic. How can something that follows from a definition fail to be consistent with Humeanism?
The answer is that the definition may be such that the entities capable of satisfying the relevant
term(s) can only be Non-Humean entities. For example, suppose that we define God as the unique
being in possession of the bare disposition to be obeyed by everything. Given this definition, it
is analytic that God’s will must be obeyed. However, worlds in which there is something that
satisfies the relevant definition of God can only be Non-Humean worlds, since Humeanism pre-
cludes bare dispositions. Our worry is that the entailment posited by NN may be like the bare
dispositions posited in the definition of God just given. It may be that the entailment cannot be a
purely logical entailment. This matter must be investigated before we may conclude that N (F,G)
is a Humean-consistent state of affairs. Thus, one cannot simply conclude that NN is consistent
with Humeanism on the grounds that NN is analytic. (This is why I said that a Humean consis-
tent account of the entailment in NN must be logical entailment, rather than logical or analytical
entailment.)
So, can the entailment in NN be a purely logical entailment consistent with Humeanism?
Can there be a relation N if Humeanism is true? On the surface, it is not obvious how this could
be so. N (F,G) is stipulated to be an atomic state of affairs, one not reducible to any fact about the
regularity that all Fs are Gs. By definition it entails facts about particular instances of F and G.
Recall our definition of Humeanism:
Humeanism: For all propositions P , P is necessarily true (false) if and only if P is true (false) in
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virtue of its meaning or logical form—that is, if and only if P is analytically true (false).
Humeanism implies that there are no synthetic necessary connections, but it looks like N (F,G)
might entail the existence of a synthetic necessary connection between two states of affairs.1
Thus, there appears to be a tension between the two. Later in this chapter, I shall attempt to
show that this tension gives rise to a genuine contradiction. For now, however, I want to focus
on Michael Tooley’s (1987) attempt to eliminate this tension by providing a Humean-consistent
explanation of what laws are and how they entail regularities. I have chosen to focus on Tooley’s
account for the following reasons: first, it is the most carefully developed; second, it aligns most
naturally with my methodological approach; third, Armstrong’s (1983) attempt relies on epis-
temological assumptions that I have previously rejected (namely, the assumption that singular
causal relations are immediately observable).
Before beginning, it is important to recognize that Tooley’s account of the nature of laws
comes in two steps. The first, which following (Sider 1992) I shall call the stipulative account, is
Tooley’s particular theoretical definition of governing laws. The stipulative account does not fully
specify the intrinsic nature of nomic relations—it doesn’t tell us how laws entail regularities—and
thus is not explicitly Humean. Tooley’s stipulative account of the relation of nomic necessitation,
N , (prior to eliminating theoretical terms via the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method) is essentially
just the account explained above.2 N is irreducible, and thus not equivalent to facts about
regularities; the instantiation of N by any pair of universals constitutes an atomic state of affairs;
for all F and G, N (F,G) is such that it entails ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx); Tooley also stipulates that N ’s holding
between two universals is a contingent matter, but I shall ignore this feature. The second, which
I shall call the speculative account, is Tooley’s attempt to show that there is a Humean-consistent
way to specify the nature of nomic relations such that laws logically entail regularities. In other
words, the speculative account is supposed to show that the stipulative account is consistent with
1 I say that connection appears to be synthetic because it is not clear how the higher-order state of affairs in question
is going to entail regularities of lower-order states of affairs.
2 I’m focusing on Tooley’s account of N instead of his general account of nomological relations for the sake of
simplicity.
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Humeanism.
4.2.2 Tooley’s Speculative Account
I shall turn now to the matter of providing a speculative account of the intrinsic nature of
nomic relations. I shall start by discussing a natural but unsuccessful speculative account before
considering Tooley’s.
One speculative account is based on the idea that the universals present in the state of affairs
constitutive of a governing law are identical to the universals present in the regularities; hence,
there is a relation of partial identity between the higher-order and lower-order states of affairs
in question, and this relation entails the necessary connection. Unfortunately, this relation is
insufficient. Consider NN, which says that N (F,G) entails ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx). Here, it is easy to see that
the entailment is due to the particular nature of N , and not to the mere fact that N is a relation
between universals. Suppose that F andG stand in the logical distinctness relation: D. D(F,G) does
not entail that all Fs are distinct from Gs, since F and G may be coextensive even though they are
distinct properties. For example, F could be the property having a heart and G the property having
a kidney. Thus, the fact that N is a relation between universals does not establish the entailment
between law and regularity; NN doesn’t follow from the fact that N (F,G) simply because N is a
relation between F and G. Perhaps it will be objected that N is an external relation whereas D is
internal. Consider an external relation, the constant conjunction relation: C. C(F,G) does entail the
regularity that all Fs are Gs, but it does so because C is analyzed in terms of the regularity that it
entails. The main component that distinguishesN from C is thatN is atomic whereas C is not. (C,
of course, has no explanatory power with respect to regularities.) But C(F,G) entails regularities
concerning F and G precisely because it is not atomic; hence, we have made no progress with
explaining the connection between N (F,G) and the regularity ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx) by claiming that N is
an external relation between universals. This does not suffice to establish the connection between
governing law and regularity. What is it then? It must be the particular intrinsic nature of the
external relation N itself that is responsible for the entailment between law and regularity. But
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here the Humean must be very careful not to explicate the nature of the relation in such a way
that it introduces (or relocates) synthetic necessities.
We turn now to Tooley’s speculative account. For simplicity, I shall focus only on his account
of the relation of nomic necessitation, N . Tooley’s (1987, 123–129) reductive account is this:3
SPEC: N (F,G) holds at world w if and only if (a) in w, there is a conjunctive universal, F&G, and
(b) in w, F exists only as a part of conjunctive universal F&G.
In order for this account to be a success, SPEC must entail NN while avoiding any synthetic neces-
sities. Some elaboration and clarification is required in order to see how the account accomplishes
this. In Causation (1987), Tooley spoke as though F was a universal, but this is somewhat mislead-
ing. We also need a careful explanation of what conjunctive universals are and an account of the
“only as a part of” relation. What follows is a speculative clarification of SPEC.4
The relevant interpretation of SPEC involves drawing a distinction between properties and
universals in the way specified by (1) through (5) below.
(1) There are transcendent universals that have non-spatial, non-temporal existence, and
whose existence does not logically supervene upon spatiotemporal states of affairs.
(2) A particular can have a property only if a relevant universal is (or universals are) instan-
tiated by the particular.
This is a Platonic rather than Aristotelian conception of universals. But this account does not
entail that all properties are universals, because properties are understood as follows:
(3) Two things a and b share a property if and only if a and b are similar in some respect.
Thus properties are conceived as “similarities” or “resemblances.” One way for two objects to
resemble one another is for them to instantiate the same universals, but it is possible for some
3 Reminder: Though Tooley provides a reductive account of the necessity that binds laws to regularities, it should
not be inferred that he has thereby provided a reductive account of the laws themselves.
4 Michael Tooley proposed this type of account in correspondence, but, as he has not endorsed the speculative
extension of the account in print, it should should not be taken to be representative of his own views. I thank Michael
Tooley for graciously allowing me to discuss this speculative proposal here.
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resemblances not to correspond to genuine universals. This is important because it allows for
scenarios such as the following:
(4) Two things, a and b, are similar in two respects F and G, and thus share two properties,
F and G, though neither F nor G is a transcendent universal. Instead, there is only a
conjunctive universal F&G.
We are now in the position to say what a conjunctive universal is.
(5) A conjunctive universal is a universal that is such that any two objects instantiating it are
similar (resemble one another) in more than one respect. For example, we write F&G to
denote the universal that is such that any objects instantiating it resemble one another in
respects F and G.
The theory constituted by (1) through (5) suggests the following, revised version of SPEC,
where ‘property’ and ‘conjunctive universal’ are as defined above:
SPEC* N (F,G) holds at world w if and only if (a) in w there is a conjunctive universal F&G, and
(b) in w, property F exists only as a part of conjunctive universal F&G.
Now we can elaborate on the only as a part of relation. This has been the source of earlier
criticism of Tooley’s account (see Sider (1992)). Sider’s primary complaint is that Tooley hasn’t
carefully specified the nature of this mereological relation, and he argues that on no plausible
mereological specification does Tooley’s speculative account succeed. However, we needn’t engage
Sider’s critique here, because the relation need not be mereological in character. Let us analyze
the only as a part of relation as follows:
(6) A property P exists only as a part of universal Q at world w =df Q is the only universal
at w such that its instantiation by multiple objects entails that those objects resemble in
respect P .
Applying this analysis to SPEC* yields the following:
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SPEC** N (F,G) holds at world w if and only if (a) in w there is a conjunctive universal F&G, and
(b) in w, F&G is the only universal such that its instantiation by multiple objects entails
that those objects resemble in respect F.
SPEC** is Tooley’s fully-developed account of the necessary connection between law and regu-
larity. As required, SPEC** entails NN. Suppose that the world is such that there are only two
universals present in that world: G and F&G. Suppose further that a has property F. Then there
must be some relevant universal present in a. In this world, that universal can only be F&G. Ac-
cordingly, anything that has property F must (in this world) have property G, but it isn’t the case
that everything with property G must have property F since an object can have G by instantiating
either universal G or universal F&G. We shall now have to determine whether SPEC** entails NN
without employing any synthetic necessity.
In the following three subsections, I shall discuss three different objections to Tooley’s ac-
count. The first two objections assume that the solution just presented succeeds in its own right,
but they show that the solution cannot be extended in other desirable directions. The third ob-
jection argues that the solution just presented does not succeed even for the simple case pre-
sented above—that it entails NN only if it introduces synthetic necessities, and thus that it is not
a Humean-consistent theory.
4.2.3 The Objection from Probabilistic Laws
Tooley’s reductive account cannot be extended to explain the connection between proba-
bilistic law and regularity. At best, it shows that deterministic laws are Humean-consistent. Here
is a quick explanation. The necessity that holds between law and regularity is, on this account,
grounded in the necessity of identity. The reason that all Fs are Gs on the account provided by
SPEC** is that a single universal is responsible for both the Fness and Gness of the individuals in
question. In this respect, it is similar to the familiar cases of a posteriori necessities in which two
names refer to a single property. On the standard view, it doesn’t make sense to say that necessity
of identity can be probabilistic; we can’t say, for instance, that water =H2O and that water is prob-
93
ably (but not necessarily) H2O. Similarly, if properties F and G arise from the same universal, it
isn’t possible to claim that Fs are probably (but not necessarily) Gs. All things F must be G (in the
world in question).
There are two potential reasons to worry about this limitation. First, it is nowadays popular
to interpret quantum mechanics as implying that the world contains genuinely indeterministic
laws. If this account is incapable of explaining the connection between actual laws and their
corresponding regularities, it would fail to give us reason for thinking that Governing Humeanism
is true of this world. For the record, I don’t fully endorse this argument for the simple reason that
I’m not convinced that quantum mechanics ought to be interpreted in the required way. It’s not
clear to me that the Copenhagen interpretation is superior to the Bohm interpretation on the
realist interpretation of scientific theories that is required to create problems for Tooley’s account.
Second, this limitation has important implications for the a priori probability of the theory.
If Governing Humeanism precludes probabilistic laws then it countenances fewer possibilities
than its Non-Humean competitor which simply takes the connections between law and regularity
as basic and therefore does not preclude probabilistic laws. This gives us some reason to think that
the a priori probability of Governing Humeanism is less than the a priori probability of Governing
Non-Humeanism. (Note that this relative “reduction” in the a priori probability of Governing
Humeanism won’t confer any explanatory advantages over Governing Non-Humeanism.) Put in
more familiar terms, other things equal we prefer a theory with fewer implications. Precluding
probabilistic laws precludes lots of possibilities, and thus has lots of implications. Though I’m
not convinced that any of the actual laws are probabilistic, I’d rather not rule them out.
4.2.4 The Objection from Temporally Extended Laws
Tooley’s account cannot explain temporally extended laws—laws of the form all Fs become
Gs at a later time—unless it incorporates a particular account of structural universals. However,
Tooley’s account will be unable to implement the required account of structural universals be-
cause that account involves primitive necessities. The failure of Tooley’s account to explain tem-
94
porally extended laws is problematic for the following reasons: first, some actual regularities
appear to be of this very form—consider laws about the half-life of radioactive elements; second,
Tooley’s own account of the nature of causal laws set out in Causation (1987) holds that causal
laws are temporally extended (this feature of his account is related to the familiar idea that causes
are prior to their effects).
So, what are structural universals? David Lewis (1986a) explains them roughly as follows.
First, they are universals: they can occur repeatedly, and so on. Second, anything that instantiates
a structural universal has proper parts, and there is a necessary connection between the instantiat-
ing of the structural universal by the whole and the instantiating of other universals by the parts.
We’ll say that structural universals “involve” these other universals, and we’ll say later what this
involvement is in the context of specific theories of structural universals. For example,
suppose we have monadic universals carbon and hydrogen, instantiated by atoms
of those elements; and a dyadic universal bonded, instantiated by pairs of atoms
between which there is a covalent bond. (I should really be talking about momen-
tary stages, but let’s leave time out of it for simplicity.) Then we have, for instance,
a structural universal methane, which is instantiated by methane molecules. It
involves the three previously mentioned universals as follows: necessarily, some-
thing instantiates methane if and only if it is divisible into five spatial parts c, h1,
h2, h3, h4 such that c instantiates carbon, each of the h’s instantiates hydrogen, and
each of the c-h pairs instantiates bonded. (Lewis 1986a, 27)
In what sense does Tooley’s account require structural universals to explain temporally extended
laws? Consider a law that says that the possession of P by individual a at t entails the possession
of Q by a at t + 1. For Tooley’s account to work, P will have to exist only as a part of a certain
structural universal. In other words, P will have to be a property (not a genuine universal) that can
only be instantiated when a certain structural universal is instantiated. In this case, the structural
universal will be analyzed in terms of an individual with two distinct spatiotemporal locations
and an ordered pair of properties P and Q. But this requires a certain account of structural
universals according to which structural universals cannot be reduced to their parts (where ‘parts’
is conceived broadly so as to include their structural features). Can such universals be explained
in a manner consistent with Humeanism?
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Lewis (1986a) discusses three accounts of structural universals. Perhaps there are others,
but, like Lewis, I can’t think of any. Accordingly, the Governing Humean could respond to my
arguments by proposing a fourth. I’m going to suggest that the first account is compatible with
the explanation given by SPEC**, but it is obviously incompatible with Humeanism. On the other
hand, the second and third accounts are incompatible with SPEC**.
The first is the magical account. Here is how David Lewis describes this account.
On the magical conception, a structural universal has no proper parts. . . A struc-
tural universal is never simple; it involves other, simpler, universals. . . But it is
mereologically atomic. The other universals it involves are not present in it as
parts. Nor are the other universals set-theoretic constituents of it; it is not a set
but an individual. There is no way in which it is composed of them. (Lewis 1986a,
41)
According to this account, the connection between a structural universal and the simpler uni-
versals (or properties) it involves—we might under other circumstances call these its “constituent
properties”—is an unanalyzable primitive. But the connection is postulated to be a necessary one.
As such, it is inconsistent with Humeanism.
Lewis elaborates:
Why must it be that if something instantiates methane, then part of it must instan-
tiate carbon? According to the linguistic conception, that is built into a recursive
specification of what it means to instantiate methane. Fair enough. According to
the pictorial conception, that is because carbon is part of methane, and the whole
cannot be wholly present without its part. Fair enough. But on the present con-
ception, this necessary connection is just a brute modal fact. (Lewis 1986a, 41)
Humeans don’t like brute modal facts, so we shall have to see if the linguistic or pictorial accounts
can succeed where the magical account has failed.
The second is the linguistic account. On this account, simple universals are treated as basic
predicates in a language; structural universals are treated as complex predicates defined in terms
of the basic predicates in accordance with certain rules.5 Essentially, the linguistic conception
is a reductive account of structural universals. It reduces structural universals to simple univer-
5 Lewis gives a much more precise explanation, but such precision is not required here.
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sals plus certain logical relations (semantic rules in the relevant language). Since the account is
reductive, the existence of structural universals isn’t controversial, given that we have already ac-
cepted universals and the relevant logical relations (see (Lewis 1986a, 32)). However, since this is
a reductive account of structural universals, it precludes an analysis of temporally extended laws
in terms of SPEC**. On this view, there is no way to make sense of structural universals without
taking simpler universals as basic. But if the simpler universals are basic, the properties they give
rise to can’t exist only as a part of structural universals; the simpler universals are simples; they
exist on their own. For our temporally extended example, it holds that the structural universal
incorporating property P is analyzed in terms of a simple (or simpler, anyway) universal P . Hence
property P does not exist only as a part of the structural universal in question. On this account,
universal P must exist on its own in order for the relevant structural universal to exist.
The third is the pictorial account. On this account, a structural universal is isomorphic to
its instances. In other words, the structure of the universal mirrors the structure of its instances.
The parts of the instances will be mirrored by the parts of the structural universal. Suppose that
we have a’s instantiating P at t and Q at t + 1. The structural universal will involve properties P
and Q standing in a certain temporal relation that mirrors the instance. This account does not
fit nicely with our ordinary understanding of universals. While it is easy enough to make sense
of the idea of individuals standing in temporal relations (e.g., a exists later than b), it is not at
all clear that universals can stand in the sorts of temporal relations required for this account to
function. It wouldn’t be sufficient to say that P is instantiated earlier than Q, since that would be
a reductive account of what it is for universals to stand in temporal relations and thus wouldn’t
do the required work. We would need to say that P exists (for some sense of ‘exists’) earlier
than Q. What could that even mean? Further, what is to be said about P and Q? Are they
universals, or merely properties (resemblances)? If they are universals, then the pictorial account
faces exactly the same problems as the linguistic account: P doesn’t exist only as a part of the
structural universal in question, since universal P exists independently of the structural universal
of which it is a part. If they are merely properties, we encounter a different problem. We have
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made no progress in explaining what the relevant structure is and why it entails the relevant facts
about particulars. If we postulate a structural universal we need to say what its structure is, lest
we encounter the problems of the magical account.
The upshot of this section is that none of the above three accounts of structural universals
allow Tooley’s solution to be extended to the case of temporally extended laws. These three ac-
counts may not exhaust the possibilities, but the discussion above suggests that the burden is on
the Humean to show that the relevant structural universals are consistent with both Humeanism
and SPEC**. A failure to do so restricts the scope of Tooley’s solution significantly, since such an
account is required to provide a Humean-consistent explanation of certain actual laws (such as
laws about the half-life of radioactive elements) and causal laws (assuming that causal relations
are cross temporal relations).
4.2.5 An Objection Concerning the Definition of Conjunctive Universals
We come now to what is in my opinion the most damaging objection to Tooley’s reductive
account. The concept of a conjunctive universal needs to be specified more carefully. I shall argue
that conjunctive universals are capable of explaining natural regularities only if they incorporate
irreducibly modal elements. Compare the following two analyses:
(7) A conjunctive universal is a universal such that, contingently, any two objects instantiating
it are similar (resemble one another) in more than one respect.
(8) A conjunctive universal is a universal such that, necessarily, any two objects instantiating it
are similar (resemble one another) in more than one respect.
Here we have a dilemma. (7) is consistent with Humeanism, but it precludes SPEC**. (8) entails
SPEC**, but it precludes Humeanism. These points require some elaboration.
(7) precludes SPEC** because it entails that worlds with accidental regularities and univer-
sals are worlds with conjunctive universals. Suppose that S and T are intuitively simple (that is,
non-conjunctive) universals. Suppose further that everything which has S also has T , simply as
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a matter of accidental fact. According to (7), S is a conjunctive universal. But an object’s hav-
ing S does not entail that it has T , so laws of nature cannot be explained in terms of conjunctive
universals if (7) is the correct analysis of conjunctive universals. The result is that a world with
two universals G and F&G will not entail that everything with F has G; in this world, nothing
precludes F&G from giving rise only to property G. We need the necessary connection between
F&G and properties F and G, but the account doesn’t provide that unless it incorporates necessity
as in (8).
Why think that the necessity in (8) is inconsistent with Humeanism? If we took conjunc-
tive universals to be structural universals with simpler universals as their parts, it would be easy
to show that the possession of a structural universal entails that any two objects instantiating
it are necessarily similar in multiple respects (the relevant part of (8)); objects instantiating the
structural universal would resemble in multiple ways in virtue of instantiating the simpler uni-
versals which are parts (or whatever) of the structural universal in question. Thus the necessary
connection between a conjunctive universal and the properties (resemblances) to which it gives
rise would be consistent with Humeanism. But Tooley cannot interpret conjunctive universals in
this way, since this account entails that the simpler universals can exist without the conjunctive
universals—that the simpler universals do not exist only as a part of the conjunctive universals.
On this Humean-consistent account of (8), SPEC** just doesn’t work. We have (8) but not SPEC**.
That is, in making the necessity benign we lose SPEC**. But how else are we to explain the neces-
sity? If we opt for a different Humean-consistent account the worry will be (again) that SPEC**
doesn’t follow. If we just stipulate that (8) is correct, we require an account of the necessity; it’s an
open question whether the necessity can be reduced. I can’t think of any Humean-consistent ac-
counts which preserve SPEC**, and for this reason I have serious doubts that SPEC** can succeed
at all.
To sum up, I don’t think that Tooley’s speculative solution succeeds. In 4.2.5 we saw that
Tooley’s analysis postulates (explicitly or implicitly) modal connections. These modal connec-
tions must be analyzed in way consistent with Humeanism, and I have presented a number of
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challenges for any such analysis. Even if such an analysis can meet these challenges, it will face
severe limitations not faced by Non-Humean theories of governing laws, since it cannot account
for probabilistic laws and it may have trouble accounting for temporally extended laws. These are
reasons to prefer Governing Non-Humeanism to Governing Humeanism. In the last two sections
of this chapter, I shall consider arguments for the conclusion that Governing Humeanism is self-
contradictory. The result will be that we have reason to believe that there is no Humean-consistent
analysis of the connection between law and regularity.
4.3 Contemporary Arguments for the Inconsistency of Governing Humeanism
In the section above I argued that Tooley’s attempt to provide a Humean-consistent explana-
tion of the necessary connection between law and regularity fails. I shall now consider arguments
for the conclusion that there can be no Humean-consistent account of the necessary connection.
Before presenting my own argument it will be helpful to consider its predecessors.
4.3.1 van Fraassen’s Argument
Begin with two problems:
The Identification Problem: which relation between universals is the relation N ?
The Inference Problem: what information does the statement that one property necessitates an-
other give us about what happens and what things are like?
These problems are closely related. The nature of N must be explicated in a way that provides an
answer to the inference problem. In van Fraassen’s words, “the relation identified as necessitation
must be such as to warrant whatever we need to be able to infer from laws” (van Fraassen 1989,
96). Most critics (van Fraassen included) have focused on the Inference Problem. If it cannot
be solved, the fact that N (F,G) necessitates its corresponding regularity must be primitive. If it
cannot be solved, Governing Humeanism is not a tenable theory.
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Van Fraassen asks us to compare N with the relation of extensional inclusion, defined as
follows:
Extensional Inclusion: A is extensionally included in B exactly if all instances of A are instances of
B.
Clearly, A is extensionally included in B entails that all As are Bs. We now have a dilemma. By
Governing Laws, the relation N cannot be the relation of extensional inclusion (since an account
of laws according to which N = extensional inclusion would be a descriptive account of laws). On
the other hand, “how could features so distinctly different from extensional inclusion still solve
the inference problem?” (van Fraassen 1989, 97).
I have no quarrel with the first horn of the dilemma, but I do not think that van Fraassen
has adequately supported the second horn. His argument begins as follows:
The law as here conceived is a singular statement about universals A and B. The
conclusion to be drawn from it is about another sort of things, the particulars
which are instances of A and B. True, the instances are, by being instances, inti-
mately related to the universals. This is not enough, however, to make the infer-
ence look valid to us. (van Fraassen 1989, 97)
This idea will already be familiar; it was discussed at the beginning of Section 4.2. The crucial
question is whether there are other resources available to the Humean which can connect laws to
regularities in the relevant manner. Van Fraassen’s argument that there are no such resources is
given by way of analogy. He asks us to consider the following invalid inference (97):
1. X knows Y
therefore
2. All children of X are children of Y
The question is whether the Humean can turn it into a valid one. Van Fraassen asks us to consider
the following valid inferences (98):
1. X has the same children as Y
101
therefore
2.
1. X has carnal knowledge only of Y
1.5. All a person’s children are born of someone of whom he or she has carnal knowledge
therefore
2.
These inferences are valid, but there are problems. The first looks too trivial; an analogous infer-
ence won’t give us governing laws. The second requires an extra premise, but the worry will be
that the analogous premise will introduce synthetic necessity into the account of governing laws.
In support of the idea that the analogous extra premise must involve synthetic necessity,
van Fraassen says the following:
That this cannot be a matter of logic, is clear from the parallel example of parents
and children born to them. Perhaps relations among parents are reflected in corre-
sponding relations between their children, but it will take more than logic to find
the correct correspondence function! (van Fraassen 1989, 98)
The entailment asked for cannot be logical entailment, just as a fact that is purely
about the parents cannot logically imply anything about the children. (Note that
it would not be purely about the parents if it described them as parents, i.e. as
people having children!) So the entailment cannot be a matter of logic. (van
Fraassen 1989, 102)
(Note the importance of the parenthetical clause. Van Fraassen appears to be claiming that one
cannot build a solution to the inference problem into the identification problem. If that is so, it is
only so on the assumption that Humeanism is true. Of course, if the entailment is anything else
we must reject Humeanism.)
I find this argument to be fairly persuasive. It’s hard to imagine a reductive account of the
necessity between law and regularity, especially after considering the failure of Tooley’s attempt.
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That being said, van Fraassen doesn’t provide a systematic argument for thinking that there can be
no such account. Moreover, this particular argument depends on the following analogy: parents
are to second-order relations between universals as children are to regularities. This analogy is
somewhat suspect even for the case at hand, and it is not at all clear that it can be extended to other
accounts of governing laws that do not hold that laws are relations between universals. In sum,
we want a broader argument that explicitly identifies an inconsistency in Governing Humeanism.
4.3.2 Bird’s Argument
Alexander Bird (2005) has attempted to explicitly identify the contradiction in Governing
Humeanism.6 Bird’s argument considers three accounts of the necessitation between governing
law and regularity.
The necessitation cannot be material implication. The resulting account would fail to satisfy
Governing Laws.
The necessitation cannot be the relation of nomic necessitation. That would lead to a vicious
regress of higher-order laws.
Finally, the necessitation cannot be logical entailment. CompareN (F,G) with P (F,G), where
P is a relation of probabilification such that its holding between two universals F and G entails
that there is a probability P that each instance of F will be an instance of G.
(I) N (F,G) entails ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)
(II) P (F,G) does not entail ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)
According to Bird, N (F,G) has a modal property that P (F,G) does not. Namely, it necessarily
stands in a unique relation to regularities. According to Humeanism, however, there shouldn’t be
any states of affairs that stand in unique modal relations to regularities (other than regularities
themselves), because that would be to accept a non-trivial (that is, non-reductive) modal relation.
6 To be precise, Bird has attempted to identify a contradiction between Armstrong’s theory of laws and Armstrong’s
view of properties—the view that no properties are bare dispositions. I shall discuss Bird’s argument as though it were
an argument against Governing Humeanism.
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In other words, since (I) and (II) have exactly the same logical form, their modal properties are
not purely logical.
This is a creative way of immediately demonstrating the tension between Humeanism and
Governing Laws. However, it relies on the idea that there are multiple basic nomological relations—
in this case, N and P . Accordingly, one way for the Governing Humean to reject this argument
would be to deny the existence of multiple basic nomological relations. I believe that this is an un-
appealing move for the Governing Humean, but it shows that Bird’s argument is not the ultimate
argument against Governing Humeanism. We want an argument that shows that the very idea
of Governing Humeanism is self-contradictory. Bird’s argument (if it succeeds) only identifies a
contradiction in a slightly augmented version of Governing Humeanism.
4.4 A Modified Argument for the Inconsistency of Governing Humeanism
I shall now present a general argument for the inconsistency of Governing Humeanism.
This argument is intended to show that there cannot be any Humean account of the necessary
connection between governing laws and regularities.
I believe that the key to identifying the contradiction is investigating the relevant concept of
distinctness that occurs in Governing Laws—that is, the sense in which governing laws are states
of affairs distinct from regularities. So, what does it mean to say that two states of affairs are
distinct? There are two obvious candidates.
D1: S1 and S2 are distinct =df S1 and S2 do not “overlap,” that is, there is no constituent individ-
ual or property of one that is a constituent of the other.
D2: S1 and S2 are distinct =df S1 does not equal S2.
If D1 is correct, it follows immediately that distinct states of affairs cannot logically entail one
another.7 Thus interpreted, there cannot be Humean-consistent governing laws. However, D1
7 Note that some Humeans will be uncomfortable with the idea of states of affairs standing in any entailment relations
at all, even logical ones. For the sake of argument, I shall allow Humeans to postulate logical relations between states
of affairs.
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seems too strong. For instance, it is reasonable to say that there is a sense in which N (F,G) is
distinct from the regularity that all Fs are Gs even though both the law and the state of affairs
constitutive of the regularity contain the constituents F and G. This sense of distinctness isn’t
captured by D1. According to D1, N (F,G) and the regularity that all Fs are Gs are not distinct.
Thus D1 doesn’t capture the sense of distinctness in Governing Laws, since it doesn’t countenance
DTA laws as distinct from regularities. That’s unacceptable.
Unlike D1, D2 does not immediately rule out the possibility of a Humean-consistent ac-
count of governing laws. However, D2 seems too weak. For instance, it holds that the following
states of affairs are distinct: S1 and S1&S2. It entails that a conjunctive state of affairs is distinct
from each of its conjuncts. It thus allows for some descriptive/reductive accounts of laws to sat-
isfy Governing Laws, since a law could be a conjunctive state of affairs such that one conjunct is a
regularity and the other conjunct is something else. That’s not acceptable either.
We need a middle ground: a definition that preserves the distinction between Governing
and Descriptive Laws without holding that DTA laws are not governing laws. I think that D2 is
closer to the relevant concept of distinctness. We just need to revise it so that it doesn’t allow
for reductive accounts of laws to satisfy Governing Laws. I don’t want to argue that there aren’t
conjunctive states of affairs, since one plausible way of specifying regularities is as a conjunctive
state of affairs satisfying certain conditions. Here, then, is an approach which allows for conjunc-
tive states of affairs but which precludes descriptive/reductive accounts of laws from satisfying
Governing Laws:
D3: States of affairs S1 and S2 are distinct =df all of the following:
(i) S1 , S2
(ii) S1 , any part of S2
(iii) S2 , any part of S1
In this context, talk of parts is shorthand for the following logical concept: x is a part of y =df
either x = y or y is a conjunctive state of affairs and x = one of y’s conjuncts. We are allowed
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to restrict the relevant concept of parthood in this way because we are dealing with states of
affairs and because we are assuming that Humeanism is true. Humeanism does not seem to be
compatible with disjunctive, conditional, or negative states of affairs. They are mysterious in
exactly the same way that synthetic necessity is mysterious. (More on this in a moment.)
D3 avoids the problems of D1 and D2. According to D3, DTA laws constitute governing
laws, but reductive accounts of laws do not. The question now is how D3 can be employed in an
argument against Governing Humeanism. Here is my proposal:
(9) The only entailment in the world consistent with Governing Humeanism is logical entail-
ment. [from Humeanism]
(10) Governing Humeanism entails that there is some regularity. [from Governing Laws]
(11) This entailment between governing law and regularity is not logical entailment, since law
and regularity are distinct in the sense of D3.
(12) Hence Governing Laws entails the existence of non-logical entailment in the world. [from
(10) and (11)]
(13) Therefore, Governing Humeanism is self-contradictory. [from (9) and (12)]
(9) follows from Humeanism. (10) follows from Governing Laws. (12) follows from (10) and (11).
(13) follows from (9) and (12). The crucial premise, obviously, is (11).
(11) says that if law and regularity are distinct in the sense of D3, one cannot logically entail
the other. This sounds intuitively plausible, but let’s see if it can be defended more carefully.
Ideally, one would prove that (11) follows from the definition of D3—that is, that for any states
of affairs p and q that are distinct in the sense of D3, p does not logically entail q and q does not
logically entail p.
I’m not going to offer that sort of proof for (11). (Other critics—namely, van Fraassen (1989,
Chapter 5) and Bird (2005)—haven’t attempted to offer this sort of proof either.) (11) does seem
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plausible, however, and I will suggest that none of the resources available to the Humean pro-
vide promising reasons to think that it is false. In other words, I shall examine all of the obvi-
ous resources for making sense of necessary connections between states of affairs and argue that
none of them establish the connection between law and regularity in a manner consistent with
Humeanism. This stops short of a full proof because there may be other resources available to the
Humean, though I can’t think of any.
We can’t say that governing laws entail regularities
(14) in virtue of a semantic connection between the terms used to describe laws and regulari-
ties.
This has already been explained above, in the example in which we defined God as the being
possessing a certain bare dispositional property. The reason is that all worlds in which there
are objects satisfying the relevant definition may be Non-Humean worlds. We can describe the
general problem here as follows: a merely semantic connection is something having to do with
language rather than the world, but laws and regularities are features of the world.
We can’t say that governing laws entail regularities because the states of affairs constitutive
of regularities are such that
(15) the terms F and G used to describe states like N (F,G) denote the same universal.
This is essentially Tooley’s speculative proposal, and we have already seen that it is subject to
serious objections. Most importantly, the idea that a single universal can give rise to multiple
resemblances must be further developed. If a single universal contingently gives rise to multiple
resemblances, this sort of account does not entail regularities. If a single universal necessarily
gives rise to multiple resemblances, the problem of reducing or analyzing the relevant necessity
has merely been moved up one level.
We can’t say that governing laws entail regularities because the states of affairs constitutive
of regularities are such that
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(16) governing laws are conjunctive states of affairs and the states constitutive of regularities
are (some of) their conjuncts.
This account isn’t consistent with Governing Laws. It holds that regularities are literally parts of
the laws themselves, so laws are not distinct from regularities in the sense required by D3.
We can’t say that governing laws entail regularities because the structure of the world mir-
rors that described by our system of logic, such that
(17) there are disjunctive states of affairs, conditional states of affairs, and negative states of
affairs; the conjunction of these states of affairs with regular old (atomic or conjunctive)
states of affairs entail regularities.
Accepting this proposal is akin to accepting Non-Humeanism. We don’t observe disjunctive or
conditional or negative states of affairs in the same way that we don’t observe synthetic modal
connections between states of affairs. If we were to accept this explanation of the connection
between governing laws and regularities we might as well accept Non-Humeanism.
I can’t think of any other resources to which the Humean might appeal in order to explain
why governing laws entail regularities. This doesn’t mean that there aren’t any; a sufficiently
creative Humean might be able find a way around these criticisms. But I hope to have shown
that there are good reasons to think that (11) (and therefore (13)) is very plausible. At the very
least, I believe that this argument places a heavy burden on the Governing Humean to explain the
connection between law and regularity. To date, this has not been accomplished.
4.5 Conclusion
Though this may surprise the reader, I’m not seriously opposed to the idea of Governing
Humeanism. I just don’t know how to make sense of the claim that states of affairs distinct (in
the sense of D3) from regularities entail regularities without taking that entailment as basic and
unanalyzable. Every problem raised for Humeanism in this chapter has been based on the refusal
to interpret the entailment between law and regularity as a synthetic necessary entailment, so
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none of these problems arise for Governing Non-Humeanism. Since in the previous chapter I
gave an empirically respectable account of the concept of synthetic necessity, I see no reason to
burden ourselves with the strict demands of Humeanism.
What if I’m mistaken about Governing Humeanism? In that case, the arguments in the
following two chapters can be reinterpreted as arguments in favor of Governing Laws instead
of Governing Non-Humeanism. In the next chapter, I’ll explain how observed natural regular-
ities can be used to argue for the superiority of Governing Non-Humeanism over Descriptive
Humeanism.
Chapter 5
Descriptive Humeanism
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I argued that Governing Humeanism is inconsistent, and thus
that Descriptive Humeanism is the only version of Humeanism. In this chapter, I complete the
argument against Humeanism by showing that Descriptive Humeanism is very likely false in light
of observed natural regularities.
My argument again Descriptive Humeanism is based on the fact that the ratio of regu-
lar state descriptions to irregular state descriptions differs according to Descriptive Humeanism
and Governing Non-Humeanism. The respects in which they differ entail that the probability
of regularity given Descriptive Humeanism (P (R|H)) is significantly less than the probability of
regularity given Governing Non-Humeanism (P (R|N )). Bayes’ theorem can then be used to show
that regularity is strong evidence against Humeanism. Further, since the conclusion of Chapter
3 is that the a priori probability of Governing Non-Humeanism (P (N )) is greater than or equal
to the a priori probability of Descriptive Humeanism (P (H)), Bayes’ theorem entails that Govern-
ing Non-Humeanism is significantly more likely to be true than Descriptive Humeanism in light
of our observation of regularity. In other words, after observing regularities we should accept
Governing Non-Humeanism over Descriptive Humeanism.
This chapter is organized as follows. In 5.2 I discuss crucial assumptions and explain the
relevant concept of natural regularity. The argument outlined above is not the first argument
against Descriptive Humeanism (or related theories) based on natural regularities. In 5.3 I con-
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sider earlier arguments due to Armstrong (1983) and Fales (1990). My goal is not to show that
these arguments fail; rather, I merely intend to highlight their potential areas of weakness so
that they may be avoided by my own argument. In 5.4 I set forth and defend my version of the
argument against Descriptive Humeanism. In 5.5 I consider objections to my argument. In 5.6
I consider a big picture objection that is based on the idea that our equiprobability postulates
cannot be applied to languages allowing for the possibility of probabilistic laws.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Regularity
We have an intuitive grasp of the concept of a natural regularity. However, for our purposes
it will help to offer a precise characterization of this concept. Obviously, universal generalizations
among natural properties such as that all Fs are Gs describe regularities. Similarly, any axiom in
a Ramsey/Lewis best systems analysis describes a regularity.1 We want a definition that captures
these intuitive ideas (and, of course, allows for merely probabilistic regularities). Here, then, is
my stipulative definition:
Natural Regularity: A natural regularity is a spatiotemporally ordered set of states of affairs in
which types of states of affairs are distributed in finite repeated patterns.
I take it that this is an acceptable definition, because in addition to satisfying the desiderata above
it appears to be met by the regularities we actually do observe.
The regularities mentioned thus far are what I call specific regularities, since they concern
fairly specific features of the natural world. Such regularities have been the focus of the explana-
tory arguments due to Armstrong and Fales (and also the focus of Michael Tooley in a manuscript
on the problem of induction closely related to the project of explaining natural regularities). My
argument appeals to a more general concept of regularity: the degree of regularity of a world (or
1 See (Lewis 1973, 73) and (Lewis 1994) for an explanation of the best systems theory. It is important to note that
one may accept the method of determining the best system in order to determine the actual laws of nature without
accepting the reductive Humean ontology often associated with that method.
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part of a world). Thus, for example, a fully regular world is one in which all types of states of
affairs are distributed in finite repeated patterns; that is, it is one in which there exists a set of
general axioms that fully specifies the distribution of all types of states of affairs at the world.
What is crucial here is that it is possible to generalize from observations of particular regulari-
ties at our world to its degree of regularity. I shall use this general concept of degree of regularity
for two principal reasons. First, its generality allows for an explanatory argument against De-
scriptive Humeanism (and in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism) that avoids many difficulties
introduced by a focus on narrow regularities. Governing Non-Humeanism doesn’t explain any
particular event sequence very well at all, though some narrow versions of it may. In contrast,
it does offer a very good explanation of the general fact that our world is highly regular. Second,
our world appears to have a very high degree of regularity; perhaps it is fully regular, as no em-
pirical observation has yet suggested otherwise. It is just as apparent to us that the world (or its
observable-by-us parts, anyway) has a high degree of regularity as that it contains many specific
regularities; the former is just a generalization from the latter.2
5.2.2 Review of Assumptions
Before considering the arguments, it will be helpful to review my basic assumptions. First, I
assume that the arguments of Chapter 3 are correct. Thus, Governing Non-Humeanism is not only
intelligible, but its a priori probability equals or exceeds that of Descriptive Humeanism. Second,
I assume that the arguments of Chapter 4 are correct. Hence there is no internally consistent
version of Governing Humeanism, and so all versions of Humeanism are versions of Descriptive
Humeanism.3 Third, I assume that the methodological approach set forth and defended in
Chapter 2 is sound. Specifically, I assume that the logical interpretation of probability offers the
2 It may be helpful to note that regularity is a distributive property: it is a property concerned with the distribution
of types of states of affairs at a world. Distributive properties vary in breadth: some are very precise (for example,
every nth state of affairs involves property P ), others are more general (for example, states of affairs are distributed in
finite repeated patterns). The appeal to distributive properties as evidence for ontological hypotheses is not new. For
example, some versions of the argument from evil appeal to the general distribution of evil states of affairs.
3 It should be noted that if this assumption turns out to be false then the argument of this chapter may be easily
recast as an argument in favor of the more general thesis of Governing Laws.
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correct way to determine objective epistemic probabilities. We may now move on to consider some
of the previous explanatory arguments against Descriptive Humeanism.
5.3 Previous Explanatory Arguments against Descriptive Humeanism
In this section I consider two different sorts of explanatory arguments against Descrip-
tive Humeanism.4 But first, a disclaimer. Armstrong accepts Governing Humeanism, and it
is clear that his arguments are intended to support this thesis. However, given my purposes, I
shall present an analogue of his argument to apply in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism.5
5.3.1 David Armstrong’s Argument
Consider the following quote from David Armstrong (1988, 229):
Perhaps the regularities need no explanation? If you believe that, I say, you can
believe anything.
Armstrong’s point is that Descriptive Humeanism’s failure to offer any explanation of natural
regularities is a severe mark against it. Why does Descriptive Humeanism fail to offer any ex-
planation of natural regularities? The reason is that Descriptive Humean laws, if there are any,
depend on the regularities; thus the regularities cannot depend on the laws. In denying any syn-
thetic necessities, Descriptive Humeanism denies the existence of any entities or facts (distinct
from regularity itself) that could increase the likelihood of regularity. Non-Humeanism, on the
other hand, does not deny such entities or facts, and so the possibility of a genuine metaphysical
explanation—that is, an explanation of one phenomenon in terms of a distinct phenomenon—of
regularity is preserved.
Armstrong develops his argument for this position more carefully in (Armstrong 1983, 52–
59, 103–106). The first step is to show that Descriptive Humeanism cannot explain regularities.
4 Though not discussed in this chapter, (Foster 1982-83) is a relevant and recommended article.
5 (Bird 2007, 86–90) includes a different sort of explanatory argument against Descriptive Humeanism, the basic
idea of which is that Humean laws don’t have explanatory power with respect to any of their individual instances;
however, it is sufficiently different from mine that an examination of it does not aid in the construction of my argument.
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This is accomplished rather easily, as explained in the paragraph above (see also 5.4.2 of this chap-
ter for further elaboration). The second step is to show that Descriptive Humeanism’s failure to
explain regularities entails inductive skepticism; that is, if Descriptive Humeanism is true, we
must all be skeptics about inductive inference. The third step is to demonstrate that inductive
skepticism is false. A simple application of modus tollens then shows that Descriptive Humeanism
is false. (For Armstrong’s defense of the first three steps see (Armstrong 1983, 52–59).) Armstrong
includes two additional steps: an argument that his own governing theory of laws does not lead
inevitably to inductive skepticism,6 and an inference to the best explanation that this privileged
theory is correct. The idea behind these latter steps is to show that his own theory avoids the
objection against Descriptive Humeanism (see (Armstrong 1983, 103–106)). These steps are re-
quired since Armstrong’s theory includes the postulate of very specific laws capable of explaining
the specific observed regularities. Since my argument concerns very general theories—ultimately,
a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive theories—it will not require these additional
steps.
Rather than explaining Armstrong’s defense of these steps, I shall simply explain why I
think his approach to the explanatory argument is less than ideal for those who share my method-
ological views. Here I have three general worries.
First, I do not think that empiricists can help themselves to Armstrong’s argument against
inductive skepticism. Armstrong applies a style of argument given by G.E. Moore (1925) to sup-
port the third step of his argument. However, Moore’s argument cannot be adopted by the empiri-
cist. Moore’s appeal to intuition in the justification of induction is akin to appealing to synthetic
a priori reasoning. The type of intuition in question is independent of experience (it must be, lest
it involve a circularity) and it falls short of a logical or analytic proof. Further, no empirically re-
spectable alternative presents itself. Whatever our justification for believing inductive inferences
6 Here, Armstrong’s idea is this: We observe a regularity, say, that all P s are Qs; we then make an inference to the
best explanation that there is a governing law of nature relating P and Q such that the instantiation of the former
by an individual entails the instantiation of the latter by that same individual. When we learn that some unobserved
individual i has P , we infer that i has Q.
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to be reliable, it cannot be purely empirical in the sense that we just “see” the inferences to be
justified. The strength of an inductive inference isn’t immediately presented to the senses. Thus,
if there is an empirically respectable defense of induction it must proceed in a rather different
manner.7
Second, the fourth step encounters two challenges, both stemming from the fact that Arm-
strong’s theory of laws is rather narrow. The primary challenge is that the narrowness of Arm-
strong’s theory severely complicates the matter of assigning a priori probabilities. Without a
rigorous investigation of these matters, there is no guarantee that the explanatory power of Arm-
strong’s theory isn’t offset by a low a priori probability. This problem may be avoidable (Tooley’s
manuscript “The Justification of Induction” includes relevant material), but even so the way to
avoid it involves a very complicated line of reasoning. The secondary challenge is that the nar-
rowness of Armstrong’s theory allows for the possibility of competing, but equally explanatory,
theories. Armstrong (1983, 105) himself notes that
There do seem to be other possible explanations of the regularity of the world.
Perhaps, as Berkeley thought, the regularities in things reflect no power in the
things themselves, but only a particular determination of the will of God to have
ordinary things (‘ideas’ for Berkeley) behave in a regular manner. If it seemed best
to him, he could abrogate the so-called ‘laws of nature’ tomorrow.
It’s not initially obvious how one is to apply an inference to the best explanation in favor one the-
ory over another when the two have equal explanatory power. Armstrong’s response to this worry
is simply to admit it, in the hopes that people will see that, all things considered, his explanation is
preferable to Berkeley’s. My suggestion, of course, would be to compare the a priori probabilities
of the two theories, but, as I have just explained, this matter is extremely complicated.
It is worth noting that there is something a bit odd about the dialectic here. Berkeley’s ac-
count (as presented by Armstrong) offers an explanation of regularity, but not (in the quick form
in which it is presented) a solution to the problem of induction. As Armstrong notes, Berkeley’s
God could, if he desired, change the laws tomorrow. So Armstrong’s initial argument—the purely
7 For one such attempt, see Michael Tooley’s manuscript “The Justification of Induction.”
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epistemological one—would seem to apply as well to Berkeley’s theory as it does to Descrip-
tive Humeanism. This isn’t (on its own) a mark against Armstrong’s basic argument, but it does
show that Armstrong’s argument isn’t solely based on the explanatory weakness of Descriptive
Humeanism. This is the third problem. The basic structure of Armstrong’s argument against De-
scriptive Humeanism is rather different from mine. Its structure is given by modus tollens rather
than inference to the best explanation or Bayes’ theorem. In the application of modus tollens, it
appeals to the problem of inductive skepticism, and thus sets out to accomplish more than my
argument. In doing more, it runs into additional complications. We can run an explanatory argu-
ment against Descriptive Humeanism without mention of the problem of induction. I suggest that
such an argument should be run first. If it succeeds, we are then in a better dialectical position
to determine which more specific version of Non-Humeanism is correct. If it fails, then stronger
arguments (such as Armstrong’s) seem bound to fail as well.
The lessons to take from Armstrong’s argument are the following: first, the argument should
not incorporate unnecessary epistemological assumptions, since the concept of explanation that
matters to us is purely metaphysical; second, the argument should be as general as possible, striv-
ing to establish that Governing Non-Humeanism is true rather than that some more specific ver-
sion of Governing Non-Humeanism is true.
5.3.2 Evan Fales’s Argument
Evan Fales (1990, Chapter 4) offers a rather different version of the explanatory argument
against Descriptive Humeanism. Like Armstrong, his primary focus is on whether Non-Humeanism
allows for a solution to the problem of induction. Since this problem is not of present concern, I
shall simply focus on the elements of Fales’s discussion that are directly relevant to the explana-
tion of natural regularities.
Here is Fales’s (1990, 105) summary of the argument:
We observe an event-sequence which exhibits a regular, repetitive pattern. In-
tuitively, and in the absence of any auxiliary information, such a sequence is re-
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markable. The (a priori) odds are against it. Of course, the odds are equally great
against any other particular sequence. But if (and only if) the sequence is a regu-
lar one, then there is a hypothesis, the truth of which would render the objective
probability of the observed sequence very high, and the probability of any alter-
nate sequence very low. What is this hypothesis? It is that there is a necessary
connection between the constantly conjoined event-types. By Bayes’ Theorem, an
event or event-sequence raises the probability of a hypothesis in proportion to the
degree to which that hypothesis raises the expectation of its occurrence over its
prior expectation. So the existence of the regular sequence enhances the chances
that this hypothesis is true.
Fales’s argument has the following structure: first, it is argued that regularity constitutes evidence
against Descriptive Humeanism. The idea here is to show first that the probability of that specific
regularity given Descriptive Humeanism is really low; this, of course, is a simple matter, and will
be familiar to anyone who has studied the problem of induction (see (Fales 1990, 92–98)). Second,
it is argued that there exists a Non-Humean theory T according to which the probability of that
specific regularity is very high. The conclusion is that the specific regularity constitutes strong
evidence for T in the sense that it raises the probability of T significantly. The basic structure of
this argument is very similar to mine. There is, however, a very important difference.
Fales asks us to consider a specific event-sequence—that is, a specific regularity—and con-
sider hypotheses which explain it. Governing Non-Humeanism is a very general theory; it doesn’t
explain any specific event sequence well at all, though sufficiently narrow versions do. The poten-
tial problem that arises, and which also arose in the context of Armstrong’s position, is this: how
are we to be certain that the explanatory power of the specific Non-Humean theory T in question
(that is, P (R|T )) isn’t “offset” by a very low prior probability of T (that is, P (T ))?
The problem is a dialectical one. In Chapter 3, I did not attempt to calculate the a priori
probability of Descriptive Humeanism. I just tried to show that it wasn’t any higher than the a
priori probability of Governing Non-Humeanism. But, for all we know, the a priori probability
of Descriptive Humeanism may be much higher than the a priori probability of T ; that will de-
pend, among other things, on just how narrow T is, and the more explanatory power T has, the
smaller its a priori probability. Taking stock, here is our position according to Fales’s argument:
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we don’t know that it is not the case that P (H) > P (T ); we know that P (R|T ) > P (R|H). We cannot
arrive at any really interesting conclusion concerning P (T |R) and P (H |R) from this. We need more
information about the a priori probabilities of T and H .
Fales provides a proposal for dealing with this problem.8 In essence, the goal is to show
that one may be justified in assigning a sufficiently high9 a priori probability to the narrow the-
ory T possessing a high degree of explanatory power with respect to the specific regularity in
question. His basic suggestion is that the Humean and Non-Humean (the latter is the proponent
of T ) go about categorizing their theories in very different ways. Since the Humean is only con-
cerned with the Humean ontology, the relevant “theory” is nothing more than the set of Humean
state descriptions. On the other hand, the Non-Humean considers theories to be something else
entirely; the relevant theories are the causal/nomological—that is, Non-Humean—structures or
range of causal/nomological structures that govern the distribution of states of affairs. Thus, ac-
cording to the Non-Humean, “[A theory] is a conjecture about the existence (or nonexistence) of
some stable underlying structure which necessitates what has happened and what will happen.”
(Fales 1990, 108). Using my terminology, Fales’s point is that a Non-Humean theory is nothing
more than a specification of Ω. This, unfortunately, is not a thesis with which I am enamored.
For one, it simplifies the method of generating Non-Humean state descriptions in a way that isn’t
obviously acceptable. In general, Non-Humeanism countenances multiple state descriptions for
each “causal structure,” that is, for each characterization of the Non-Humean connections in Ω.
However, the number of state descriptions consistent with each causal structure is not constant,
since it depends on the nature of the causal structure as well as the quantities of individuals and
properties. Hence, this approach omits information.
Perhaps there is a way to calculate more precisely the a priori probabilities of H and T ,
and the conditional probabilities P (R|T ) and P (R|H). Perhaps with the right sort of rigor, one
could show that the latter ratio is higher than the former, and thus develop an argument for Non-
8 Fales’s solution is closely related to Foster’s (1982-83) solution.
9 That is, high enough that the explanatory gains of T aren’t completely offset by its low a priori probability.
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Humeanism (or, for that matter, for T ). However, I don’t know the best way for such an argument
to proceed.10
This criticism is not intended to show that Fales’s argument fails. (Actually, I am optimistic
that it can be salvaged.) It is simply intended to demonstrate that the appeal to specific regularities
as evidence introduces technical complications. These complications can be avoided by focusing
on the generalization that the world is regular. How? It turns out that the very general theories
of Governing Non-Humeanism and Descriptive Humeanism can be compared directly as regards
their explanatory power with respect to general regularities—more precisely, with respect to the
fact that the world has a high degree of regularity. Though it is by no means simple to show
that the probability of regularity given Governing Non-Humeanism (P (R|N ) is greater than the
probability of regularity given Descriptive Humeanism (P (R|H)), such a demonstration is possible.
In my opinion, this is the path of least resistance. We have already compared the priors and found
that P (N ) ≥ P (H); if, in addition, we find that P (R|N ) > P (R|H), that will be enough to conclude
that P (N |R) > P (H |R). That, of course, is the central thesis of this chapter.
5.4 The Argument from General Regularity
The purpose of this section is to defend the general version of my explanatory argument
against Descriptive Humeanism. Unlike its predecessors, it is not based on some specific regular
distribution of states of affairs, but rather on the generalization that our world has a high degree
of regularity.
5.4.1 In Contrast with the Previous Arguments
I can now say exactly what my argument does (and does not) accomplish. I do not defend
a specific version of Governing Non-Humeanism; I simply argue that those versions expressible
by positing connections in the Ω parameter have a high degree of explanatory power (relative to
Descriptive Humeanism) with respect to the fact that the world contains a high degree of regu-
10 Tooley provides a related argument in “The Justification of Induction.”
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larity. I do not provide an analysis of laws, or of whatever it is that explains regularities. For
example, I take no stand on the matter of how governing laws are to be analyzed. One could pos-
tulate higher-order relations between universals, as Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977), and Armstrong
(1983) have done, with the added stipulation that the connection between law and regularity is a
synthetic necessary connection. One could postulate a deity with impressive powers, where these
powers are a species of bare disposition (Ellis (2001, 267) appears to attribute this view to New-
ton, and Armstrong (1983, 105) attributes it to Berkeley). One could postulate that it is the world
itself, rather than a deity, that possesses the grand dispositions in question (see, for example, (Ellis
2001)).11 All of these theories appear to be versions of Governing Non-Humeanism.
Further, I take no stand on whether laws are metaphysically contingent or metaphysically
necessary. Contrary to what many philosophers have thought, the view that laws are analyzed in
terms of synthetic necessary connections does not imply that laws are metaphysically necessary.12
For example, one could augment the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong framework by holding that the
entailment between laws and regularities is a synthetic metaphysical entailment, while still hold-
ing that the matter of which universals stand in nomic relations is a contingent matter. Similarly,
one could analyze laws in terms of God’s preferences, holding that it is metaphysically necessary
for particular events at a world to match up with God’s preferences at the world, all the while
holding that God’s preferences are contingent. The primary reason for these omissions is that
the argument does not require a stand on issues such as these. The general thesis of Governing
Non-Humeanism—the acceptance of basic synthetic necessary connections between categorical
properties, represented by adding connections to parameterΩ—is all that the argument requires,
because all that the argument attempts to establish is that Governing Non-Humeanism (in its
most general form) is true.
11 Perhaps one could postulate bare subjunctive conditionals in such a way that the conditionals entail governing laws
(see, for example, (Lange 2009)), though I should mention that I find the failure of this view to respect now-popular
truthmaking principles somewhat unappealing.
12 For example, Bird (2007, 1–5, 96–97) seems to think that Non-Humeanism has this consequence.
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5.4.2 A Statement of the General Argument
For simplicity of presentation, I assume that Governing Non-Humeanism and Descriptive
Humeanism are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. This is a reasonable assumption for
the moment, since the purpose of this chapter is simply to determine which of those two theories
is preferable. Also, the assumption has no effect on the overall argument for Governing Non-
Humeanism, since when all is said and done (at the end of Chapter 6) the theories compared are
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The general structure of the argument is as follows:
(1) Governing Non-Humeanism is at least as likely a priori as Humeanism (P (N ) ≥ P (H)).
(2) Governing Non-Humeanism offers a better explanation of regularity than Humeanism
(P (R|N ) > P (R|H)).
(3) The actual world has a high degree of regularity.
(4) Therefore, by Bayes’ theorem, Governing Non-Humeanism is more likely to be true in
light of our observation of regularity than Humeanism (P (N |R) > P (H |R)).
The relevant version of Bayes’ theorem is as follows:
P (H |R) = P (H)P (R|H)
P (H)P (R|H) + P (N )P (R|N )
The argument is valid;13 if (1), (2), and (3), are true, the conclusion must be true. I defended (1)
in Chapter 3. (3) is an empirical observation. That leaves (2), the defense of which is the purpose
of this section.
13 An explanation of the argument’s validity: Consider the following parallel equation for P (N |R):
P (N |R) = P (N )P (R|N )
P (N )P (R|N ) + P (H)P (R|H)
Dividing the second equation by the first yields the following:
P (N |R)
P (H |R) =
P (N )P (R|N )
P (H)P (R|H) =
P (N )
P (H)
∗ P (R|N )
P (R|H)
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In accordance with the methodology set out in Chapter 2, I shall defend the claim that
P (R|N ) > P (R|H), regardless of the equiprobability postulate employed. I offer two separate ar-
guments. Each is presented under the assumption that equiprobability of state descriptions is
the correct equiprobability postulate. It is then a simple matter to demonstrate that the same
arguments hold if instead equiprobability of structure descriptions is correct.
First, however, I shall explain why Descriptive Humeanism offers a poor explanation of the
fact that our world is highly regular, since the ideas presented in this explanation are relevant to
both of the following arguments.
In the preceding chapter, we saw that Humeanism entails that there are no governing laws:
that there are no states of affairs (logically/ analytically) distinct from regularities that entail
regularities. Thus, if Humeanism accepts the existence of laws they must be descriptive. Such
laws may be characterized as those that satisfy the following schema:
Non-Governing Laws: x is a law of nature =df [some fact about regularities]
Any law fitting this schema won’t provide an interesting explanation of particular matters of fact,
facts about regularities included. For example, consider one of the simplest satisfactions of Non-
Governing Laws:
It is a law that all Fs are Gs =df all Fs are Gs.
The law and the regularity are the very same thing, and no thing explains itself. The addition
of Humean-consistent conditions to the right-hand side doesn’t change this fact.14 More pre-
cisely, the explanatory power of a Descriptive Humean theory is inversely related to its a priori
probability. It is true that the probability that all Fs are Gs given the Descriptive Humean law
that all Fs are Gs is 1; however, it is also true that the a priori probability of there being a De-
scriptive Humean law that all Fs are Gs is exactly the a priori probability according to Descriptive
Humeanism that all Fs are Gs. So the sense in which Descriptive Humean laws “explain” is not
14 Bird’s (2007, 86-90) explanatory argument against Humeanism includes a substantial development of this point.
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metaphysically interesting. Thus, there is no possibility of lawlike (or “top-down”) explanations
of regularity given Descriptive Humeanism.
Similarly, there is no possibility of “bottom-up” explanations of regularity given Descriptive
Humeanism, since Humeanism precludes the postulate of bare dispositions or any other essential
connections between natural properties. Hence regularities cannot be explained by appeal to the
intrinsic natures of the properties involved in regularities.
How does Descriptive Humeanism explain the fact that our universe is highly regular—more
generally, that our universe is the way that it is? It holds that the distribution of states of affairs
is a matter of chance, and nothing more. We can immediately see why previous philosophers
have focused on specific regularities. Given a large sample that all Fs are Gs, the probability of
that sample occurring by chance is incredibly small. However, something similar can be said for
my broader definition of regularity: whatever the patterns involved, the probability that a given
pattern will repeat by chance is incredibly small.
5.4.3 Equiprobability of State Descriptions
According to equiprobability of state descriptions, P (R|N ) and P (R|H) are determined by
the following fraction:
P (R|T ) = number of regular state descriptions according to theory T
total number of state descriptions according to T
The crucial challenge is to determine how these fractions differ for the two theories. I shall provide
two arguments that P (R|N ) > P (R|H).15
5.4.3.1 Argument 1
The first argument compares P (R|N ) and P (R|H) by comparing the following two fractions:
(5) P (R|N ) = number of regular Governing Non-Humean state descriptionstotal number of Governing Non-Humean state descriptions
15 Note to the reader: The second argument is simpler and easier to understand than the first; if you wish to avoid a
rather technical argument, I recommend skipping ahead to the second argument, referring back to the example in the
first argument when necessary.
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(6) P (R|H) = number of regular Humean state descriptionstotal number of Humean state descriptions
The idea is to argue that (5) > (6), and one way to do so is to begin by comparing the following
two fractions, where P (RN ) represents either the quantity of regular state descriptions accord-
ing to Governing Non-Humeanism or the a priori probability that the actual state description
is a Governing Non-Humean state description (it doesn’t matter which since we are assuming
equiprobability of state descriptions):
(7) P (RN )P (RH ) =
number of regular Governing Non-Humean state descriptions
number of regular Humean state descriptions
(8) P (IN )P (IH ) =
number of irregular Governing Non-Humean state descriptions
number of irregular Humean state descriptions
I shall argue that (7) > (8). Then, using a bit of math, it follows that (5) > (6). Here is the proof:16
(9) ( P (RN )P (RH ) >
P (IN )
P (IH )
) ⊃ ( P (RN )P (IN ) >
P (RH )
P (IH )
).17
(10) For all a, b, c, and d > 0, if ab >
c
d then
a
b+a >
c
d+c .
18
(11) From (9) and (10), we have:
( P (RN )P (RH ) >
P (IN )
P (IH )
) ⊃ ( P (RN )P (IN )+P (RN ) >
P (RH )
P (IH )+P (RH )
).
The antecedent of (11) says that (7) > (8). The consequent of (11) says that (5) > (6)—that is, that
P (R|N ) > P (R|H). Therefore, if (7) > (8) then (5) > (6). Accordingly, I shall now argue that (7) > (8).
The argument is based on the idea that the mapping from a Descriptive Humean state de-
scription to its Governing Non-Humean categorical equivalents is one-to-many. (Recall that, ac-
cording to Governing Non-Humeanism, two state descriptions are categorically equivalent if and
only if their assignments of individuals and properties from parameters Σ and Φ are the same
and they differ only with respect to the assignment of Non-Humean connections from parame-
ter Ω. Note also that I shall call a specification of Σ and Φ an observable state.) There are many
16 Earlier versions of this argument were both longer and less precise; I am indebted to Michael Tooley for suggesting
this manner of setting up the argument.
17 This is a theorem; the consequent is obtained from the antecedent by cross-multiplication.
18 Proof: Suppose that ab >
c
d . Since b and d > 0, ad > bc. Adding ac to both sides yields ad + ac > bc + ac. So
a(d + c) > c(b+ a). Since a, b, c, and d > 0, (d + c) and (b+ a) > 0, and thus ab+a >
c
d+c .
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Non-Humean worlds corresponding to each highly regular observable state, since (a) not all of
the regularities in a highly regular world need correspond to Non-Humean laws, and (b) there
are many ways of specifying probabilistic laws that can give rise to the same regularities. In this
argument, I shall ignore (b) for reasons of simplicity.19 To simplify even further, I shall assume
that there is only a single basic nomic relation. In an observable state with n regularities, the
number of possible Governing Non-Humean laws can range from 1 to n, and there are thus 2n −1
possibilities that contain at least 1 Governing Non-Humean law, since each of the n regularities
can either correspond to a Governing Non-Humean law or not, and the only case “thrown out” is
the one in which no regularities correspond to a Governing Non-Humean law. This shows that,
given an observable state with n regularities, P (RN ) > P (RH ) by a factor of 2n − 1. There are 2n − 1
Governing Non-Humean categorically equivalent state descriptions corresponding to the single
Descriptive Humean state description for the given observable state.20
Of course, similar remarks can be made for the claim that P (IN ) > P (IH ). Once again, the fac-
tor will be 2n−1. However, it is important to remember that that factor is relativized to individual
Humean state descriptions, where the value of n depends on the number of regularities in—that
is, the degree of regularity of—the Humean state description in question. The higher the degree
of irregularity of a Descriptive Humean state description, the fewer Governing Non-Humean cate-
gorical equivalents it has, since there are fewer ways of specifying the necessary connections in Ω
that allow for Governing Non-Humean categorical equivalents. In other words: more regularities,
more possible laws; fewer regularities, fewer possible laws. Here is an example. Suppose you have
a state in which all Fs are Gs, but there is no regularity among P s and Qs. That observable state is
consistent with its being a governing law that all Fs are Gs, but not with its being a law that all P s
areQs (or its being a law that allQs are P s). For an observable state with lots of regularities, 2n−1
19 The arguments are much easier to present if we assume that laws cannot be probabilistic. Then, once the argu-
ments have been presented for the deterministic case, it is relatively straightforward to argue that they also hold for
probabilistic cases.
20 If we drop the assumption of a single nomic relation, the argument would be strengthened. In that case, for an
observable state with n regularities, the number of possible Governing Non-Humean laws can range from 1 to n ∗m,
where m is a constant expressing the number of basic nomic relations (basic nomological connections inΩ). For values
of m > 1, the probability of regularity given Governing Non-Humeanism will be higher than for m = 1.
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is high. For an observable state with few regularities, 2n − 1 is comparatively small. This is a very
simple way of saying that 2n −1 is smaller for smaller values of n. The conclusion is that there are
relatively more Governing Non-Humean categorical equivalents corresponding to the Descriptive
Humean state descriptions with higher degrees of regularity, and relatively fewer Governing Non-
Humean categorical equivalents corresponding to the Descriptive Humean state descriptions with
lower degrees of regularity. Since n corresponds to the degree of regularity at a world, Governing
Non-Humeanism countenances more categorical equivalents for regular worlds, and fewer cate-
gorical equivalents for irregular worlds. That is, Governing Non-Humean state descriptions tend
to be regular, whereas Humean state descriptions do not. According to Equiprobability of State
Descriptions, this entails that (7) > (8).
To recap, this argument has proceeded by looking at the set of Descriptive Humean state
descriptions and asking how many Governing Non-Humean categorical equivalents correspond
to each Descriptive Humean state description. In each case, the answer is 2n − 1, where n is the
number of regularities, a number which varies from one Descriptive Humean state description to the
next. Higher degrees of regularity correspond to higher values for n; lower degrees of regularity
correspond to lower values for n. P (RN ) is the number of regular Governing Non-Humean state
descriptions, and it corresponds to higher values for n. P (IN ) is the number of irregular Governing
Non-Humean state descriptions, and it corresponds to low values for n. Hence, P (RN ) is greater
than P (RH ) by a factor of 2n − 1 where n is higher, whereas P (IN ) is greater than P (IH ) by a factor
of 2n − 1 where n is low. Thus, though P (IN )P (IH ) may well be greater than 1, it is greater than 1 by a
smaller factor than P (RN )P (RH ) . Therefore, (7) > (8). And, by (11), (5) > (6). Thus, P (R|N ) > P (R|H).
Two further points are worth noting. First, it doesn’t matter where we draw the line between
regular and irregular worlds, since 2n−1 is monotonic (as n increases, 2n−1 increases, regardless of
the value of n). Thus, the basic result is that Governing Non-Humeanism predicts a higher degree
of regularity across the board than Descriptive Humeanism. Second, we may draw a conclusion
stronger than the final inequality—P (R|N ) > P (R|H)—indicates. Since the ratio 2n−1n becomes
increasingly larger as n increases, P (R|N ) is in fact much greater than P (R|H). Therefore, regularity
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is strong evidence against Descriptive Humeanism.
At this point, it may be helpful to consider an example. (Note: In order to keep the example
sufficiently small that it is illuminating, a number of fairly restrictive assumptions have had to be
made—for example, concerning the definition of regularity. These restrictive assumptions are not
adopted by any of the arguments of this chapter.) Suppose that our language L is characterized as
follows:
Σ = {a,b}
Φ = {F,G}
Ω = {necessitation(→)}
This example allows for the state descriptions displayed in Tables 5.1 – 5.4. An X next to a row
refers to the fact that the state description in question is logically inconsistent; H1 refers to the
first Humean state description, N1 refers to the first Non-Humean state description, and so on.
Table 5.1: Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = ∅
Fa Ga Fb Gb
H1 X P
H2 X P
H3 X P
H4 X P
H5 X X F
H6 X X P
H7 X X I
H8 X X I
H9 X X P
H10 X X F
H11 X X X P
H12 X X X P
H13 X X X P
H14 X X X P
H15 X X X X F
A quick examination tells us that, in this case, P (N ) = 19/34 and that P (H) = 15/34. But
what should be said about regularity? There is, I think, a very natural way of looking at regularity
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Table 5.2: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {F→ G}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
X X P
N1 X P
X X P
N2 X P
N3 X X F
X X X P
X X X I
X X X I
N4 X X P
N5 X X F
X X X X P
N6 X X X P
X X X X P
N7 X X X P
N8 X X X X F
Table 5.3: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {G→ F}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
N9 X P
X X P
N10 X P
X X P
N11 X X F
N12 X X P
X X X I
X X X I
X X X P
N13 X X F
N14 X X X P
X X X X P
N15 X X X P
X X X X P
N16 X X X X F
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Table 5.4: Non-Humean State Descriptions for L: Ω = {F→ G, G→ F}
Fa Ga Fb Gb
X X P
X X P
X X P
X X P
N17 X X F
X X X P
X X X I
X X X I
X X X P
N18 X X F
X X X X P
X X X X P
X X X X P
X X X X P
N19 X X X X F
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in this simple example.
A world is fully regular =df ∀x(Fx ≡ Gx)
A world is partially regular =df (∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)∨∀x(Gx ⊃ Fx)& ∼ (∀x(Fx ≡ Gx))
A world is irregular =df ∼ (∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx)∨∀x(Gx ⊃ Fx))
Note: These definitions do not satisfy my earlier definition of regularity, but they are suitable
stand-ins because they allow us to examine rather small worlds. We can then look at the figures to
determine which state descriptions satisfy which definitions. The raw results are represented in
the rightmost column which says whether or not each state description is fully regular (F), partially
regular (P ), or irregular (I).
A summary of the results: Let K(f, h) = the number of fully regular state descriptions ac-
cording to Descriptive Humeanism, K(p, n) = the number of partially regular state descriptions
according to Governing Non-Humeanism, and so on.21
(12) K(f, h) = 3
(13) K(p, h) = 10
(14) K(i, h) = 2
(15) K(f, n) = 9
(16) K(p, n) = 10
(17) K(i, n) = 0
Suppose for the moment that we define regularity as full regularity (that is, we want to know the
probabilities of a fully regular world conditional on Descriptive Humeanism and Governing Non-
Humeanism). We have22
21 An anonymous referee from the Australasian Journal of Philosophy suggested this neat manner of setting up the
problem in comments on a related paper.
22 This example, in all its details, was chosen randomly, so I was surprised that the numbers worked out so neatly.
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(18) P (R|H) = 3/15
(19) P (R|N ) = 9/19
(20) P (H |R) = 1/4
(21) P (N |R) = 3/4
Suppose instead that we define regularity as partial or full regularity; that is, we want to know the
probabilities of a world that is at least partial regular conditional on Descriptive Humeanism and
Governing Non-Humeanism. We have
(22) P (R|H) = 13/15
(23) P (R|N ) = 19/19
(24) P (H |R) = 13/32
(25) P (N |R) = 19/32
This example yields the desired results. It is taken to be representative of our world only
in that it illustrates the following points: the higher the degree of regularity of a Descriptive
Humean state description, the more Governing Non-Humean categorical equivalents it will have;
the higher the degree of irregularity of a Descriptive Humean state description, the fewer Gov-
erning Non-Humean categorical equivalents it will have. Those state descriptions which are max-
imally irregular are precluded by Governing Non-Humeanism. Some partially regular state de-
scriptions are precluded by Governing Non-Humeanism. No fully regular state descriptions are
precluded by Governing Non-Humeanism. The result, which is borne out in the calculations
above, is that the ratio of regular state descriptions to irregular state descriptions is greater ac-
cording to Governing Non-Humeanism than according to Descriptive Humeanism.
To this point, I have not yet considered the possibility of infinitely large worlds. A different
approach to the problem of determining the probabilities of regularity conditional on Descriptive
Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism will be helpful for infinite scenarios.
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5.4.3.2 Argument 2
The same conclusion—that P (R|N ) is much greater than P (R|H)—follows if one starts with
the very intuitive idea that irregularities are the result of a lack of governing laws—that is, a lack
of Non-Humean connections in Ω. Let a Non-Humean property* be a property such that its in-
stantiation entails (or probabilifies) the instantiation of another property in virtue of a relevant
governing law of nature. A Humean property* is any property that is not a Non-Humean property*.
Let Non-Humean Monism be the view that all properties are Non-Humean properties*—
that is, that all properties stand in relations to other properties as specified by Ω. Dualism is
the view that there are both Humean properties* and Non-Humean properties*. Suppose that
Non-Humean Monism is true. In this case, regularity results of necessity (that is, if there are no
probabilistic connections; if there are, then regularity is just very likely, given the average of all
possible probabilistic connections). Here’s why. Suppose that P stands in the relation of nomic
necessitation to Q. Then the following state description will be inconsistent: P a & ∼Qa & P →Q.
The fact that P → Q guarantees the regularity that all P s are Qs. Now, if every property is a Non-
Humean property*, every property will be like the case of P and Q, so no irregular observable
state will correspond to a Governing Non-Humean observable state. The result is regularity—
that is, repeated patterns. The patterns might be complex, depending on the specification of the
necessary connections entailed by the Non-Humean properties*, but, given a sufficient sample,
types of states of affairs must fall into a pattern (or, in the probabilistic case, are very likely to fall
into a pattern). The nature of Non-Humean properties* is such that if all properties at a world are
Non-Humean properties*, nothing can give rise to irregularity.
The lesson here is that the percentage of Non-Humean properties* at a world is directly
related to the probability of regularity at that world. This was observed in the simple example
described by the figures in the subsection above; the Non-Humean set of worlds (c) with more
Non-Humean properties* (that is, with more necessary connections) implies full regularity; the
Non-Humean sets of worlds (a) and (b) with fewer Non-Humean properties* do not. A higher per-
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centage of Non-Humean properties* entails a higher likelihood of regularity. One who endorses
Dualism can, of course, allow for irregularity, but irregularity is due to the Humean properties*,
the lack of Non-Humean necessary connections between said properties. Suppose that there are
K = PN + PH properties, where PN is the quantity of Non-Humean properties* and PH is the quan-
tity of Humean properties*. The total number of irregular Non-Humean state descriptions will be
a function of PH rather than K , since it is only the Humean properties* that give rise to irregular-
ities. (In infinite worlds, matters will be spelled out in terms of limiting relative frequencies.)
Ultimately, we should like to know the a priori value of P (R|N ). That is, we should like to
know the most likely percentage of Non-Humean properties* given Governing Non-Humeanism.
In the absence of any evidence, equiprobability of state descriptions might be thought to suggest
that the answer is 50%. For example, in the absence of evidence, if someone has selected a number
between 1 and 100, asks you to guess the number, and will reward you based on how close you
are to this number, your best bet is to select 50. Out of all the other numbers, it has the highest
a priori expected payoff. Of course, one might worry here about Bertrand paradoxes; specifically,
one might wonder whether there are other standpoints from which it would make sense to assign
a lower or higher percentage. I can’t think of any good candidates, much less any candidates that
would entail that P (R|N ) is anywhere near as low as P (R|H). For the latter reason, I don’t think
that this is serious problem. Given only the information that Dualism is true, regularity is much
more likely than if Humean Monism is true. Given only the information that a world w contains
Governing Non-Humean laws, we should expect a reasonable degree of regularity. Certainly we
should expect a higher degree of regularity than for a Humean world of the same size, since, by
the postulate of Non-Humeanism, PH < K , but in the Humean world, PH = K .
To sum up, if equiprobability of state descriptions is correct, we have good reason to believe
that P (R|N ) is much greater than P (R|H). Thus, our observation of natural regularity constitutes
strong evidence in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism.
133
5.4.4 Equiprobability of Structure Descriptions
In accordance with the methodology set out in Chapter 2, I shall now explain how the two
arguments presented above apply even if it is equiprobability of structure descriptions that is
correct instead of equiprobability of state descriptions. As explained earlier, the result will be
that any equiprobability postulate along Carnap’s λ-continuum entails that P (R|N ) > P (R|H).
It is relatively simple to demonstrate that the same results hold as in the case of equiproba-
bility of state descriptions. In the case of equiprobability of structure descriptions, the probability
of regularity given a particular theory T is
P (R|T ) =
∑
(weighted probabilities of regular state descriptions according to T )∑
(weighted probabilities of all state descriptions according to T )
Above, I argued that although both P (RN ) > P (RH ) by a factor of 2n − 1 and P (IN ) > P (IH )
by a factor of 2n − 1, n is higher in the former case than in the latter. I did so by considering the
set of Descriptive Humean state descriptions, and then determining the number of Non-Humean
categorical equivalents for each one. That number is given by the formula 2n − 1, where n cor-
responds loosely to the degree of regularity of each Humean state description. Since n is higher
for worlds with higher degrees of regularity, there are relatively more Governing Non-Humean
categorical equivalents for worlds with higher degrees of regularity, and thus Governing Non-
Humeanism offers a better explanation of regularity than Descriptive Humeanism. The results of
this procedure can be adapted for equiprobability of structure descriptions, the proposal under
consideration here.
The procedure for calculating P (RH ) under equiprobability of structure descriptions is the
following:
(26) Find all structure descriptions.
(27) Assign equal probabilities to each structure description.
(28) For each structure description, find the state descriptions that are its members and dis-
tribute the probability of that structure description equally over the state descriptions
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that are its members.
(29) Find the regular Descriptive Humean state descriptions and sum their weighted probabil-
ities to get P (RH ).
The procedure for calculating P (RN ) is, of course, exactly parallel, with the only difference being
that ‘Governing Non-Humean’ replaces ‘Descriptive Humean’ in (29). The only major difference
for this case is that the state descriptions being considered do not have the same a priori proba-
bilities; the homogenous ones—that is, the regular ones—have higher a priori probabilities since
they are assigned higher weights.
The question now is what effect this has on the original argument given in the context of
equiprobability of state descriptions. In my view, the answer is that it has no (negative) effect
on my argument. The argument above showed that higher degrees of regularity/homogeneity
correspond to a greater difference between the number of Governing Non-Humean and Descrip-
tive Humean state descriptions. Thus, consider some structure description S: the higher degree
of homogeneity of the state descriptions members of S, the greater the proportion of Governing
Non-Humean to Descriptive Humean state descriptions that are members of S; the lower degree of
homogeneity of the state descriptions members of S, the lower the proportion of Governing Non-
Humean to Descriptive Humean state descriptions that are members of S. For example, consider
language L (same as above) with only two predicates, F and G, and two individuals a and b. Let S*
be the structure description with probability p according to which all Fs are Gs and all Gs are Fs.
There is only one Descriptive Humean state description (H15 from Figure 1 above) that is a mem-
ber of S*, but there are three Governing Non-Humean state descriptions (N8, N16, N19) that are
members of S*. Hence, the weighted probability of each state description is p/4, and so Govern-
ing Non-Humeanism “captures” 3/4 the weight of p, whereas Descriptive Humeanism “captures”
only 1/4. Now let S** be the structure description with probability p according to which no Fs are
Gs and no Gs are Fs. There are two Descriptive Humean state descriptions (H7 and H8) members
of S**, but not a single Governing Non-Humean state description that is a member of S**. In this
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case, the entire weight of the irregular structure description belongs to Descriptive Humeanism.
My second argument established exactly the same point, albeit indirectly. Instead of focusing on
the relative numbers of categorical equivalent state descriptions according to the two theories, it
focused directly on their ratios. But the lesson is the same. Once again, it entails that the Govern-
ing Non-Humean state descriptions will capture more weight of the more homogenous structure
descriptions.
Thus, at step (28), regardless of the argument employed, the result will be that the weight of
structure descriptions giving rise to regular state descriptions will tend to be distributed towards
Governing Non-Humean state descriptions (since, as the earlier arguments showed, there tend
to be more of them), whereas the weight of structure descriptions giving rise to irregular state
descriptions will tend to be distributed towards Descriptive Humean state descriptions (since,
as the earlier arguments showed, there tend to be more of them). Thus, it is evident that the
arguments that P (R|N ) > P (R|H) proceed unaffected.
That the arguments proceed unaffected is not surprising. The general effect of moving to-
wards equiprobability of structure descriptions is to privilege homogenous state descriptions.
There are more homogenous state descriptions according to Governing Non-Humeanism than ac-
cording to Descriptive Humeanism. Thus, it is to be expected that equiprobability of structure
descriptions entails that P (R|N ) > P (R|H).
Therefore, my conclusion—that P (R|N ) > P (R|H)—holds regardless of the equiprobability
postulate employed. Similarly, the conclusion of Chapter 3—that P (R) ≥ P (H)—holds regardless
of the equiprobability postulate employed. And, of course, we observe pervasive natural regular-
ities. Therefore, by Bayes’ theorem, the a posteriori probability of Governing Non-Humeanism
(P (N |R)) is greater than the a posteriori probability of Humeanism (P (N |H)). Thus ends my em-
pirical argument against Humeanism.
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5.5 Objections
I shall now consider five objections to the argument given in 5.4. First, one might worry
that my definition of regularity is too general. The idea here is that for any infinite (or very large)
distribution of states of affairs, there is a finite pattern that systematizes it. I do not think that this
is correct—I’m thinking of the sequence of decimal places that constitutes any irrational number
as a counterexample.23 Moreover, I see no reason to think that a finite pattern would “emerge”
from any sequence. Hence, I do not believe that this objection warrants serious consideration.
Second, one might worry that I have ignored an observation selection effect. Suppose for the
moment that we live in an infinitely large Humean universe. Then we should not expect to observe
irregularity, since if we were in an irregular part of the universe life would be very unlikely to have
formed, or so the objection goes. Supposing that this is correct, there remain certain features of our
actual observation of regularity that are nonetheless remarkable. If Humeanism were true, and if
we were fully aware of the phenomena of observation selection effects, we would expect to live in a
universe in which (a) regularity is widespread, but only locally, since it is only local regularity that
is required to support life, and (b) our local portion of the universe is, with a very high probability,
very soon going to become irregular. But we don’t observe (a); instead, we observe regularity as far
as observation takes us. And, though this is merely of rhetorical importance, do any of us really
believe (b)?
The third objection is structurally similar to one that has been set forth against the fine-
tuning argument for the existence of God.24 My argument relies on the claim that P (R|N ) >
P (R|H). But one might argue that P (R) = 1 on the grounds that we observe regularity.25 After
all, I have assumed that we know that the world has a high degree of regularity. But if P (R) = 1,
23 Irrational numbers are those which cannot be expressed by a string of repeating or terminating decimals, such as
pi.
24 See (Sober 2003) for a defense of the objection, and (Monton 2006) for criticism of the objection.
25 I am ignoring the fact that regularity of observed states of affairs does not entail regularity of the whole world.
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then for all T , P (R|T ) = 1.26 Thus P (R|N ) = P (R|H), an unacceptable result.27 Unfortunately, the
present proposal would make it impossible for any old observation to count as evidence against
Humeanism, or as evidence against any ontology whatsoever. This is, of course, an instance of
the problem of old evidence, and any solution to this problem involves adjusting the relevant
probability functions. Once the relevant adjustments are made (they involve treating P (R) < 1),
the objection loses force.28 On a related note, the objection appears to conflate two distinct ways
of understanding P (R): the objective epistemic a priori probability of R and the a posteriori probability
of R given the observation that R. Of course, it is possible for us to believe that a proposition is true
while believing that the fact that it is true is unlikely. Suppose that a dealer in a game of poker
repeatedly deals herself a straight flush. This outcome is a priori unlikely, but the players believe
that it occurs; they observe it. The way to make sense of this is to distinguish between the two
interpretations of statements of probability. Eventually, the players will believe that the dealer’s
good luck constitutes evidence that she is cheating, and this is despite the fact that, according to
the objection being considered, the probability that she is dealt the good hands by chance given
the observation that she is dealt the good hands is equal to 1. Once the distinction is made between
the different interpretations of statements of probability, the objection again loses force.
The fourth objection is based on Goodman’s new riddle of induction (first introduced in
(Goodman 1955)). Here is the objection: Any sequence is a regularity, because predicates can be
defined in such a way that any sequence is systematizable. For example, consider a world in which
all green particles have positive charge and all blue particles have negative charge prior to the year
2000. After the year 2000, however, all green particles have negative charge, and all blue particles
have positive charge. The connection between greenness, blueness, and charge does not appear to
26 Provided that P (e) > 0, this is a theorem of the probability calculus. Proof: The following are theorems of the
probability calculus: (i) P (p|e) = P (e&p)P (e) ; (ii) P (p) = 1 ⊃ P (p&e) = P (e). Suppose that P (p) = 1. By (ii), P (p&e) = P (e).
Substituting equivalents, P (p|e) = P (e)P (e) = 1. By ⊃-introduction, if P (p) = 1 ⊃ P (p|e) = 1. Since p and e were chosen
randomly, the result may be universalized.
27 I do not think that this objection is at all compelling (since it conflates two ways of interpreting statements about
probability), but it seems to be a popular one and is thus worth considering.
28 See (Monton 2006, 415) for a discussion of the problem of old evidence in connection with the analogous objection
to the fine-tuning argument.
138
be easily systematizable. But wait! Let grue =df green prior to 2000 or blue after 2000. Then this
world is easily systematizable: all grue particles have positive charge. In this way, predicates can
be defined to systematize any distribution of states of affairs.
This objection is easy to answer within my methodological framework. We don’t get to
define the predicates; our understanding of basic properties (to which the predicates correspond)
is ultimately given through immediate sense experience; properties like green are analytically
basic, and thus suitable members of Φ ; properties like grue are not, and are thus unsuitable. The
“regularities” generated from gruesome definitions of the predicates in Φ are not genuine. The
systematization involved in the above objection is mere wordplay.29
The fifth objection is that there could be other empirical evidence that bears against Non-
Humeanism. Although P (N |R and only R) may be greater than P (H |R and only R), it may be the
case that P (N |E) < P (H |E) where E is the totality of empirical evidence. Can the Humean give an
empirical argument parallel to the argument of this essay that would establish that Humeanism is
more likely that Non-Humeanism on other grounds? Such an argument would require evidence
that bears against Non-Humeanism, such as widespread irregularity. But this particular bit of
evidence does not obtain—at least, we do not observe it—and I cannot think of any other clear type
of empirical data that could bear against Non-Humeanism. There seems to be something special
about the relationship between distributive properties and this particular ontological issue, and
this relationship is due to the way in which the theories are defined. Thus, I do not think that this
alternative is likely to succeed.
5.6 A Big Picture Objection
The objection considered in this subsection is not an objection to the argument that P (R|N ) >
P (R|H). Rather, it objects to the overall argument presented in 5.4.2. Thus far (not just in this
chapter, but in this whole project), I have based my arguments on the simplifying assumption that
our equiprobability postulates can be applied to handle state descriptions involving probabilistic
29 For a related recent discussion of this issue, see (Sider 2009, 397-402).
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laws. Unfortunately, there is good reason to believe that they cannot be applied in this manner;
the possibility of probabilistic laws implies that our two equiprobability postulates are false (I’ll
explain in a moment). This gives rise to the following dilemma: on the one hand, if probabilistic
laws are possible then new and controversial equiprobability postulates must be defended; on the
other hand, if probabilistic laws are impossible then a further and more complicated argument is
required in order to defend the thesis that P (N |R) > P (H |R), since in that case my argument that
P (N ) ≥ P (H) fails. Thus, on the second horn of the dilemma I need to argue that P (R|N )P (H |N ) > P (H)P (N )
even though it may be the case that P (H) > P (N ). The purpose of this section is to explain this
dilemma and argue that the challenges of each horn can be avoided.
5.6.1 Probabilistic Laws
In Chapter 3, I appealed to the possibility of probabilistic laws in order to argue that P (N ) ≥
P (H). Appealing to equiprobability of state descriptions, it followed immediately that there are at
least as many state descriptions involving Non-Humean governing laws as Descriptive Humean
state descriptions. The reasoning was as follows. Consider a probabilistic law that, for each F,
there is a probability P that it will become a G. Since P can be any number between 0 and 1, we
already have the result that there are infinitely many Non-Humean state descriptions. Moreover,
there will be infinitely many Non-Humean state descriptions corresponding to each Humean state
description (and thus to each observable state). This is sufficient to show that P (N ) ≥ P (H).
The initial problem with this proposal may be seen by examining the following case:
Case 1: Let w1 and w2 be state descriptions of the same size (having the same number of individ-
uals and the very same properties) such that:
• In w1 it is a law that for each F there is a probability of .9 that it is G, and all Fs are
Gs.
• In w2 it is a law that for each F there is a probability of .9 that it is G, and no Fs are
Gs.
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According to equiprobability of state descriptions, w1 and w2 have the same a priori probability.
This is obviously false. w1 should be assigned a much higher a priori probability than w2. (Similar
remarks can be made for equiprobability of structure descriptions.) It appears that the contents
of the probabilistic laws in question have a significant bearing on the probabilities of the state
descriptions in which they occur.
What is going on here? It appears that probabilistic laws introduce another “layer” of prob-
ability. The purpose of this subsection is to better articulate what such a layer must look like
and to suggest that the arguments of this chapter (the arguments for the explanatory weakness of
Humeanism) succeed on whatever modified interpretation of probability is required to accommo-
date probabilistic laws. (I stop short of a full development because I believe that the argument for
the other horn of the dilemma can be countered in a very straightforward manner.)
To begin, I’d like to remind the reader that the arguments of Chapter 3 suggest that there is
no reason to assign one state description a lower a priori probability than another simply on the
grounds that the former contains Non-Humean governing laws and the latter does not. For this
reason, (something very much like) equiprobability of state descriptions can be maintained for
cases in which Humean state descriptions are compared to Governing Non-Humean state descrip-
tions involving deterministic laws. Consider some observable state S1 and two state descriptions
satisfying that observable state: a Humean state description H1 and a Governing Non-Humean
state description GN1 that involves only deterministic laws. Since H1 and GN1 differ only in that
the latter includes governing laws, there is good reason to think that these two state descriptions
have equal a priori probabilities. With that in mind, I believe that a fruitful place to begin is by
considering how matters ought to change if we were to consider a Governing Non-Humean state
descriptionGN2 exactly likeGN1 except that it replaces a law of the formN (F,G) with a law of the
form P.99(F,G).30 It is hard to see how any justification could be given for thinking that P (GN2) is
significantly lower than P (GN1), or, more generally, that probabilistic laws are a priori less likely
30 I shall use Pm(F,G) to represent a nomic probabilification relation such that the instantiation of F probabilifies the
instantiation of G to degree m.
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than deterministic laws (assuming that one agrees that they are possible).
Merits of this proposal aside, it is incomplete. Though we don’t want to say that P (GN2) is
significantly lower than P (GN1), we certainly don’t want them to be equal. Consider GN3, which
is exactly like GN2 except that a single F is not a G. Unlike GN2, GN3 does not map to any Gov-
erning Non-Humean state description involving only deterministic laws. Thus, looking at state
descriptions like GN1 won’t give us a guide for how to assign probabilities to state descriptions
like GN3. That said, I believe that the general strategy of assigning probabilities to state descrip-
tions involving probabilistic laws on the basis of their relations to categorically equivalent state
descriptions involving only deterministic laws is likely to succeed. Compare GN2 and GN3. The
relative likelihood of these two state descriptions should be given to us by the laws. (Remember
that GN2 and GN3 have exactly the same laws.) But how?
At this point, I think that it is helpful to adopt as a heuristic a Laplacian view of the uni-
verse. On this view, the course of history begins with a set of initial conditions and laws. The initial
conditions may be thought of as first-order states of affairs. Suppose you’re given some initial con-
ditions and a complete set of deterministic laws, where a complete set is such that every event and
state of affairs at the world in question is law governed. There will only be one state description
compossible with that Laplacian picture (call it DL1). Now suppose that you’re given the same
set of initial conditions and a set of probabilistic laws. This Laplacian picture (call it P L1) is com-
possible with many state descriptions. If we draw pictures to represent these views, the DL1 is a
single line extending futureward, whereas P L1 branches in the direction of the future. The natural
proposal is that the Laplacean pictures—the tree-like structures DL1 and P L1—are equiprobable.
The probability of P L1 will then be distributed unequally among its various branches (where each
complete “path” from the start to the end of the tree is a state description) in accordance with the
content of the laws. The sort of equiprobability postulate consistent with this proposal meets all
of the desiderata explained above. It doesn’t artificially privilege deterministic laws over proba-
bilistic laws, and it shows how the content of laws is relevant to the a priori probability of a given
state description in a very intuitive way. Further, on this sort of postulate, the argument for the
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conclusion that P (R|N ) > P (R|H) merely requires small formal changes.
Of course, this type of postulate will need to be specified more precisely (and there are some
difficulties that arise in attempting to defend a fully specified version of such a postulate). How-
ever, the progress so far should be sufficient to demonstrate (a) that such a postulate is plausible,
(b) that such a postulate is very much in the spirit of our original equiprobability postulates, and
(c) that such postulates do not change the force of my arguments for Governing Non-Humeanism.
In short, this suggests that the probabilistic horn of the dilemma can be countered. That said, my
real reason for stopping at this point is that I believe the deterministic horn of the dilemma can
be resolved much more quickly and easily.
5.6.2 Deterministic Laws
I shall now discuss the second horn of the dilemma. The problem here is that the argument
that P (N ) ≥ P (H) provided at the end of Chapter 3 depends on the assumption that probabilistic
laws are possible. Without that assumption, the argument does not establish that P (N ) ≥ P (H).
In fact, most signs point to the opposite conclusion. Thus we find ourselves in the following
situation. P (N ) < P (H), but by how much? P (R|H) < P (R|N ), but by how much? In order to
conclude that P (N |R) > P (H |R) we require an argument that P (R|N )P (R|H) > P (H)P (N ) .31 Earlier, I criticized
Evan Fales for failing to provide an adequate argument for what was essentially that same thesis.
Can such an argument be provided by focusing on the concept of general regularity? I believe
that it can.
I need to argue for the following thesis:
P (R|N )
P (R|H) >
P (H)
P (N )
My argument begins with the claim that the number of regular Non-Humean state descriptions is
greater than the number of regular Humean state descriptions. That is, that
31 Note that P (N |R) > P (H |R) is equivalent to P (R|N )P (N ) > P (R|H)P (H). Dividing both sides by P (N )P (R|H) gives us
P (R|N )
P (R|H) >
P (H)
P (N ) .
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(30) RN > RH
That thesis has already been established by the arguments of 5.4.3.1.32 Now divide both sides of
(30) by the total number of Governing Non-Humean state descriptions (N ) to get
(31) RNN >
RH
N
Now divide both sides of (31) by RHH to get
(32)
RN
N
RH
H
>
RH
N
RH
H
We can reduce the right-hand side of (32) to get33
(33)
RN
N
RH
H
> HN
Recall that under equiprobability of state descriptions
P (R|T ) = number of regular state descriptions according to theory T
total number of state descriptions according to T
Applying this definition to the left-hand side of (33) gives us
(34) P (R|N )P (R|H) >
H
N
Further, under equiprobability of state descriptions
P (T ) =
total number of state descriptions according to T
total number of state descriptions, period
Applying this to the right-hand side of (34) yields34
(35) P (R|N )P (R|H) >
P (H)
P (N )
32 Reminder: The idea is that for any observable state with n regularities, there will be only one Descriptive Humean
state description corresponding to that observable state, but 2n − 1 Governing Non-Humean state descriptions corre-
sponding to that observable state.
33 As follows: RHN /
RH
H =
RH
N ∗ HRH =
H
N
34 Recall that this argument is presented under the assumption that Humeanism and Non-Humeanism are mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Accordingly, the denominator of the above fraction is equal to H +N . Thus P (H) =
H
H+N and P (N ) =
N
H+N . Thus
P (H)
P (N =
H
H+N /
N
H+N . This equals
H
H+N ∗ H+NN , which is just HN .
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This is what we set out to prove at the outset. Therefore, by demonstrating that there are more
regular state descriptions according to Governing Non-Humeanism than Descriptive Humeanism
we can easily prove that P (N |R) > P (H |R).
In sum, the explanatory weakness of Humeanism is not offset by the fact that Humeanism
may have a higher a priori probability than Governing Non-Humeanism. The evidence against
Humeanism is sufficiently strong that, all things considered, we may reject it even if we do not
know the a priori probabilities of Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism.
The same argument succeeds on the structure description approach. The very same proof
gets us to (33). From there, the proof is slightly more complicated. Recall that under equiproba-
bility of structure descriptions
P (R|T ) =
∑
(weighted probabilities of regular state descriptions according to T )∑
(weighted probabilities of all state descriptions according to T )
The application of this definition to (33) is less straightforward (than the application of the rel-
evant definition from equiprobability of state descriptions). It requires the argument set forth
in 5.4.4. That argument employed this definition to show that
RN
N
RH
H
= P (R|N )P (R|H) . Thus, the definition
above plus the argument of 5.4.4 gives us (34).
Further, under equiprobability of structure descriptions
P (T ) =
∑
(weighted probabilities of state descriptions according to T )∑
(weighted probabilities of all state descriptions)
This principle can be applied to (34) in exactly the same way as the principle used in the context
of equiprobability of state descriptions to yield (35). Thus if either equiprobability of state de-
scriptions or equiprobability of structure descriptions is correct (and thus if any equiprobability
postulate on the λ-continuum is correct), the evidence against Humeanism is sufficiently strong
that, all things considered, we may reject it even if we do not know the a priori probabilities of
Humeanism and Governing Non-Humeanism.
Returning to the big picture, we have been considering the claim that one cannot show that
P (N |R) > P (H |R) unless there are probabilistic laws (since probabilistic laws are required to show
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that P (N ) > P (H)). As I have demonstrated, this claim is simply mistaken. Even if probabilistic
laws are impossible, one can prove that P (N |R) > P (H |R).
5.7 Conclusion
I have argued that, in light of the generalization that the natural world has a high de-
gree of regularity, Descriptive Humeanism is much less likely to be true than Governing Non-
Humeanism. My arguments are thoroughly empirical (though perhaps not completely empirical,
since they assume justification for thinking that some system of logic is correct and that the logical
interpretation of probability is correct). These arguments from general regularity are straightfor-
ward, so why haven’t they received much attention in the literature? I think that there is a clear
reason. Most philosophers working in this area have been interested either in the philosophy of
science—an area focused on specific theories with great predictive power—or on the problem of
induction—a problem which is most easily understood through an examination of specific cases.
Philosophers with such interests would of course focus on particular regularities. However, for
those of us concerned with the more general theses of Descriptive Humeanism and Governing
Non-Humeanism, specific regularities aren’t required; the generalization that our world has a
high degree of regularity is sufficiently strong evidence in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism
over Descriptive Humeanism. This strategy allows us to avoid the problem of assigning a priori
probabilities to narrow hypotheses. I happen to think that this problem is neither insuperable nor
inscrutable, but it just doesn’t need to be engaged for our purposes. And, in this chapter, I have
shown that it can be avoided while still establishing that Descriptive Humeanism is most likely
false.
Chapter 6
Descriptive Non-Humeanism
6.1 Introduction
I have argued that Governing Non-Humeanism is superior to both versions of Humeanism.
Now we shall turn our sights to the debate between Governing Non-Humeanism and Descriptive
Non-Humeanism. The methodology should be familiar by this point. The two theories need to
be compared with respect to both their a priori probabilities and their explanatory power with
respect to observed natural regularities. In this chapter, I complete the argument for Governing
Non-Humeanism by arguing that it is superior to Descriptive Non-Humeanism.
Last chapter, I argued that Governing Non-Humeanism has great explanatory power with
respect to observed natural regularities. Can Non-Humeans achieve those same explanatory bene-
fits without postulating governing laws? I shall argue that they cannot; Descriptive Non-Humean
explanations of observed regularities merely relocate the regularities elsewhere.
I do not intend for the arguments of this chapter to be decisive; this chapter isn’t supposed
to be the final word on the debate between Descriptive and Governing Non-Humeanism. My
primary aim here is to highlight some promising arguments that weigh against Descriptive Non-
Humeanism and in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism. There are a number of reasons for the
modesty of this approach. First, the matter of selecting a version of Descriptive Non-Humeanism
is complicated; there are a variety of approaches in contemporary literature, all of which differ in
subtle but important ways. Compare (Ellis 2001),1 (Mumford 2004), and (Bird 2007). These im-
1 Ellis’s view is not (insofar as I can tell) straightforwardly a version of Descriptive Non-Humeanism. He holds that
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portant nuances cannot be handled sufficiently in one chapter. Second, my arguments depend on
a number of assumptions concerning the nature of natural properties and the nature of observa-
tion. These assumptions are controversial, and though they fit naturally with my methodological
approach they do require more support than I can give them here. Third, one of my primary
aims in discussing the various theories of laws is to justify the methodology of this project by giv-
ing a concrete example of how it can provide genuine epistemic reasons for metaphysical theory
choice. That has already been accomplished. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is not to
provide anything like a comprehensive discussion of Descriptive Non-Humeanism, but instead to
show how my methodology can contribute to the debate between Descriptive Non-Humeanism
and Governing Non-Humeanism by modestly suggesting that observed natural regularities favor
the latter theory.
This chapter is organized as follows. In 6.2 I argue that the a priori probability of Descrip-
tive Non-Humeanism is no greater than the a priori probability of Governing Non-Humeanism.
In 6.3 I explain how Descriptive Non-Humeanism attempts to explain natural regularities. In 6.4
I distinguish two ways of understanding observed regularities. I argue that empirical founda-
tionalists must understand observed regularities as relations among categorical properties, and I
explain how this argument bears on contemporary debates concerning the nature of natural prop-
erties. In particular, I argue that we must reject the view according to which all natural properties
are bare dispositions. In 6.5 I argue that the explanation of regularities provided in 6.3 cannot
be extended to explain regularities among categorical properties, and thus that it cannot be ex-
tended to explain observed regularities. I conclude by contrasting the explanatory weakness of
Descriptive Non-Humeanism with the explanatory power of Governing Non-Humeanism. If my
arguments are sound, the result is that Governing Non-Humeanism is more likely to be true than
Descriptive Non-Humeanism.
the world is of a natural kind, where the natural kind may be understood as a disposition of sorts. Depending on the
precise characterization of this disposition, we may end up with an account that satisfies Governing Laws instead of
Descriptive Laws. If the disposition is bare then it may constitute a state of affairs distinct from regularities that entails
regularities. On the other hand, if it is reducible to those bare dispositions instantiated in (but not by) the world then
Ellis’s account appears to satisfy Descriptive Laws. It is not entirely clear to me which account Ellis accepts.
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6.2 The A Priori Probabilities
To begin, I shall discuss the relative a priori probabilities of Governing Non-Humeanism
and Descriptive Non-Humeanism. It is not terribly difficult to isolate those features of the theories
relevant to their a priori probabilities, so this section will be brief.
Consider an observable state in which all Fs are Gs. The Governing Non-Humean can
explain this regularity by positing a governing law—for instance, by positing a state of affairs
N (F,G). The Descriptive Non-Humean can explain this regularity by claiming that F is a bare
disposition, the instantiation of which by any object brings about the instantiation of G by that
same object in all conditions of manifestation. The difference between the two views is that they
postulate irreducible necessity in different places. The Governing Non-Humean adds a necessary
(or probabilistic) connection to Ω; the Descriptive Non-Humean treats F as a bare disposition of
sorts—a Non-Humean predicate in Φ . By giving a sufficiently creative account of how the rel-
evant necessary connections manifest, it looks like both theories can countenance the very same
observable states; more precisely, it looks like they can offer multiple categorically equivalent state
descriptions for any given Descriptive Humean state description, and in fairly similar ways. Both
theories can posit probabilistic necessary connections; both theories can tweak the form in which
the necessary connections manifest (are they unary, binary, et cetera? are they conjunctive, dis-
junctive, et cetera? and so on). In sum, since the two theories have similar resources, the natural
conclusion to draw is that there is a one to one mapping from Governing Non-Humean to Descrip-
tive Non-Humean state descriptions.2 For this reason, we do not yet have any reason to think that
the a priori probabilities of Governing Non-Humeanism and Descriptive Non-Humeanism differ.
This result shouldn’t be terribly surprising. Most Descriptive Non-Humeans (for example,
Alexander Bird) believe that facts about laws, conceived as reducible relations between universals,
supervene on facts about dispositions. Most Governing Non-Humeans and Governing Humeans
(for example, Michael Tooley and David Armstrong) believe that facts about dispositions super-
2 I’ll argue against this point later in this chapter.
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vene on facts about laws. This would not be the case if, given our methodology, there were obvious
reasons for thinking that one theory is a priori much more likely than the other—that is, if one
could accommodate lots of observable states that the other couldn’t. For this reason, I shall assume
that the a priori probabilities of Governing Non-Humeanism and Descriptive Non-Humeanism
are the same. If we want to decide between them, we’ll need to do some empirical investigation.3
6.3 How Descriptive Non-Humeanism Explains Regularities
In the last chapter, we saw that Governing Non-Humeanism does a good job of explaining
natural regularities. It does so in large part because it allows for the postulate of irreducible
necessary connections. So does Descriptive Non-Humeanism, so we might expect it to have similar
explanatory power. I shall now explain how most Descriptive Non-Humeans have attempted to
employ irreducible necessity to explain observed regularities.
The Descriptive Non-Humean cannot posit irreducible necessary connections between prop-
erties in the manner of the Governing Non-Humean. For instance, they cannot treat the necessary
connections as a relation the instantiation of which constitutes an atomic state of affairs, since
that would be to countenance a governing law (there are other restrictions corresponding to other
ways of getting governing laws, but I shall ignore these for the moment). Instead, Descriptive
Non-Humeans must build the necessity into the properties themselves. That is, they must accept
that there are (something very much like) bare dispositions, and they must employ these bare
dispositions to explain natural regularities without positing governing laws of nature. Recall our
earlier definition of a dispositional property:
Disposition: D is a dispositional property if and only if there exist a property M and conditions C
such that, necessarily, (∀y)((y has D and y is in C)⊃ y is M).
Properties which satisfy this definition intrinsically—that is, in a basic and irreducible way—
are bare dispositions. I shall treat the acceptance of bare dispositions understood in this way as
3 I should point out that some philosophers have thought that there are good reasons to prefer one theory to the
other on the grounds that for example laws reducible to dispositions are unable to accommodate certain forms of
scientific laws. See for example (Bird 2007, 211-215) for a discussion of this issue.
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an essential postulate of Descriptive Non-Humeanism.4 This will be controversial, because (as
noted in Chapter 3) Disposition is a much stronger analysis of dispositions than is popular. It
can be weakened by replacing the necessity in Disposition with counterfactual dependence or by
changing the analysis so that it permits finks and antidotes (see (Bird 2007) for a good example
of a weaker analysis). However, there is a very good reason for using the strong analysis here. If
bare dispositions satisfying the strong analysis cannot be employed to explain regularities, there
will be no hope for those satisfying weaker analyses.
Now, consider some arbitrary property D which satisfies Disposition. Disposition entails
that it is necessary that any object which possesses D will attain M under conditions C. This
entails the regularity that all D in C are M. That’s all there is to it! This is a very simple, and, on
the surface, plausible way to account for natural regularities.
This explanation appears to make governing laws dispensable. The state of affairs consist-
ing of a particular’s possession of D will literally be a part of the regularity that all D are M in C.
According to Bird (2007, 47), such generalizations are indicative of relations between universals—
for example, in our case there is a relation betweenD andM and C—but these relations are not sui
generis, not atomic, and not themselves universals. Hence the laws aren’t distinct from the regular-
ities; all of the properties in question are parts of the regularities, so the laws are not governing. To
quote Bird, on this view “the laws spring from within the properties themselves” (2007, 2). Thus
there is no need to postulate a governing law to account for the necessary connection between D,
M, and C.
Thus it would appear that Descriptive Non-Humeanism is on a par with Governing Non-
Humeanism in its ability to explain natural regularities. However, I shall argue that the expla-
nation provided by Descriptive Non-Humeanism falls short in a very important area. Namely,
though it can explain some natural regularities (as we have just seen), it cannot explain regular-
ities among categorical properties. This result is quite damning, since the regularities given in
4 In Chapter 3, I considered a slightly modified version of Disposition; this modification is ignored here for the sake
of simplicity, but this omission has no effect on the arguments of this chapter.
151
experience—the observed regularities, the regularities most in need of explanation—are regulari-
ties among categorical properties. Accordingly, my argument against Descriptive Non-Humeanism
has two parts. In the next section, I argue that observed regularities constitute regularities among
categorical properties. In the section that follows, I argue that Descriptive Non-Humeanism is
unable to provide an explanation of these regularities.
6.4 The Nature of Observed Regularities
I shall begin my argument against Descriptive Non-Humeanism by arguing that (at least
some) observed regularities constitute regularities among categorical properties.
At this point, we must ask a very important question: What is the nature of properties
given in experience? No doubt many philosophers will argue that the properties given in expe-
rience (supposing, of course, that some properties are given in experience—a reasonable suppo-
sition given the epistemological assumptions of this project) are obviously categorical properties.
Though there has been little direct discussion of this issue in recent literature, there has been
much discussion over a closely related issue: whether all natural properties are categorical (cat-
egorical monism), all natural properties are bare dispositions (dispositional monism), or there are
natural properties of both types (dualism). For the purposes of this chapter we can ignore categor-
ical monism. The relevant question, accordingly, is whether there are some categorical properties.
If there are not, then obviously the natural properties given in experience cannot be categori-
cal properties. Thus the debate over the types of natural properties is relevant to the matter of
whether the properties given in experience are dispositional or categorical.
It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a full assessment of the debate
over the types of natural properties. Instead, I shall introduce and defend an argument for the
conclusion that (at least some) observed regularities constitute relations among categorical prop-
erties only—that is, that when we observe regularities we (at least sometimes) observe regularities
that hold among categorical properties. Once this argument has been introduced, I shall explain
how it bears on two of the most important arguments in the debate over whether there are any
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categorical properties. Ultimately, I believe that the matter hinges on one’s underlying method-
ological assumptions. In this case, empirical foundationalism privileges the view that at least
some properties—namely, the properties given in experience—are categorical.
6.4.1 The Argument From Experience
I shall now argue that observed regularities constitute regularities among categorical prop-
erties only.5 We are interested in the metaphysics of laws of nature in the first place because
our experiences of the world are systematizable into relatively simple patterns (patterns that are
a priori unlikely). In other words, we care about laws because we observe regularities. Thus it
is very important to determine the nature of observed regularities. Are they regularities among
categorical properties, dispositional properties, or both?
In order to answer this question, I need to introduce a few other assumptions about the
nature of properties. First, I assume that natural properties are sparse. This is to say that not
every predicate or concept corresponds to a genuine property. For instance, one could accept this
view by holding that mass, charge, and the other fundamental properties of physics are the only
(metaphysically) real properties. Second, I shall assume that real properties are universals. (We
could probably do without the second assumption, but it allows for a simple presentation of the
competing explanations of natural regularities.) Third, I shall assume that the instantiation of
the same property by two individuals implies that the two individuals resemble one another in at
least one respect. This probably goes without saying, but by ‘resemble’ I don’t mean ‘visually re-
semble’ nor do I mean ‘resemble in some way detectable by the senses’. This brings us to two very
important questions: In which respects do the instantiations of a categorical property resemble
one another? In which respects do the instantiations of a bare disposition resemble one another?
The central idea behind my argument is that categorical properties and dispositional properties
differ in these respects.
It seems obvious that there is a genuine distinction between modal and non-modal resem-
5 This argument is related to Swinburne’s (1980) epistemological regress argument against dispositional monism.
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blance relations. Consider Disposition. By stipulation, at least one respect (and, in my view, the
only respect) in which two instantiations of a bare disposition resemble one another is a modal
respect; the resemblance cannot be grasped without possessing the antecedent modal concepts
appearing in the analysans of Disposition. There is simply no other respect in which two instan-
tiations of a bare disposition must resemble one another. If they didn’t resemble in the relevant
modal respect then the relevant property could not be a bare disposition. In contrast, it is clear
that some objects resemble without resembling in modal respects. Consider two instantiations of
the property qualitative squareness in different regions of one’s visual field. These property instan-
tiations resemble, and the resemblance can be grasped without any antecedent modal concepts.
So there are both modal and non-modal resemblances. The upshot is this. Since we have good
reason to accept the distinction between modal and non-modal resemblances, and since by defi-
nition the only respects in which instantiations of a bare disposition must resemble are modal, it
follows that we have the concept of categorical properties. Further, since some resemblances are
(a) given in experience, and (b) non-modal, it follows that there are some categorical properties.
We can say something stronger: that modal resemblance relations cannot be given in experi-
ence at all; that the respect in which two instantiations of a bare disposition resemble one another
is unobservable. Consider the following argument:
(1) Two instantiations of the same bare disposition resemble in a modal respect.
(2) We cannot be acquainted (through observation) with the modal respects in which the
instantiations of a given property resemble one another.
(3) Therefore, bare dispositions cannot be given in experience.
(4) Since we do have experiences, some properties are given in experience.
(5) Therefore, the properties given in experience are not dispositional properties.
Since, by definition, any property that is not a bare disposition is a categorical property, it follows
that some categorical properties are observable. Since observed regularities are observable, it
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follows that observed regularities are regularities among categorical properties.
I have already provided a defense of (1) (above—it simply follows from the definition of a
bare disposition). Pace eliminativists about the mental, (4) is as obvious as anything is obvious.
This leaves (2), which is widely accepted. Consider: we can be acquainted with saltiness easily
enough; we cannot (it would seem) be acquainted with water-solubility. One way to support (2)
is to appeal to examples such as this, but there is a better argument for (2). Begin with Hume’s
argument for the unobservability of causal relations. In Chapter 2 I explained that this argument
may be extended to any modal facts about the world; they just aren’t the sorts of facts that can be
given in experience. The truth of counterfactuals isn’t given in experience; causal relations aren’t
given in experience; governing laws of nature aren’t given in experience. Why not? We experience
that which is, but not that which merely could be. We taste salt; we observe crystalline structure;
we observe dissolving in water; in short, we observe the regularity that all salt dissolves in water;
we do not observe water-solubility. We know what it’s like to observe redness and squareness. But
what could it possibly be like to observe a property being such that, necessarily, dissolves when placed
in water? True, this isn’t exactly an argument that bare dispositions cannot be given in experience,
but it strongly suggests that dispositional properties are not given in experience. At the very least,
it places the following burden on those who believe that dispositions can be given in experience:
they needs to tell us how it is that such properties are given in experience and what it is like to
experience them. If they can’t, we have no reason to think that bare dispositional properties are
given in experience, and thus we have no reason to think that observed regularities constitute
regularities among bare dispositional properties. (Note that it won’t be of any help to say that
dispositional properties are not given in experience but that they give rise to experiences. The
categorical nature of our experiences must be accounted for, and this road leads to both dualism
and the view that observed regularities are relations among categorical properties.)
Of course, it is open to the Descriptive Non-Humean to deny (2). Indeed, I believe that this
is the most promising strategy for the Descriptive Non-Humean. However, I do not think that
this is an appealing option. On the surface, it appears that the denial of (2) requires the denial
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of empirical foundationalism. It is, of course, open to the Descriptive Non-Humean to deny em-
pirical foundationalism, but (obviously) I do not find this option appealing. I simply note it here,
since the success of this argument in particular has a particularly strong tie to my methodological
assumptions. There is a related limitation worth noting. The argument appears to commit us to
sense data or qualia, understood in an irreducible way.6 I don’t find this commitment troubling
in the least, but then I have no prior commitments to a rigid metaphysical naturalism or any such
view that is hostile to sense data or qualia. Since the assumptions (and commitments) required
for this argument are in line with my epistemological and methodological assumptions, for the
remainder of this chapter I shall assume that this argument is successful.
The argument I have defended is an epistemological regress argument. If this argument is
sound, dispositional monism is false. There have been a number of responses to regress arguments
against dispositional monism on behalf of Descriptive Non-Humeans, especially to purely meta-
physical regress arguments without commitments to sense data or qualia. In the next subsection, I
consider an important objection to such regress arguments. My aim is to show that this important
objection is ineffectual against my argument from experience. In the following subsection, I show
that considerations from my argument undercut the most important argument against categorical
properties—that is, they undercut the most important argument for dispositional monism. These
arguments are borrowed from (Bird 2007), as his is a recent, careful, and clear exposition of them.
(Note: The discussion in the following two subsections is somewhat tangential to the central
line of argument in this chapter. Some readers may wish to skip to 6.5 and return to this discussion
after finishing the rest of the chapter.)
6 This same limitation exists for inverted spectrum arguments against dispositional monism. The possibility of
an inverted spectrum shows that some properties—namely, color properties—are categorical, since color properties
are not defined solely in terms of their relations to other properties (including their causal/nomological relations),
but instead stand in brute identity (or, in this case, non-identity) relations to one another. I believe that the empirical
foundationalist is in a good position to defend such an argument, but I won’t discuss it here because it is similar enough
in crucial respects to the argument defended in this section.
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6.4.2 The Regress Argument Against Dispositional Monism
I shall now quickly explain a standard metaphysical regress argument against dispositional
monism. I do so for the purposes of showing that the argument presented above (in 6.4.1) is
immune to the criticisms of the standard regress argument. As its name suggests, the regress
argument against dispositional monism attempts to show that dispositional monism leads to a
vicious regress. But what sort of regress? As it turns out, there are a number of arguments bearing
this title (Bird (2007, Chapters 4 and 6) provides a nice summary). I’m going to focus on one
particularly influential version. It is this sort of argument that is responsible for Ellis’s (2002) and
Fales’s (1990, 219–220) rejection of dispositional monism. Before explaining Bird’s version of the
argument, I’ll borrow a few quotes from earlier works that explain the intuitive idea behind it.
Keith Campbell (1976, 93):
Is it possible for anything to be constituted by nothing but causal powers? What-
ever the answer is to that question, I doubt very much whether it is possible for
everything to be constituted by nothing but causal powers. But that seems to be
the situation [for dispositional monism]. When one point moves another, all that
has been shifted is a power to shift powers to shift. . . But powers to shift what?
Brian Ellis (2002, 171):
If all of the properties and relations that are supposed to be real are causal powers,
then their effects can only be characterized by their causal powers, and so on. So
causal powers are never manifested. They just produce other causal powers in
endless sequence.
(Note: here I would prefer not to say that causal powers are never manifested, but rather that
causal powers are never manifested in a way that distinguishes one causal chain from another.)
John Foster (1982, 68):
. . . there seem to be no physical items in terms of whose behaviour the content of
the powers could be specified, and consequently, it seems that, in the last analysis,
there is nothing which the powers are powers to do.
I particularly like Bird’s own explanation of the argument, and it is this version of the ar-
gument (and Bird’s responses to it) that I shall engage directly. Note that Bird uses the term
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‘potencies’ to refer to dispositional properties.
Consider the analogy with the circularity of definitions. One way of understand-
ing that problem is that we think of a definition giving meaning to a definien-
dum because the definiens already has meaning. Definition is a way, as it were,
of passing on meaning, not of creating it ab initio. A system where all meanings
were given by definitions would not have any semantic value in the system to be
passed around by those definitions. What is needed is some other way of pro-
viding meaning, e.g. an ostensive definition linking a word to a thing, so that the
system as a whole has some real meaning (semantic value) that can be passed on to
the definienda. Similarly one might think that a dispositional statement can only
represent some real state of affairs because its stimulus and manifestation condi-
tions are at least possible states of affairs. But if the stimulus and manifestation
conditions are themselves mere potencies, there seems to be insufficient reality in
the system as a whole. What is needed is that at least some properties are non-
dispositional in order to inject some genuine being into the system. As Armstrong
goes on to say, ‘Perhaps accepting that the purely spatiotemporally properties are
categorical will give enough categorical basis to blunt the force of this criticism.’
(Bird 2007, 101–2)
Bird offers a two-part response to this argument. First, he tries to show where the argument breaks
down.
The clear and simple response for the potency theorist is to deny that dispositions
are respectable only if they are reducible to counterfactuals (or something else).
The dispositional monist’s thesis is that real properties just are dispositions, and
are necessarily those dispositions. Thus she will reject immediately the assump-
tion of the objection that dispositions are real only if they are really something
else. Once we reject that assumption, the objection falls apart. (Bird 2007, 102)
I am somewhat sympathetic to this response. I say this because I am comfortable (enough) with
the idea of a set of languages that consist solely of semantic rules and are completely lacking in
any primitive semantic values. Of course, it would be difficult to distinguish one such language
from another, and it is not clear what the role of such languages could be. (Bird’s idea, I think,
will be that each language forms a sort of network or structure, and that the languages can be
distinguished by these structures.) But we can set these worries aside. Similarly, one might think
that the concept of a world without any categorical properties is perfectly intelligible, though
given a pair of such worlds one might not be able to distinguish one from the other. So let’s assume
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for the sake of argument that Bird’s response to the version of the regress argument presented
above is legitimate.
That said, I think that the analogy with circularity of definitions is nicely accommodated by
my approach to the regress objection, explained in 6.4.1 above. Categorical properties are well-
suited to play the role of semantic primitives; dispositional properties are not. Of course, this is
how the authors above would interpret things, but I believe that the analogy is stronger than Bird
would admit. The language introduced in the context of the interpretation of probability treats
Humean predicates (members ofΦ) as basic semantic values, some of which are given in experience
(and the other, more complex ones will be analyzed in terms of those that are given in experience).
In contrast, it treats Non-Humean predicates (members ofΦ , bare dispositions) and members ofΩ
(governing laws) as “rules” that restrict the way in which the Humean members of Φ are to be put
together with individuals to form consistent sentences (state descriptions). On this framework,
only Humean predicates are of the sort that can be given in experience. They are primitives, of
course, but this primitiveness is not problematic since it is given in experience. In contrast, it
seems that no addition of Non-Humean predicates or of governing laws (semantic rules) will ever
give us an analysis of Humean predicates. Sure, different characterizations of Ω and of the Non-
Humean members of Φ result in different state descriptions (different possible worlds), but these
differences do not suffice to explain differences in possible experiences we could have. Thus the
Bird’s response to the original regress argument explained above does not constitute an adequate
response to my argument.
Bird gives a second response. He tries to show that if dispositions are unsuitable candidates
for basic semantic values then so are categorical properties. Here is how Bird sets up his response:
To be precise, we may list the essential features that can be attributed to a cate-
gorical property thus:
(a) it is distinct from (i.e. not identical with) other properties;
(b) it is a universal and thus can have instances;
(c) for some n it is an n-adic universal. (Bird 2007, 103)
159
Bird then argues that the dispositional monist’s understanding of dispositions satisfies (a), (b),
and (c). I don’t have any objections to this argument. He continues:
Thus everything attributable to the being of a categorical property is also at-
tributable to the being of a potency. What distinguishes potencies is the additional
claim that they have (essentially) a dispositional character. Thus there is more to
the being of an essentially dispositional property than there is to that of a cate-
gorical property. In which case the claim that essentially dispositional properties
are lacking in reality unless reducible to or explicable in terms of a ‘decently real
categorical property’ is in error. If anything the boot is on the other foot. The
thinness of the nature of a categorical property should raise questions about its
sufficiency for reality. (Bird 2007, 103)
The problem with Bird’s argument is that (a), (b), and (c) do not exhaust the essential fea-
tures of a given categorical property (or, at least, of some categorical properties); together, they
don’t explain the feature of categorical properties according to which the instantiations of a given
categorical property must resemble one another, and the respects in which they must differ from
(that is, not resemble) the instantiations of a distinct categorical property. To put things crudely, a
given categorical property will have a certain quality in virtue of which its instantiations resemble
one another (and it is this quality in virtue of which (a) is true). This quality is brute. Bird might
call it a quiddity, and object to this characterization on those grounds (see 6.4.3 below). However,
it is precisely that quality of a categorical property—the resemblance relations it entails among its
instantiations—that makes it the categorical property it is. According to empirical foundational-
ism, this is the feature of a categorical property with which we have acquaintance. Conditions (a),
(b), and (c) are abstractions from or postulates about this quality of such properties, so contrary
to Bird they do not exhaust the being of a categorical property. This is why it makes sense to
use the analogy with semantics above; it is the possession of such basic qualities that makes cat-
egorical properties suitable candidates for the basic semantic values of predicates in a language.
In contrast, since dispositions are intrinsically modal (and thus, from the standpoint of empiri-
cal foundationalism, intrinsically unobservable) and since their modal features (plus (a), (b), and
(c)) exhaust their being, they are unsuitable as basic semantic values. Bare dispositions lack that
which makes categorical properties suitable to play the role of basic semantic values. The latter
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have a sort of bruteness about them, but it is the sort that can be given in experience. The former
do not, nor can they be given in experience. Thus Bird’s definition of categorical properties is
incomplete; it is not the case that everything attributable to the being of a categorical property is
also attributable to the being of a dispositional property. Once again, we see that Bird’s response
to this well-known version of the regress argument is ineffectual against the regress argument I
defended above.
Summing up, the essential idea is that some semantic values must be primitive. How else
would we get meaning in a foundationalist framework? Bird treats semantic rules as primitive;
why can’t we treat values in the same way, especially when we have access to such primitives
through immediate experience? It looks like we need both semantic values and semantic rules to
generate a language that describes our experience of the world. The upshot, at this point, is that we
have a good reason to be skeptical of dispositional monism, and, further, good reason to believe
that observed regularities constitute regularities among categorical properties. In 6.4.3 I shall
examine an argument in favor of dispositional monism, and I shall argue that the considerations
introduced by my argument allow us to easily avoid Bird’s criticisms of categorical properties.
6.4.3 Does Dualism Imply Quidditism? Is That Bad?
I shall now discuss Bird’s attempt to show that the idea of a categorical property is prob-
lematic. Since dispositional monism is the only view according to which there are no categorical
properties, this is an argument in favor of dispositional monism.
Before explaining Bird’s argument for Dispositional Monism, we need to take another close
look at how Bird understands categorical properties. Bird explains,
What we mean by ‘categorical’ must be understood in negative terms. That is, a
categorical property does not confer of necessity any power or disposition. Its ex-
istence does not, essentially, require it to manifest itself in any distinctive fashion
in response to an appropriate stimulus (Armstrong 1977: 80–3). The categorical
versus essentially dispositional distinction is a modal one. To say that a prop-
erty is categorical is to deny that it is necessarily dispositional (Armstrong et al.
1996: 16–17). More generally fundamental categorical properties have no neces-
sary connections with other entities. (Bird 2007, 66–67)
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Further,
Indeed, there is very little on [the categoricalist view] to the nature of a given
property and certainly nothing that would distinguish it from some other prop-
erty. The identity and distinctness of properties is a brute fact, not grounded in
qualitative differences. (Bird 2007, 3)
I agree mostly with Bird. In denying that a property Q is dispositional we have not denied that
instantiations of Q must resemble one another in some respect. Recall that, by definition, mul-
tiple instantiations of the same property must resemble in some respect. But in what kind of
respect could they resemble one another? If it’s not modal and not relational (and it isn’t), it must
be brute—that is, primitive. But some primitives are acceptable, especially those which are ul-
timately grounded in our experiences. Accordingly, my suggestion is that categorical properties
are acceptable primitives: either they are given immediately in experience, or they are theoretical
postulates whose analysis is ultimately grounded in our immediate experience in the right sort of
way (namely, such that they don’t constitute bare dispositions).
Thus there is one important respect in which I disagree with Bird. Bird says that there
is nothing that would distinguish one categorical property from another. This is simply false.
Distinct categorical properties have a distinct “bruteness” to them—the feature in virtue of which
instantiations of one property resemble one another but do not resemble the instantiations of a
distinct property. There aren’t any relational properties that seem to distinguish red and green,
but there certainly is something that distinguishes them, and that something is given in immediate
experience. So I disagree with Bird when he says that “Categorical properties are all essentially
alike—differing only in their mutual distinctness” (2007, 72). This difference of opinion has a
great impact on how Bird’s arguments are evaluated.7
Now that we are aware of this difference of opinion, we can discuss Bird’s argument against
categorical properties. Bird argues that categorical properties imply the position known as quid-
ditism. Quidditism is an analogue of haecceitism, which Bird understands as follows: the core of
7 Bird says that his view is more or less the view of both David Armstrong (see above) and David Lewis (1986b, 205).
However, insofar as Bird and I disagree, I’m not sure whether Armstrong and Lewis are in agreement with me or with
Bird.
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haecceitism is that the transworld identity of particulars does not supervene on their qualitative
features in the given worlds, where qualitative features are understood to be those which exclude
properties or relations involving identity (Bird 2007, 71). Accordingly, quidditism is the view
that the transworld identity of properties does not supervene on the second-order properties they
have nor on the qualitative relations they stand in to other properties. The relations here include,
among other things, causal and nomological relations. So if quidditism is true, properties are not
defined by the causal and nomological networks into which they enter.8
So far as I can tell, my view of categorical properties satisfies the definition of quidditism
just provided. On my view, the identity of a given property is a sort of brute fact, but one with
which we can become acquainted through observing the resemblance relations holding between
its instantiations. Since it is brute, the identity of a property doesn’t supervene on its second-
order properties plus its qualitative relations to other properties (including causal and nomo-
logical relations). However, we need to be very careful. Bird claims to provide an argument
against quidditism, but his is an argument against two (perhaps closely related) statements, not
against quidditism as we have just defined it. Thus, in order to see why Bird’s argument against
quidditism—and, thus, against the view that some natural properties are categorical—fails, we
shall need to carefully distinguish quidditism as it is defined above from quidditism as it is de-
fined by Bird.
Bird provides two definitions of quidditism and argues against both. However, we don’t
need to look at these arguments carefully to see that my version of quidditism is immune to them.
(QA1) For all fundamental universals F and powers X there is a world where F lacks X. (2007,
71)
(QB1) Two distinct worlds, w3 and w4, may be alike in all respects except that: (i) at w3, universal
F has powers {C1,C2, . . .}; (ii) at w4, universal G has powers {C1,C2, . . .}; (iii) F , G. (2007,
8 We could probably do without the qualifier ‘transworld’. If, instead, we defined haecceitism as nothing more than
the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles (so that no reference to non-actual worlds is required), I believe that the
arguments would apply in more or less the same manner.
163
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Against (QA1), following Black (2000), Bird applies an analogue of Chisholm’s (1967) well-known
argument against haecceitism. The basic idea is that the (QA1) leads to an absurd view of prop-
erties, according to which two worlds can be distinct simply on the grounds that they possess
distinct properties, though in those worlds the distinct properties “look” exactly the same, play
exactly the same causal/nomological roles, and so on. Against (QB1), Bird argues that it would
require us to accept that theories can be multiply realized, and thus that a given theoretical term
taken to describe a fundamental property in nature may not refer to a single property, but rather to
a group of properties that play the same functional role. In this case, a statement like ‘the unique
particle with negative unit charge’ just won’t refer; Bird thinks that that leads to an undesirable
skepticism than dispositional monism avoids. Thus he claims, “We do not want our metaphysics
of properties to condemn us to necessary ignorance of them. And so we should reject quidditism”
(Bird (2007, 78).
My version is immune to both of Bird’s arguments because it entails neither (QA1) nor
(QB1). First, note that both (QA1) and (QB1) are false if there can be Governing Non-Humean
laws of nature. Suppose that there is a synthetic necessary connection (a governing law, a member
of Ω) that holds between fundamental categorical properties F and G in all worlds, such that it
is necessary that all Fs are Gs (but that it is not necessary that all Gs are Fs). Then there cannot
be a world in which some Fs are not Gs, despite the fact that F and G are categorical properties.
It follows that, necessarily, objects with F are disposed to be G in all possible conditions. By D,
F is therefore a disposition. But F is not a bare disposition, since by hypothesis F is a categorical
property.10 Thus, contrary to (QA1), F is a categorical property even though there is no world in
which F lacks the relevant power (to become G in all conditions). Thus (QA1) is false. Contrary to
(QB1), G lacks a power corresponding to the power that F has—namely, the power to bring about
9 The following commentary may be helpful. (QB1) is basically saying the following: exactly the same propositions
are true in these worlds, except that any true proposition in one world referring to universal F will be replaced in the
other world by a proposition referring to universal G, and vice versa.
10 I thank Michael Tooley for suggesting that I use this sort of example.
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the other property in all conditions; by hypothesis, the possession of G does not necessitate the
possession of F. Thus (QB1) is false.
But for the same reason that (QA1) and (QB1) are false, my version of quidditism—according
to which the identity of a categorical property is a brute fact—doesn’t entail either (QA1) or (QB1).
In the example just given, F is a categorical property. Thus Fs identity conditions are brute. Thus
F should be compossible with any given power. But our example has shown that it isn’t. If gov-
erning laws are possible, categorical properties are not compossible with any given power. Hence
the acceptance of categorical properties—properties whose identity is a brute fact—doesn’t re-
quire the acceptance of (QA1). Similarly, if governing laws are possible, there is no guarantee that
the powers of distinct categorical properties are interchangeable—that will depend on the con-
tent of the relevant governing laws, and the example above showed that some laws are such that
the powers of a categorical property are not interchangeable. Thus the acceptance of categorical
properties doesn’t require the acceptance of (QB1).
The upshot? Bird’s arguments against quidditism—and thus against categorical properties—
fail, because he doesn’t account for the possibility of Governing Non-Humean laws of nature.
Once we accept the possibility of such laws, however, we see that the acceptance of categorical
properties (and quidditism) entails neither (QA1) nor (QB1). Thus the fact that these principles
are false isn’t an objection to categorical properties.
Summing up, I’ve argued that empirical foundationalists have good reason to reject dis-
positional monism. There is, however, a fair amount of unexplored territory surrounding these
arguments. The fairly quick discussion given here does not do full justice to the debate over the
nature of natural properties. That being said, I believe that my arguments do place a heavy burden
on the dispositional monist; they show that much work is required to make dispositional monism
a tenable view (at least from the standpoint of empirical foundationalism). Thus, for the remain-
der of this chapter I shall assume that dispositional monism is false and that observed regularities
constitute regularities among categorical properties.
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6.5 The Explanatory Weakness of Descriptive Non-Humeanism
I shall now return to the central question of this essay: can Descriptive Non-Humeanism
offer a good explanation of observed regularities? I shall argue that it cannot; it merely relocates
the need for explanation by postulating regularities elsewhere.
In the explanation of regularity provided in Section 6.3, the basic idea was that it is neces-
sary that all objects that possess D and are in conditions C attain M. This entails the regularity
that all D are M in C. This is a perfectly acceptable explanation of the regularity in question. So
what’s the problem?
The problem is that D is a bare disposition. We don’t observe instances of D; D is an un-
observable theoretical property. Though we have a regularity (namely, that D are M in C), we
don’t have an observed regularity. We don’t ever observe regularities that can be explained by the
Descriptive Non-Humean appeal to bare dispositions, since one of the properties involved in such
regularities must always be an unobservable bare disposition. What we need is an explanation
of regularities that hold between categorical properties—the properties given in experience—but
that sort of explanation has not been provided by this account. In sum, the explanation of regu-
larities provided in 6.3 cannot be extended to explain observed regularities.
An example: Suppose that water-solubility is a bare disposition such that, necessarily, any-
thing with it dissolves when placed in water. We know what it’s like to observe that something
is placed in water. We know what it’s like to observe something dissolve. But what is it like to
observe the water-solubility of an object? It’s not like anything, so far as I can tell; the posses-
sion of that property is unobservable. Thus the regularity that everything water-soluble dissolves
when placed in water is unobservable. What we want in this case is an observable regularity: for
example, that all salt dissolves when placed in water. An explanation for that sort of regularity
has not been provided.
I shall now consider a few ways in which the Descriptive Non-Humean might attempt to
extend their theory to cover observed regularities. I’m not sure that these options exhaust the
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possibilities, but they are the best options I can think of. Suppose that the Descriptive Non-
Humean makes the following move: we can explain observed regularities by postulating that there
is a categorical property Q that is always co-instantiated by D. (To help keep variables straight,
the reader can associateQ with Qualitative properties.) This is the natural move to make. We have
to get the relevant categorical properties into the picture somehow! Here, the regularity that all D
are M in C will also be the regularity that all Q are M in C. The latter regularity is an observable
regularity. However, there is an obvious problem with this proposal. It gives rise to two options,
neither of which is satisfactory: either it is contingent that Q and D are co-instantiated—that is,
contingent in the sense that there is no necessary connection binding D to Q—or it is necessary.
If it is contingent that all Q are D then we have just pushed the regularity in need of ex-
planation up one level. The regularity that all Q are D is just as much in need of explanation as
the regularity that all Q are M in C. Here, the regularity that all Q are D is doing the crucial
work—without that regularity the regularity that all Q are M in C goes unexplained—but the
regularity that all Q are D has not been explained. Accepting that all Q are D is contingent—the
result of chance, as opposed to the result of some necessary connection between Q and D—is just
as damning as accepting that the regularity that all Q are M in C is contingent.
On the other hand, if it is necessary that D and Q are always co-instantiated then one must
give an account of the necessity. There seem to be three options, three different accounts of the
necessity.
First, one can treat this necessary truth as primitive. That won’t work, because the holding
of a primitive necessary relation between Q and D constitutes a state of affairs distinct from the
regularity that all Q are D; unlike the state of affairs consisting of a particular’s possession of D
and Q, the state of affairs consisting of an unanalyzable necessary relation between Q and D isn’t
a part of the regularity that all Q are D. This, of course, is equivalent to accepting the existence of
a governing law relating Q and D, and is thus inconsistent with Descriptive Non-Humeanism.
Second, one can attempt to analyze the necessary truth that all Q are D by postulating a
further bare disposition D* relating Q to D in the following way: necessarily, anything with D*
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has both Q and D. However, in this case we would need to explain the regularity that all Q are
D*—it’s not enough to show that all D* are Q—and the same problem would arise, leading to a
vicious explanatory regress. To clarify, the original regularity in need of explanation is that all Q
are M in C. We then postulated a disposition, D, such that the possession of D guarantees the
possession ofM in C. The proposal under consideration asks us to postulate a further disposition,
D*, such that the possession of D* guarantees the possession of both D and Q. This gets things
backwards. Though it explains the regularity that all D* are D and Q, it does not explain the
required regularity—namely, that all Q are D.11
Third, one can attempt to analyse the necessary truth that all Q are D by claiming that D
is part of the very concept of Q (suppose for the moment that D and Q are predicates rather than
properties in the world). The problem with this strategy is that it makes Q unobservable. On this
proposal, that which we observe is merely a property Q* that is categorically equivalent to (that
is, looks the same to us as) Q, but does not necessarily involve D. So we can have two objects
resemble in respect Q* (the purely categorical respect) without resembling in respect Q (that
is, without resembling in multiple respects Q and D). Thus, since we cannot observe whether
an object is Q, this account cannot explain the observed regularities in question; none of those
regularities involve Q. (This may sound confusing, but the problem here will become clearer in
the context of the example presented below.) Another way to state the problem is to point out
that, on this proposal, Q cannot be a categorical property.
In sum, for the account to explain the regularity that everything with Q has M in C we
require the extra step that everything with Q has D. The Descriptive Non-Humean cannot treat
the connection between Q and D as contingent; the regularity that all Q are D is just as much
in need of explanation as the regularity it is supposed to explain. The Descriptive Non-Humean
cannot treat the connection between Q and D as a primitive necessary connection; that would
be to endorse governing laws. The Descriptive Non-Humean cannot postulate additional bare
dispositions to explain the necessary connection between Q and D; that would lead to a vicious
11 That is, the regularity ∀x(D*x ⊃ (Qx&Dx)) does not entail ∀x(Qx ⊃Dx).
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explanatory regress, since at each higher level there is a new regularity in need of explanation. The
Descriptive Non-Humean cannot bind Q and D together by definition; that makes the possession
of Q unobservable, and so fails to explain any observed regularity.
An example: Consider the regularity that all salt dissolves in water. According to Descrip-
tive Non-Humeanism, we explain this regularity as follows. There is a property of water-solubility
such that, necessarily, everything which possesses water-solubility dissolves when placed in wa-
ter. All salt possesses water-solubility. That is why we observe the regularity that all salt dissolves
when placed in water.
In this explanation, there are four crucial properties. There are three categorical properties
identifiable by observation: salt, dissolving, and placed in water. In addition, there is an unob-
servable dispositional property postulated to explain the regularity that all salt dissolves when
placed in water: water-solubility. (I am treating water-solubility as a bare disposition here, though
of course no one thinks that water-solubility is really a bare disposition.) Water-solubility is not
directly observable; unlike the other three properties in question, there is nothing that it is like to
see it, taste it, touch it, etc. The account in question explains perfectly well why everything with
water-solubility dissolves when placed in water, but that’s not the observed regularity we set out
to explain in the first place. It does not explain why all salt dissolves when placed in water unless
we stipulate that the instantiation of salt always brings with it the instantiation of water-solubility.
However, the regularity that all salt has water-solubility is just as much in need of explanation as
the regularity that all salt dissolves when placed in water.
We cannot explain the regularity by positing a primitive necessary connection between salt
and water-solubility, because that would be to endorse a governing law and thereby deny Descrip-
tive Non-Humeanism.
We cannot explain the regularity by postulating a new dispositional property D* that all
salt has in virtue of which all salt has water-solubility, since then we will need to explain the
regularity that all salt has D*, and so on ad infinitum. And of course it won’t do to say that there
is a property, D*, such that everything with it is both salt and water-soluble, since, once again,
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that won’t explain the regularity that all salt has water-solubility.
We cannot explain the regularity by stipulating that the concept of salt includes the concept
of water-solubility—that is, by binding the two together by definition such that nothing that fails
to possess water-solubility is salt. This strategy fails to account for the nature of our observable
experiences; it entails that salt is not a categorical property. We can easily introduce a new concept:
schmalt, a property which is categorically equivalent to salt but lacking the definitional connection
to water-solubility. With this concept on the table, it is easy to see that we cannot actually observe
that a given substance is salt; instead, that quality which we observe of a given substance is merely
its schmaltiness. We may have thought that we were observing the regularity that all salt dissolves
in water, but all along we were just observing the regularity that all schmalt dissolves in water.
To sum up, although Descriptive Non-Humeanism provides a perfectly good explanation of
certain natural regularities (such as the regularity that everything with water-solubility dissolves
when placed in water), it cannot provide an explanation of observed natural regularities, since it
does not permit an explanation of natural regularities between categorical properties, the prop-
erties we observe when we observe regularities. There are two natural responses to this problem.
First, Descriptive Non-Humeans can reject Dualism in favor of Dispositional Monism and attempt
to give an account of how Dispositional Monism accounts for the origin of categorical concepts
and for our experience of basic properties as categorical. Second, the dualist can reject Descrip-
tive Non-Humeanism in favor of Governing Non-Humeanism. As I mentioned earlier, I think that
there are reasons to prefer the second option to the first, though I haven’t provided the arguments
for this view in this chapter.
6.6 Conclusion: The Explanatory Power of Governing Non-Humeanism
Governing Non-Humeanism isn’t susceptible to the difficulty that plagues Descriptive Non-
Humeanism. Though one might reasonably worry that the postulate of governing laws is analo-
gous to the postulate of bare dispositions—in both cases, we are postulating an unobservable state
to explain an observable one—there is an important difference between the two.
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Governing laws are postulated to be unobservable relations which hold between tuples of
properties, but nothing prevents these tuples from consisting of categorical properties only. Ac-
cording to Governing Laws, it is necessary (or probable) that, for any properties F and G, if a
nomic relation holds between them then a given regularity obtains between instances of F and G.
However, unlike the postulate of bare dispositions, all of the relata of such nomic relations may
be categorical properties. Thus suitably postulated governing laws entail observable regularities.
It is impossible for the Descriptive Non-Humean to give this sort of explanation, since at least
one of the relata must be a bare disposition, the possession of which by any object constitutes an
unobservable state.12 In short, the world is structured differently if there are governing laws
as opposed to descriptive laws; I have argued here that these structural differences make a big
difference in a theory’s ability to explain observed regularities.
Suppose we accept governing laws in order to explain the regularity that all Q are D. If we
go this route, it seems that we no longer have any need to treat D as a bare disposition; we can
reduce D by positing a governing law that holds between Q, M, and C (in which case all Q will
possess D, but D will not be a bare disposition; it will be analysed in terms of the laws). Thus it
appears that it is (ordinary) bare dispositions, not governing laws, which are dispensable.
To close, I would like to remind the reader that to some extent Governing Non-Humeanism
is a compromise position between the popular theories which accept Descriptive Laws and Gov-
erning Laws. I agree with Bird, Mumford, and other Descriptive Non-Humeans that some ne-
cessity must be taken as basic—namely, the necessary connection between law and regularity.
Interestingly, this appears to commit me to the view that fundamental nomic relations are essen-
tially dispositional (since such relations can be shown to satisfy Disposition or something very
much like it with relatively little effort). As should be familiar, I have no problem with bare dis-
positions. The arguments of this chapter are not arguments against bare dispositions. They are
simply arguments that bare dispositions cannot do the work of governing laws unless the states of
affairs involving bare dispositions constitute governing laws themselves. Thus, as I have argued in
12 I defend the explanatory power of Governing Non-Humeanism with much greater care elsewhere.
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this chapter, I agree with Dretske, Tooley, and Armstrong that governing laws are indispensable.
Thus concludes my argument for Governing Non-Humeanism.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Final Remarks on Laws of Nature
In Chapter 1, I explained my preferred way of dividing up the logical space concerning
theories of laws of nature. In Chapter 2 I set out and defended an empirical method of practicing
genuine metaphysics. Chapters 3 through 6 apply this method to the metaphysics of laws of
nature. In those chapters, I defended the following theses:
(1) Empirical foundationalists can give an intelligible account of the concept of synthetic ne-
cessity, and therefore can give an intelligible account of the distinction between Humeanism
and Non-Humeanism. (Chapter 3)
(2) Governing Non-Humeanism is a priori at least as likely as Descriptive Humeanism. (Chap-
ter 3)
(3) Governing Humeanism appears to be internally inconsistent; if it is not, its a priori prob-
ability is lower than that of Governing Non-Humeanism, and it does not provide a better
explanation of natural regularity than Governing Non-Humeanism. (Chapter 4)
(4) Governing Non-Humeanism offers a much better explanation of the fact that our world is
highly regular than does Descriptive Humeanism. (Chapter 5)
(5) Governing Non-Humeanism is a priori just as likely as Descriptive Non-Humeanism.
(Chapter 6)
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(6) Governing Non-Humeanism offers a much better explanation of the fact that the observ-
able world is highly regular than does the most plausible version of Descriptive Non-
Humeanism. (Chapter 6)
(1) through (6) entail that the probability of Governing Non-Humeanism in light of observed
regularities is greater than that of any of its competitors. The end result is that we have excel-
lent reason to accept the existence of governing laws of nature, where the connection between
governing law and regularity is understood to be a synthetic necessary connection. Ultimately, I
believe that this reason is decisive. There are no decisive a priori arguments against Governing
Non-Humeanism, so the only way for a competing theory to be redeemed would be to provide a
posteriori arguments against it. This does not seem at all promising. It is very hard to see how
any sort of empirical evidence other than observed regularities could be relevant to theories as
broad as those under consideration here. Until our world ceases to be regular, we should accept
Governing Non-Humeanism.
This conclusion is extremely broad. I have argued that there are governing laws, but I have
not attempted to show that some more carefully specified theory of governing laws is correct. For
instance, I haven’t argued that laws are atomic relations between universals; I haven’t argued that
laws are the possession of grand bare dispositions by the world as a whole; I haven’t argued that
laws are preferences in the mind of God. Relatedly, in contrast to the approach taken by many
metaphysicians, I have not arrived at the conclusion that there are governing laws or synthetic
necessities by generalization from some particular governing law or synthetic necessity (e.g., as in
the case of the generalization from the fact that necessarily, water is H2O to the fact that there is
some synthetic necessity). Given my methodology, this should come as no surprise. The method
deals in theories that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. One reason for the generality
of the conclusion is the manner in which the theories are defined (but more on this in a moment).
Another reason is the generality of the data I selected: the mere fact that the world has a high
degree of regularity. For example, we wouldn’t expect the generalization that the world is regular
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to establish that there is a contingent, external relation between universals F and G that entails
(or probabilifies) facts about the distribution of particular states of affairs instantiating F and G.
For that, we would want at least an observation that all (or most) Fs are Gs. I mention this because
I don’t want to leave philosophers with the impression that the method cannot answer narrower
questions in ontology. It hasn’t answered narrower questions here because (a) I haven’t explored
how narrower theories deal with the general observation of natural regularities, and (b) I chose to
work with a very broad class of observations. In principle, however, there is no reason to think
that the method cannot be applied to the comparison of narrower theories.
I mentioned in the abstract that my argument is a new argument for metaphysically inter-
esting a posteriori necessities. A word on the qualifier metaphysically interesting is required. I am
of the opinion that the classic a posteriori necessities such as that water is necessarily H2O or that
salt is necessarily water soluble are metaphysically uninteresting. I don’t have the time to defend
this claim here (and it isn’t required for the claim that my argument establishes the existence of
metaphysically interesting a posteriori necessities), though my discussion of the example of salt
and water-solubility at the end of Chapter 6 hints at my reasons. The central idea is that such a
posteriori necessities have no implications for our possible experiences of the world. How could
they? They involve the mere necessity of identity. (I’m presented with a schmalty substance; I’m
not allowed to infer that it is water soluble unless I also possess knowledge that all schmalt is
salt, but that isn’t the a posteriori necessity in question.) It is this sense in which I think such
necessities are uninteresting (they may well be philosophically interesting for other reasons). In
contrast, I have argued that we have empirical reasons to accept the existence of governing laws
of nature. These laws do have important implications for our possible experiences of the world.
Thus, this is not merely a new argument for the same old a posteriori necessities of identity; it is
an argument for a more powerful species of a posteriori necessity.
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7.2 Final Remarks on Method
To conclude, I want to make some general remarks on the method and discuss its implica-
tions for issues in contemporary metaontology.
7.2.1 Relation to Quine’s Empirical Method
I shall now discuss the relationship between my method and a more common method of
practicing metaphysics that is often assumed to be empirically respectable.
The method in question is due to Quine—its essential features may be gleaned from Quine’s
(1948) and (1951)—and may be described as follows:
Contemporary Quinean Metaphysics (CQM): Metaphysical theorizing, like scientific theorizing, con-
sists of selecting the best set of theoretical beliefs that undergird, support, and fit nicely
within our web of pretheoretical1 background beliefs—that is, our logical beliefs, ordi-
nary beliefs, beliefs concerning immediate experiences, and so on. Potential criteria for
selection of the best set include (but may not be limited to) considerations of simplicity,
unity, and explanatory strength.2
As stated, Quine’s method is not fully specified. In order to apply the method, we need to have
some idea of what constitutes the best theory or, more broadly, the best web of beliefs. We need
rules that give us some guidance as to how the criteria for theory choice are to be applied. An
ideally specified method would include (a) a set of weighted background beliefs and (b) a set of
weighted criteria for theory choice (where the weights tell us the importance of each type of belief
or criterion).
Unfortunately, it is far from clear how an empiricist is supposed to defend a specified ver-
sion of CQM method that says anything at all about (a) and (b). If CQM were merely intended
to provide pragmatic reasons for theory choice—that is, if it were merely intended to provide a
1 ‘Pretheoretical’ can refer to beliefs prior to metaphysical theorizing only if we like, so the method allows for the
inclusion of non-metaphysical theoretical beliefs such as scientific beliefs in the set of background beliefs.
2 See (Sider 2009, 385) for a related statement of CQM.
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useful, simple way of systematizing the ontological commitments of our closely-held background
beliefs—then it would not be terribly difficult to justify a specified method. For instance, it is easy
to show that simplicity is a pragmatic virtue of a theory. Indeed, it appears that Quine interprets
his own method as merely providing pragmatic reasons for theory choice.3 But we want more
than that. We want to know what the world is really like. The goal of metaphysics, as I understand
it, is to investigate reality, not merely our use of language or our way of forming concepts. Since
we want to know which theory is true, a method of practicing metaphysics must provide epistemic
reasons for theory choice.
Unfortunately, providing epistemic justification for a carefully specified version of CQM
(that is, for a given assignment of weights to background beliefs and criteria for theory choice) is
very difficult. For example, Sider (2009, 385) mentions some questions that shed doubt on CQM:
What justifies the alleged theoretical insights? Are criteria that are commonly
used in scientific theory choice (for example, simplicity and theoretical integra-
tion) applicable in metaphysics? How can these criteria be articulated clearly?
And what hope is there that the criteria will yield a determinate verdict, given the
paucity of empirical input?
Questions like these raise serious problems for CQM. Proponents of CQM who claim to provide
epistemic reasons for theory choice must be able to answer them.
My point here is not to argue that the nowadays-popular criteria for theory choice cannot
be supported (though I do have serious doubts that empiricists can assign any very basic epis-
temic status to criteria of simplicity, unity, and the like). I certainly do not wish to argue that
the general epistemic barriers to CQM are insuperable. I have merely noted that there are epis-
temic challenges to CQM, and that contemporary metaphysicians ought to be concerned with
these challenges. Rather, I highlight these challenges because the method defended in this project
constitutes a (partial) response to them. I have justified an empirical method of practicing meta-
3 Quine recommends the view that we have merely pragmatic reasons for theory choice in (1951). See also (Price
2009) and (Soames 2009) for arguments that Quine is to be interpreted in this manner. In contrast, (Sider 2009) and
(van Inwagen 2009) both interpret Quine’s method as providing epistemic reasons for theory choice. This is not to say
that they interpret Quine as providing such reasons, only that they take the method to provide such reasons. Manley
(2009, 3–4) refers to these realist interpretations as mainstream metaphysics—an indicator of the popularity of this
position.
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physics that fits the general model of CQM (though in a rather different way than Quine would
have wanted). The defense of my method is a defense of CQM in the sense that my method as-
signs weights to background beliefs and to criteria for theory choice. Since the general statement
of CQM doesn’t tell us how to choose the best web of beliefs, it is consistent with foundationalism
and semantic atomism, even though the web metaphor is usually associated with coherentism
and semantic holism. The method I have advocated is one way of explaining how the best web of
beliefs is to be chosen, and in this sense it is clearly a version of CQM. (It is not surprising that my
method can be described in a such a way that it satisfies CQM; CQM is so general that it provides
almost no guidance at all.)
However, when we examine my method’s way of assigning weight to background beliefs and
criteria for theory choice it becomes apparent that my method is quite revisionary. It certainly
differs from Quine’s approach to metaphysics, even if we pretend for the moment that Quine
intended his method to give epistemic reasons for selecting the best web of beliefs. My method
holds that certain points of the web are firmly grounded, not subject to revision no matter the
theoretical benefits. Analytic propositions and those propositions justified through immediate
experience are never to be compromised; these foundational nodes are not open to revision. In
addition, my method assigns no weight to certain sorts of background beliefs: beliefs justified
by rational intuition, ordinary beliefs, commonsense beliefs, scientific beliefs, and the like. My
method assigns no basic weight to certain criteria for theory choice: unity, integration with other
domains, simplicity, and the like.4 On my method, the metaphysician approaches her trade by
discovering analytic linking principles and comparing the antecedents of those principles with
her immediate experiences. The analytic principles are taken to be unrevisable parts of her web
of beliefs, as are her immediate experiences. The result is that there is no need (and perhaps no
room) for basic principles concerning unity, simplicity, and the like.5
4 Some of these criteria do receive an indirect weight as a result of other components of the method. For instance,
a very limited version of Occam’s razor may be derived from the version of the logical interpretation of probability I
favor.
5 Given these differences, my guess is that (Manley 2009, 4) would characterize me as a reformer rather than as a
mainstream metaphysician.
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7.2.2 Contemporary Debates in Metaontology
Finally, I want to discuss how this method bears on other contemporary debates in metaon-
tology.
I have focused on answering epistemic challenges to the practice of empirical metaphysics.
However, semantic objections to the general practice of metaphysics have become quite popular.
The latter object to realist interpretations of CQM on the grounds that metaphysical disputes are
either meaningless or trivial.6 Note, however, that if one follows the method defended here,
such objections lose force for the metaphysical issues receptive to this method. If a metaphysi-
cal dispute can be framed in accordance with this method, that dispute is both meaningful and
non-trivial, since the method sets out clear conditions for defining the theories such that they are
required to differ in either their a priori probabilities or their observational consequences. For ex-
ample, I have argued that the method can be applied to the metaphysics of laws of nature in such a
way that different theories of laws have very different implications for our immediate experiences
(namely, that governing laws make it likely that our experiences will be full of regularities, and
that non-governing accounts of laws do not). How could theories differing in this way fail to differ
in their meaning? The application of my method to the metaphysics of laws of nature shows that
there are clear cases for which the semantic objections fail.
There is also a more general implication of this method. It is the breadth of the theories
employed by my method that makes genuine metaphysics possible (recall that without Step 4, the
constraint on defining theories, the method does not allow for genuine confirmation of theories,
and the scope of the method is thus extremely limited). For this reason, the role of defining
theories is given a central position within the process of theorizing. Any old statement of a theory
won’t do, because not just any old theory (or set of theories) may be “plugged in” to this method.
The theories being compared must be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and in almost all
cases they must differ with respect to their observable consequences. Thus, the applicability of
6 Hirsch (2009) argues that some metaphysical disputes are meaningless. Thomasson (2009) argues that some
questions in ontology are either unanswerable or trivial.
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this method will depend on our ability to define theories in accordance with these constraints.
Some issues in metaphysics seem to be ripe for such treatment, such as problems in the
metaphysics of laws of nature explained in this project. In addition, a number of classical argu-
ments in the area of philosophical theology might be run in accordance with this method, such as
teleological arguments and evidential versions of the problem of evil (provided that proper sense
can be made of the ethical components of such arguments). On the other hand, other issues appear
intractable. The method does leave the door open for a type of epistemic deflationism concerning
certain metaphysical issues. It may be the case that, for some metaphysical issues, there is no way
of parsing the theories such that (a) there are observations relevant to the dispute, (b) theories
differ in their observational consequences, and (c) the theories are such that it is possible for us to
determine something about their a priori probabilities. The standard theories in the debates over
composition and colocation do not seem amenable to this treatment (at least not to me), since the
relevant theories do not appear to differ in their observable consequences. Further, the theoreti-
cal criteria of my method seem insufficient to select one theory over another. Thus, the method
appears to support Bennett’s (2009) argument that we simply aren’t in the epistemic position to
choose between the standard theories concerning composition and colocation. The debates may
be meaningful, but it is difficult to see how my method (or anything like it) could be applied to
resolve them. (Note that my method does not suggest that the debates are in fact meaningful, so
it is also consistent with a semantic deflationism concerning certain disputes.)
As in the other sections, everything noted in this final section is contingent upon the suc-
cess of my method. It needs to be shown that empirical foundationalism is consistent with the
assumption that we have justification for accepting some system of logic; similarly, it needs to be
shown that some method of assigning objective epistemic probabilities is correct; and empirical
foundationalism must be established as the correct epistemic theory. However, none of these tasks
are strictly required for the demonstration that metaphysics can be informed by our immediate
experiences of the world. Even if these assumptions are false, and even if we do possess synthetic
a priori reasoning, metaphysics need not be an exercise in synthetic a priori reasoning only, nor
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an exercise in interpreting the commitments of our best scientific theories only. Metaphysics can
be informed by our immediate experiences.
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